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Abstract

Introspection about certain hypothetical decision situations suggests that the sure-thing principle and, with it, the theory of utility are normatively unsatisfactory. Consider an example based on two decision situations each involving two gambles.

Leonard Savage was deceased at the time of publication.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This particular example is due to Allais (1953). Another interesting example was presented somewhat earlier by Georges Morlat (1954).

  2. 2.

    Allais has announced (but not yet published) an empirical investigation of the responses of prudent, educated people to such examples (Allais 1953).

  3. 3.

    See also Archibald (1959) and Hakansson (1970).

References

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Savage, L. (2016). Allais’s Paradox. In: Arló-Costa, H., Hendricks, V., van Benthem, J. (eds) Readings in Formal Epistemology. Springer Graduate Texts in Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_19

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