The Demarcation Problem of Conceptual Relativity

Abstract

Conceptual relativity leads to a deflationist diagnosis of many existence debates. For example, there is not only one correct answer to the question how many objects exist in a universe with three individuals. Furthermore, there is not only one correct answer to the question what species exist. While these examples illustrate the critical potential of conceptual relativity, one may worry that conceptual relativity leads to an excessive deflationism that does not leave room for substantive existence disputes and that implies the self-defeating claim that every existence claim is true relative to some legitimate conceptual framework. Conceptual relativists therefore face a “demarcation problem” and have to distinguish merely verbal and substantive existence disputes. I discuss a variety of demarcation criteria and argue that the most plausible criteria support the idea that conceptual relativity is common in the empirical sciences. Furthermore, I argue that the demarcation problem is at least as pressing for critics of conceptual relativity. While conceptual relativists have to leave room for substantive non-verbal disputes, their critics have provide an account of non-substantive verbal disputes.