Abstract
The mutually influential interaction between Carnap and Neurath defined the then emerging left wing of the Vienna Circle in the early 1930s. Here it is investigated whether a comparable interaction can be detected already in the period leading to the publication of Carnap's Aufbau in 1928 when Neurath had been one of the readers of the typescript of an earlier version of the book that circulated amongst members of Schlick’s discussion group. With reference to a brief note of Carnap's which recorded some his comments from this time, this paper investigates whether Neurath had any influence on the final version and what form this influence may have taken.
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Notes
- 1.
Another new colleague whose influence it would be interesting to investigate is, of course, Schlick .
- 2.
“Alte Schriften durchblätternd stosse ich auf die Namen Hasselblatt, Kurella, Ahlhorn und den Ihren—alte Schuld fällt mir ein! Sie haben mir über Anregung unserer lieben Münchner Freunde rfreuliche [sic!] Dinge geschickt. Insbesondere die Abhandlung über die räumlichen Gegenstände las ich mit grossem Interesse. In gar vielem sind ich und meine Frau mit Ihnen darin einverstanden, wenn uns auch die Wendung ins Kantische nicht recht ein will! Aber den Zusammehang von konkreter Wirklichkeit und Mathematisch-Logischem ist in vielem durchaus unserer Anschauung entsprechend—die letzten Endes an Poincaré orientiert ist, an Duhem und den anderen Konventionalisten. Freilich möchte ich gerade die Abgrenzung der allgemeinsten Sätze anders formulieren als es bei Ihnen üblich ist.” Neurath to Carnap , 19 October 1923, RC 029-16-07 ASP, p. 1. (Unless otherwise noted, translations of previously untranslatated materials are by TU, with the originals of so far unpublished material given in footnotes).
- 3.
See Carnap (1922a) and (1923). Given the exploratory nature of Carnap’s mail it is unlikely that he sent what would have had to be, in his day, a carbon copy of the ms for “Dreidimensionalität des Raumes und Kausalität: Eine Untersuchung über den logischen Zusammenhang zweier Fiktionen” published in the following year (1924).
- 4.
“Sie wissen wohl von Roh , wie gross mein Interesse für die Bestrebungen ist, die in Ihren Kreisen gepflegt werden, aber ich komme freilich immer mehr zur Anschauung, das seine grundsätzliche Aenderung unserer Zeit auf breitester Basis vor sich geht und dass das war wir Intellektuellen ausdenken nur ein schwaches Element dem ganzen Getriebe ist, dessen Wesen besser zu erkennen vor allem wichtig ist—auch für die Tat.” RC 029-16-07 ASP, p. 2.
- 5.
- 6.
On Carnap ’s involvement with Politische Rundbriefe see Carus (2007, 59–63). His mail to Neurath may have included “Carnap’s Völkerbund—Statenbund”, a two-part contribution to Politische Rundbriefe from 1918a that discusses how the “Free-Germans” might view the imminent “negotiations … for the organization of the world” and the founding of the League of Nations (1918a). Another possibility (one suggested by Neurath’s phrasing “what we intellectuals think”) is a copy of Carnap’s ms “Deutschlands Niederlage. Sinnloses Schicksal oder Schuld”, which was also intended for Politische Rundbriefe but remained unpublished, for there Carnap explicity addressed the role of the intellectual in the political domain (see 1918b and the discussions in Mormann 2010 and Uebel 2012).
- 7.
- 8.
Neurath ’s letter added: “I would very much like to discuss these matters with you, by writing if it should be impossible otherwise. … For a start I send you a few opuscula which make a somewhat tentative start and require rounding off.” Original: “Ich würde gar gerne mit Ihnen derlei besprechen, wenn es nicht anders geht schriftlich. … Zunächst sende ich Ihnen ein paar opuscula zu, die etwas tastend entstanden der Abrundung noch bedürfen.” RC 029-16-07 ASP, pp. 1–2. What “opuscula” these were is unknown.
- 9.
Christian Damböck (personal communication) suggested that their first personal meeting took place when Carnap attended the Esperanto Congress in Vienna in August 1924.
- 10.
Carnap ’s diary notes that not having found Neurath at home first time around, he subsequently spent six afternoons or evenings at his flat. Neurath’s and his wife’s presence at his first circle presentation is noted explicitly (alongside that of Schlick , Hahn , Menger , Feigl , Neumann —a Viennese mathematician—“an Englishman”, and Kaufmann ); and while no individual participants are mentioned their presence at the second talk can be presumed; see Carnap’s diary for 1925 (RC 025-72-04 ASP).
