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The “Doctrine of Principles” in Neo-Constitutional Theories and the Principle of Reasonableness in Action

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General Principles of Law - The Role of the Judiciary

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 46))

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Abstract

The application of legal principles in legal argument is a fundamental claim of the neo-constitutionalist legal theory. Principles are at the top of the legal hierarchy and provide for the material unity of the judicial system, which is a pluralistic one and intertwined with various needs. Consequently, principles are to be regarded as prior and antecedent to rules, from a pre-political, fundamental point of view aiming at the judicialization of power. Considering the expansive nature of principles, in particular constitutional principles and principles proclaimed by supranational Charters of rights, it is no longer sufficient to respect the law’s prescriptions about who and how: gradually, and mostly thanks to the control of constitutional legitimacy, an unavoidable question is arising about the what of law, the an of legal rulings as well as its compatibility with the standards of justice. Dworkin, in particular, affirms that principles are first of all “a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality”; they rightly step into the world of law thanks to the adequacy and to the justification power they show. The first part of the present chapter will analyze the definitive recognition of the normative character of principles; in particular the difference of their structure and functioning from rules, and finally the different and similar aspects between principles and values. The second part of the chapter will observe more closely the functioning of principle of reasonableness, through the analysis of some passages of important judgments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Dworkin (1978, 1985, 1986, 1996); Habermas (1992, ed. Ceppa 2001); Alexy (1992a, 1994); Nino (1994).

  2. 2.

    For an overall view on the concept of “principle”, see Dworkin ( 1978 ); Pattaro (1987), pp. 25–35; Betti (1971); Del Vecchio (1958), p. 205 ff.; Alpa (2006); Cheng (1953); Guastini (2004), pp. 199–205. See also I principi generali del diritto, Atti del convegno, Accademia dei Lincei, Roma, 1992 and conference proceedings of VIII World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Mexico City, 2010, available at: http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/wccl/en/i.htm.

  3. 3.

    See Barberis (2011), pp. 33–41; Mazzarese (2002); Pozzolo (2001); Omaggio (2003), pp. 93–131; La Torre (2010); Bongiovanni (1999).

  4. 4.

    The wording is of Mario Dogliani, quoted in Omaggio (2003), p. 108, footnote 44 (my translation).

  5. 5.

    Pizzorusso (2011), p. 658; Guastini (2010), p. 328; Alpa (2006), p. 263.

  6. 6.

    Hart (1961) (eds. Bullock and Raz 1994).

  7. 7.

    Dworkin (1978), p. 22.

  8. 8.

    Dworkin (2011).

  9. 9.

    Habermas (1992) (ed. Ceppa 2001), p. 17; Habermas (1996), Italian partial version (my translation).

  10. 10.

    Alexy (1994, 2000).

  11. 11.

    For the technique of balancing see Alexy (1992b), pp. 153–192; Alexy (2007), pp. 45–56; Dworkin (1978); Celano ( 2002), pp. 223–239; Pino ( 2009), pp. 131–158; Pino (2007); Bin (1992); Modugno (1995), pp. 643–648; Contra Waldron (1993); Ferrajoli ( 2013); Alexander and Kress (1995).

  12. 12.

    See Atienza and Ruiz Manero (1996, 1998).

  13. 13.

    MacCormick (1978), p. 245.

  14. 14.

    Rawls (1971), p. 18.

  15. 15.

    MacCormick (1978), p. 234.

  16. 16.

    Habermas (1996), p. 258.

  17. 17.

    Habermas (2001), p. 36 (my translation).

  18. 18.

    Habermas (1996), p. 255.

  19. 19.

    See also Amirante (1981), p. 9 ff. and  Baldassarre (1991), p. 639 ff.

  20. 20.

    Zagrebelsky (2002), p. 872.

  21. 21.

    Dworkin (1978), p. 91.

  22. 22.

    Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v. Martin&Co. (Contractors) Ltd., 3 All ER 557 (1972). See also Shiner (2005), pp. 47–48.

  23. 23.

    See Gordley et al. (2006), pp. 313–314.

  24. 24.

    Dworkin (1978), p. 108.

  25. 25.

    MacCormick (1978), p. 263 (emphasis in the original).

  26. 26.

    Ibid., p. 264.

  27. 27.

    Dworkin (1985).

  28. 28.

    See also Nino (1991a, b).

  29. 29.

    Hart (1979), p. 22.

  30. 30.

    See Palombella (2006), p. 147 ff.

  31. 31.

    Sen (1985), p. 12.

  32. 32.

    Palombella (2002), p. 155 (my translation).

  33. 33.