- 11.
See Schlick to Carnap , 9 August 1924 and notes of Carnap’s Besprechung with Schlick on 16 August 1924 for the latter, and Schlick to Carnap, 22 November and 25 December 1924 for the former (RC 029-32-50, 029-32-51 and 029-32-47, 029-32-44 ASP, respectively).
- 12.
See Carnap ’s diary for 15 and 22 January 1925. About the latter it notes: “Evening lecture: Prolegomena to a constitution theory. Difficult and long (½ 9 until 10; discussion until ½ ??), stimulating discussion.” Original: “Abends Vortrag: Prolegomena zu einer Konstitutionstheorie. Schwierig und lang (½ 9 bis 10; discussion until ½ ??), anregende Discussion.” (RC 025-72-04 ASP).
- 13.
See Carnap to Schlick , 2 and 11 December 1925 and Carnap’s diary for 27 December 1925 and 27 January 1928 (RC 029-32-33, 029-32-32, 25-72-04 and 025-72-02 ASP respectively).
- 14.
About the second meeting Carnap reported to Reichenbach who had, incidentally, helped to set up his Besprechung with Schlick the previous August: “Then another evening was added and I had to report about ‘constitution theory’ which was difficult, of course, since I have not yet worked it all out. These ideas too met with greater interest and, importantly, understanding than one can expect to find in philosophical circles elsewhere. The Viennese tradition of exact philosophy (Mach -Bolzmann-Schlick) seems to be at work here.” Original: “Dann wurde noch ein Abend eingelegt und ich musste noch über die ‘Konstitutionstheorie’ etwas berichten, was natürlich schwierig war, weil ich selbst noch nicht damit fertig bin. Auch diese Gedanken begegneten grösserem Interesse, und vor allem, Verständnis, als man es sonst in philosophischen Zirkeln erwarten kann. Die Wiener Tradition einer exakt fundierten Philosophie (Mach-Boltzmann -Schlick) tut da wohl ihre Wirkung.” 10 March 1925 (RC 102-64-11 ASP).
- 15.
“.. gründliche Ausarbeitung nötig”. Carnap to Schlick , 21 April 1925 (RC 029-32-41 ASP ). See also 31 May, 12 July, 23 September 1925 (RC 029-32-43, 029-32-40, 029-32-38).
- 16.
See Carnap to Schlick , 2 and 11 December 1925 (RC 029-32-33 and 029-32-32 ASP).
- 17.
See Carnap to Schlick , 21 March 1925 and 28 May 1926 (RC 029-32-41 and 029-32-21 ASP).
- 18.
Carnap passed his habilitation examination on (“Colloquium”) on 17 June, gave a 20 min long exemplary lecture (“Probevorlesung”) on 2 July, and started teaching logic on 19 November 1926; see Carnap’s diary (RC 025-72-05 ASP).
- 19.
See, e.g., Schlick to Carnap , 7 and 14 March 1926 (RC 029-32-27 and 029-32-17 ASP). Incidentally, apart from remarks on the introductory sections in May 1926 (RC 102-64-10 ASP), Reichenbach did not comment on the entire ms until February 1927 (RC 102-64-02 ASP).
- 20.
Besides the original sketch “Von Chaos zur Wirklichkeit” of July 1922, there exists a three-page plan “Entwurf einer Konstitutionstheorie der Erkenntnisgegenstände” dating from January 1925 and the notes for two of three lectures given in June and early July 1926 in Vienna, titled “Thesen zur Konstitutionstheorie” (RC 081-05-01, 081-05-02 and 081-05-07 ASP, respectively).
- 21.
According to the list in Benson (1963, 1059) he seems to have been the first. Schlick ’s review followed in 1929 as did Kaufmann ’s, and Dubislav ’s review followed in 1930; Reichenbach ’s somewhat misrepresentative review (not listed there) did not appear until 1933.
- 22.
See Neurath (1910/2005, 267).
- 23.
- 24.
This analysis is further elaborated in Uebel (2007, 37–42).
- 25.
- 26.
Note that this objection is of an epistemological nature and did not mistake Carnap ’s thesis as an ontological.
- 27.
Neurath ’s review is discussed in greater detail in Uebel (2007, 105–112).
- 28.
“Meine Darstellung sei leider mehr gegen Realismus als gegen Idealismus gewendet. Zu starke Betonung des method[ischen]. Solipsismus. Das klinge zu individualistisch. Mehr den ‘Objektivismus’ betonen. Gleich zu Anfang sagen, dass das Ziel eine objektive Welt, die gleiche für alle Individuen sei. Erl[äutern?]
§224 Der Realismus des Physikers bleibt bestehen, nur wird er korrigiert zu einem Objektivismus. Die gesetzmässigen Zusammenhänge sind objektiv, d.h. dem Willen des Einzelnen enthoben; es gibt aber keine Materie, der man ‘Realität’ zuschreiben könnte; das ist ein metaphysic[scher] Begriff.”
So recorded in Carnap ’s shorthand (with his underlining here given as italics). There follow two further short paragraphs the texts of which are reproduced in the next footnote. “Neurath über Konsti[tutions]theorie”, 21 November 1926 (RC 029-19-04 ASP). I thank Jerry Heverly for the transcription. The published Aufbau does not contain a §224, of course.
- 29.
Ҥ143 ff. Shorten the logisti[cal] demonstration of the system: combine the fomulae, maybe in smaller print in an appendix; give commentaries only ever to several formulae at a time. That would allow dropping the long elucidations between the formulae.
Cut Part V? Maybe, but then work its important bits into the front sections.
Good: that space as a totality is const[ructed] in one go; do not combine a whole out of parts! Instead the parts gain their significance only in the whole. (That is anyway the fundamental attitude of the theory of relations: the members gain their character only by their position in the whole.)”
Original: “§143 ff. Die logisti[sche] Darstellung des Systems kürzen: Die Formeln zusammenschreiben, vielleicht in Kleindruck in einem Anhang; immer zu mehreren Formeln auf einmal kurzen Kommentar. Damit fallen die langen Erläuterungen zwischen den Formeln weg.
V. Abschnitt streichen? Vielleicht ja, aber dann das Wichtigere daraus in die vorderen Abschni[tte] verarbeiten.
Gut ist: Dass der Gesamtraum auf einmal konst[ru]iert wird; nicht ein Ganzes aus Teilen zusammensetzen! Sondern die Teile bekommen erst ihre Bedeutung aus dem Ganzen. (Das ist ja überhaupt eine grundsätzliche Einstellung der Relationstheorie: Die Glieder bekommen ihren Charakter nur durch ihre Stellung im Ganzen.).“ RC 029-19-04 ASP.
Needless to say, it would need to be determined here too just which sections of the published Aufbau correspond to §§143ff and Part V.
- 30.
For Neurath ’s private language argument and Carnap ’s response, see Uebel (2007, 226–252).
- 31.
Manninen (2002, fn.14) argues persuasively that it was a copy of the enclosure “Frage über die Wahl des Buchtitels” of the letter Carnap to Schlick , 23 December 1927. The enclosure of the letter to Neurath has not been preserved.
- 32.
“Ich schicke Ihnen das Blatt …, da Sie, wie ich vermute, gerade besonderes Interesse haben werden für das Begriffssystem mit physischer Basis. Ich vermute, dass wir über die Mehrleistung, aber auch über die Wenigerleistung dieses Systems im Vergleich zu dem mit eigenpsychischer Basis einig sein werden.” Carnap to Neurath , 25 February-3 March 1928 (RC 029-16-05 ASP).
- 33.
Carnap to Schlick , 23 December 1927, quoted in Manninen (2003, 145).
- 34.
See Carnap (1932a/1934, 67).
- 35.
Carnap stated that “the word ‘object’ is here always used in the widest possible sense, namely, for anything about which a statement can be made” (1928a/2003, 5) and that “it makes no logical difference whether a given sign denotes the concept or the object, or whether a sentence holds for objects or concepts” (ibid., 10).
- 36.
In this sense the intertranslatability thesis was invoked for expository purposes in Uebel (2007, 38). The distinction between the weak and the strong versions was not drawn there, however.
- 37.
Space constraints demand that I refer the reader to Uebel (2014) even though I would now prefer alternative formulations to some of the points made there.
- 38.
Carnap ’s candidates in §62 for basic elements and relations of the system with a physical basis were these: (i) electrons (including protons) and their-spatio-temporal relations; (ii) space-time points of the four-dimensional continuum and their relative locations in the continuum and the many-one relations between real numbers and space-time points corresponding to the individual components of certain functions; (iii) and world points as elements of world lines of physical points (following Minkowski ) and relations of coincidence and local time-order. Carnap also noted that the basic elements of (i) were constructable out of the elements of (ii) and the basic elements of (ii) out of the elements of (iii).