    See “I principi di proporzionalità e ragionevolezza nella giurisprudenza costituzionale, anche in rapporto alla giurisprudenza delle Corti europee”, in “Quaderno predisposto in occasione dell’incontro trilaterale tra Corte Costituzionale italiana, Tribunale Costituzionale spagnolo e Corte Costituzionale portoghese”, pp. 32–34, available at:

    http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/RI_QuadernoStudi_Roma2013.pdf. See also Atienza (1990), pp. 148–161. On “reasonableness” in general as interpretation and application technique see Perelman (1979); Aarnio (1987); Corten (1999), pp. 613–625.

  34. 34.

    Viola (2000), pp. 35–71 (my translation).

  35. 35.

    Luther (2007)  “Ragionevolezza e dignità umana”, In La ragionevolezza nella ricerca scientifica ed il suo ruolo specifico nel sapere giuridico, ed. Augusto Cerri, 185-214. Roma: Aracne p. 3,

    (my translation).

  36. 36.

    Alexy (1994), p. 297 (my translation).

  37. 37.

    Italian Constitutional Court, judgment no. 220 of 1995, Considerato in diritto, para. 4.

  38. 38.

    MacCormick ( 1978), p. 132.

  39. 39.

    Dworkin (1986), pp. 263–274.

  40. 40.

    Italian Constitutional Court, judgment no. 249 of  2010.

  41. 41.

    Ibid., para. 9.

  42. 42.

    Ibid., para. 4(1).

  43. 43.

    Italian Constitutional Court, judgment no. 104 of 1969 (my translation).

  44. 44.

    Italian Constitutional Court, judgment no. 148 of 2008 (my translation).

  45. 45.

    Dworkin (1978), p. 130.

  46. 46.

    Italian Constitutional Court, judgment no. 249 of 2010, para. 5.

  47. 47.

    Della Cananea (2009), p. 25 (my translation).

  48. 48.

    Case C-61/11 PPU El Dridi [2011] ECR I-3015.

  49. 49.

    See Klatt and Meister (2012).

  50. 50.

    Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, Strasbourg (16 December 2008).

  51. 51.

    Unlike illegal immigrants, who do not have valid documents, citizens in illegal stay might have entered a “guest” Country legally and later have lost the legal requirements, mostly when their residence permits expire and are not renewed.

  52. 52.

    El Dridi cit., para. 54.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., pp. 3048–3049, para. 43 (emphasis added).

  54. 54.

    Ibid., p. 3052, para. 55.

  55. 55.

    Zanichelli (2004), p. 46 (my translation).

  56. 56.

    Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium (App. nos. 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64), ECtHR, judgment of 23 July 1968.

  57. 57.

    On this case, and on the protection of minority languages, see Torretta (2014), pp. 695–734.

  58. 58.

    It is well known, though, that the “prohibition of discrimination”, which is related to the principle of formal equality, does not completely cover the concept of “protection of minorities”. The latter is closer to the principle of substantial equality, which requires “positive discriminations” and “affirmative actions”. See Guiglia (2012), p. 8. See also D’Aloia (2002), p. 434.

  59. 59.

    Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium cit., para. 10 (emphasis added).

  60. 60.

    Lauterpacht observed on this matter: “[W]hen, in international disputes, rules of general jurisprudence are referred to, what is meant is that not a rule of one particular system of private law is to be applied, but only such a rule … as has gained recognition by the general body of civilized nations. This is so for the simple reason that international law has not, in the particular sphere, developed any rules on its own. In fact, there would be no need to have recourse to general jurisprudence, if there were international rule already at hand”. Lauterpacht (1975), p. 206.

  61. 61.

    Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium cit., para. 10.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., para. 5 (emphasis added).

  63. 63.

    Ruggeri (2000), pp. 567–611.

  64. 64.

    On the concept of “public” in law, that is to say on a conception of law viewed as the foundation of the public dimension beyond States, see Palombella (2012), Chap. V.

  65. 65.

    Kingsbury et al. (2005); Cassese (2006), pp. 663–694; D’Alterio (2010). See also the works of the “GAL” Project, available at: http://www.iilj.org/GAL/.

  66. 66.

    Brown (2008).

  67. 67.

    With regard to this point, judge Cançado Trindade offered a particularly pertinent observation about the International Court of Justice. He asserted: “[T]he Hague Court, also known as the World Court, is not simply the International Court of Law, it is the International Court of Justice, and, as such, it cannot overlook principles” (emphasis in the original). See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep. 14. The quote is taken from Fontanelli (2012), pp. 119–136.

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  1. Ph.D. Candidate in Legal Theory, University of Parma, Parma, Italy

    Francesco De Vanna

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    Laura Pineschi

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De Vanna, F. (2015). The “Doctrine of Principles” in Neo-Constitutional Theories and the Principle of Reasonableness in Action. In: Pineschi, L. (eds) General Principles of Law - The Role of the Judiciary. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 46. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19180-5_5

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