- 39.
For documentation and discussion of these worries and their overcoming, see Uebel (2007, 191–200, 200–212 and 238–246).
- 40.
“… jeden Sachverhalt beliebiger Art, der intersubjektiv erkennbar ist.” Carnap , RC 110-03-22 ASP, 20; for discussion see Uebel (2007, 194).
- 41.
“Erst auf Grund dieser Trennung und der Verwerfung der inhaltlichen Redeweise ist aber die Überwindung des Dualismus der beiden Sprachen möglich.” Carnap to Neurath , 2 March 1932, RC 029-12-60/61, p. 2. The preceding sentence makes clear that the dualism in question is that of the physical language and the auto-psychological protocol language.
- 42.
For a discussion of the wide acceptance of psycho-physical parallelism as an empirical hypothesis in nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany and Austria—and of the different philosophical interpretations it was often given (all of which Carnap rejected)—see Heidelberger (2003).
- 43.
When he spoke without qualification of “a univocal correspondence between each property of the psychological process and some (even though entirely different) property of the brain process” and held that “all types of psychological processes have physical parallels (in the central nervous system)” (1928a/2003, 92), Carnap endorsed psycho-physical parallelism purely as an empirical hypothesis. For him, psycho-physical parallelism simply asserted a correlation which to determine the relata of was the job of brain physiology, psychology and psychopathology (§21). To go further than asking “between what objects the relation obtains” (and presumably under what circumstances the relation does so) and to speculate about “what it is between the correlated objects by virtue of which they are connected” Carnap counted as switching, illegitimately, to an “essence question”, in short, as switching from empirical science to “metaphysics” (ibid., 35, emphasis added). Later (in §§166-169) he carefully delimited the mind-body problem as arising from the demand to “interpret” (not “explain” as George ’s translation erroneously has it) the correlation that makes for the empirical thesis of psycho-physical parallelism: “the quest for an interpretation of that parallelism belongs within metaphysics” (ibid., 271, trans. amended).
- 44.
“Δ zu S. 566. Es wird zuweilen gesagt, dass dem praktischen Verstehen der Realwissenschaften, insbesondere der Physik, ein unausgesprochener Realismus zugrunde liege. Hier muss aber deutlich unterschieden werden zwischen der Verwendung einer gewissen Sprache und der Behauptung einer These. Die realistische Einstellung des Physikers äussert sich zunächst in der Verwendung der realistischen Sprache; diese ist zweckmässig und berechtigt (vergl. §52). Ein darüber hinausgehender Realismus als expl[izite] These ist dagegen unzulässig; er muss zu einem ‘Objektivismus’ (wenn man so sagen will) korrigiert werden: die gesetzmässigen Zusammenhänge(die in den Naturgesetzen als Implikationen formuliert werden) sind objektiv, dem Willen des Einzelnen enthoben; dagegen würde die Zuschreibung der Eigenschaft ‘real’ an irgendeine Substanz (sei sie nun Materie, Energie, elektromagneti[sches] Feld oder was immer) aus keiner Erfahrung herzuleiten, also metaphys[isch] sein.” RC 029-19-04 verso.
- 45.
The two minor differences are that the published version has “(usually tacit)” (“(meist unausgesprochener)”) instead of “tacit” (“unausgesprochener”) and emphasis also on “so as to become ‘objectivism’” (“zu einem ‘Objektivismus’”). (Needless to say “Δ to p. 566” is missing there too).
- 46.
Carnap (1924, 130; quoted with permission from a translation circulated by Michael Friedman ).
- 47.
“The reason for the multiplicity of possibilities lies in the fact that the real process of cognition, which we shall call intuitive in contrast to the rational reconstruction, is overdetermined. Hence the possibility and necessity of a plurality of determination each of which would be sufficient by itself.” (1928a/2003, 146)
- 48.
”The only purpose of these constructions was to show the aim of construction theory more clearly and to illustrate the method. The detailed execution depends upon the results of the empirical sciences.” (1928a/2003, 190).
- 49.
See also Carus (2007, 170–171).
- 50.
- 51.
“Das Chaos enthält keine identischen, d.h. als einzelne fassbaren und als diese selben festhaltbaren Elemente.” RC 081-05-01 ASP, p. 1.
- 52.
The terms are “Erlebnisbereich”, “Wirklichkeitsbereich” and “Bausteine”. See RC 081-05-01 ASP, p. 3.
- 53.
“Eine Eigentümlichkeit, die diesen Aufbau sehr wesentlich von der Wirklichkeit unterscheidet, liegt darin, dass … nicht alle Vorgänge des Bereichs durch andere bedingt sind. Sondern gewisse Vorgänge, die ‘Empfindungen’ heissen, gehorchen keiner Gesetzmässigkeit dieses Bereichs; sie springen unvermittelt und unerklärt in diesem Bereich auf. Eine bestimmte Eigenschaft, durch die sie sich von den andern Vorgängen kenntlich machen würden haben sie nicht. … Ihre Sonderstellung erhalten sie in scharf umgrenzter Weise erst durch eine gewisse Zuordnungsbeziehung (‘Reizbeziehung’) zu gewissen Vorgängen der Wirklichkeit. Das hat zur Folge, dass der Aufbau des psychologischen Bereiches den Aufbau der Wirklichkeit methodisch voraussetzt.” RC 081-05-01 ASP, pp. 12–13.
- 54.
“To be sure, (sensible) experience necessarily exhibits a certain spatial and temporal ordering , and also certain qualitative relations of equality and inequality. By contrast, the grouping together of certain element of experiences as ‘things’ with ‘properties’, and also the coordination of certain elements to others as their ‘cause’, is not necessary—i.e. not a condition of every possible experience. It is, rather a matter of free choice whether this elaboration takes place and, also, to a large extent how it takes place.” Carnap (1924, 106–107).
- 55.
See Carus (2007, 168) with reference to RC 081-05-03 ASP and RC 081-05-02 ASP.
- 56.
For a detailed critical analysis of this process which stresses the necessary role of the mathematical structure of the world of physics that is focussed upon below, see Richardson (1998, 76–91).
- 57.
See RC 081-05-01 ASP, p. 11.
- 58.
This is the point, of course, where Quine diagnosed the failure of a reductive phenomenalist project, but that is not of concern here.
- 59.
See Carnap (1928a/2003, §125).
- 60.
RC 029-19-04 ASP; see fn. 15 above.
- 61.
Carnap (1922, 39; quoted by permission from a translation circulated by Michael Friedman and Peter Heath ).
- 62.
Carnap noted that given his more radical starting point—“We have begun our structure several levels further down”—this was the situation: “… in order to be able to follow the same route as Russell , we will first of all have to construct the aspects [of visual things] from our basic elements, namely, the elementary experiences. However, this is probably impossible for aspects ‘which have not been seen’, or at least, it would offer considerable difficulties.” Carnap (1928a/2003, 192) Interestingly, Carnap added: “It must be admitted, however, that our kind of construction of physical points and of the physical space is by no means a fully satisfactory solution.” But he did not specify what worried him: was it what posterity learnt of as Quinean worries?.
- 63.
See RC 081-05-07 ASP, transcription of shorthand additions by Brigitte Parakenings . To be sure, one may wonder whether the construction of physical space already plays this role in the earlier conception of “Konstitutionstheorie” that formed the basis of Carnap ’s second presentation to the Circle in January 1925. There he spoke explicitly of a “primitive order of space” (“primitive Raumordnung”) within which physical objects were to be constituted; see RC 081-05-03 ASP, p. 2. Be that as it may be (and so possibly unlike its 1925 sketch), the “Konstitutionstheorie” of 1926 underwent no further changes of comparable significance.
- 64.
“Abends bei Neurath , auch Frau Reidemeister da. Neurath sagt, dass mein Buch leider in der ethischen Einstellung nicht richtig auf die wirke, für die es eigentlich geschrieben sei, weil es dem Matrialismus und Realismus schärfer gegenübertritt als dem Idealismus, der doch der schlimmere Feind sei. Er spricht davon, wie die Welyanschauung der neuen Zeit aussehen wird. Der Kollektivismus müsse in meinem Buch starker hervorkommen, der ‘methodische Solipsismus’ gefällt ihm nicht.” (RC 025-72-05 ASP).
- 65.
See Carnap ’s comments about his life-long liberalism concerning different forms of language in (1963, 17–18).
- 66.
I wish to thank André Carus for helpful comments at the conference, Christian Damböck for correspondence, Brigitte Parakenings at the Philosophisches Archiv, University of Konstanz, for transcriptions of Carnap ’s short-hand notes and her guidance to newly available parts of Carnap’s Nachlass, and the Archive of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, for permission to quote from their holdings.
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Uebel, T. (2016). Neurath’s Influence on Carnap’s Aufbau . In: Damböck, C. (eds) Influences on the Aufbau. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21876-2_4
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