Skip to main content

Part of the book series: European Studies in Philosophy of Science ((ESPS,volume 1))

Abstract

According to a coherentist position in philosophy of science, good theories cohere with the available data and one theory is better than another if it coheres better with the available data. This paper examines that relationship with a special focus on probabilistic measures of coherence. In a first step, it is shown that existing coherence measures satisfy a number of reasonable adequacy constraints for the comparison of two rival scientific theories. In a second step, the virtue of a coherentist position in philosophy of science is considered. More specifically, it is assessed whether coherence implies verisimilitude in the sense that a higher degree of coherence between theory and evidence entails a higher degree of (estimated) truthlikeness. To this end, it is demonstrated that there is an intimate relationship in this sense if we explicate coherence by means of the so-called overlap-measure.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    In this paper I will use the terms “verisimilitude” and “truthlikeness” as synonyms.

  2. 2.

    The first philosopher to propose a definition of verisimilitude that suffered from a similar drawback is Karl Popper. Miller (1974) and Tichý (1974) independently proved that Popper’s original definition Popper (19631972) suffered from a logical flaw so that on his account a false theory can never be closer to the truth than another true or false theory. For a comprehensive survey of subsequent developments see Oddie 2008, Niiniluoto 2011 and Zwart 2001.

  3. 3.

    See Sect. 4 for details.

  4. 4.

    The first formal approach to coherence is Paul Thagard’s neural network-based constraint satisfaction model of coherence (Thagard 1989; Thagard and Verbeurgt 1998). A detailed comparison of Thagard’s approach with probabilistic approaches is beyond the scope of the present paper.

  5. 5.

    The general case is slightly more intricate: Fitelson’s (2004) account as well as Douven & Meijs’ recipe are applicable to sets of propositions. As such they take into account the mutual degree of confirmation for each pair of non-empty, disjunct subsets of the given set under consideration.

  6. 6.

    For a comprehensive overview see Crupi 2015 and Crupi et al. 2007.

  7. 7.

    Douven and Meijs (2007) consider further confirmation measures to be fed into their recipe, namely the ratio-measure (Keynes 1921; Horwich 1982) and the (log-) likelihood measure (Good 1984; Zalabardo 2009) of confirmation. However, \(\mathcal{S}_{d}\) is their favorite explication of coherence. Accordingly, since an evaluation of all possible coherence measures is beyond the scope of the present paper, we restrict our attention to \(\mathcal{S}_{d}\) and neglect all others.

  8. 8.

    This measure has independently been proposed by Schippers and Siebel (2012, Reassessing probabilistic measures of coherence, Unpublished manuscript).

  9. 9.

    This latter property, sometimes called the “Bar-Hillel-Carnap semantic paradox” (Floridi 2004, p. 198), might seem curious at first sight. However, (iii) follows naturally from the assumption that t’s information content is related to the amount of state descriptions precluded by t. A tautology precludes no state description at all and is consequently assigned the lowest possible degree of informativity. A contradiction on the other hand precludes every possible state description and is accordingly maximally informative. In this sense, Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953) state that “a false sentence which happens to say much is thereby highly informative in our sense. [] A self-contradictory sentence asserts too much; it is too informative to be true” (p. 229).

  10. 10.

    For a subset of measures, a similar theorem is due to Brössel (2013). The proof of Theorem 2.1 is straightforward.

  11. 11.

    (a1)–(a3) are standard verisimilitude-assumptions (cf. Cevolani 2011; Niiniluoto 1987, pp. 232ff.). (a4)–(a5) are taken from Zamora-Bonilla 1996; variants of (a6) can be found in Glass 2007 and Kuipers 2009.

  12. 12.

    This is similar to the famous child’s play objection against content-definitions of verisimilitude (cf. Tichý 1974).

  13. 13.

    Both in the case of explanation and in the case of predictive success to be considered below we assume simple cases of deductive explanation/success. This is not to say that these are the only relevant such cases; however, in the given context the focus is exclusively on these salient cases.

  14. 14.

    The proofs only require elementary probability theory and straightforward arithmetic manipulations. For the proofs pertaining to measure \(\mathcal{O}\) see Zamora-Bonilla 1996. There, \(\Pr (e)^{-1} \times \mathcal{O}(t,e)\) is proposed as a probabilistic measure of verisimilitude. For further discussions see also Zamora-Bonilla 2002, 2013.

  15. 15.

    Let \(\Gamma \) and \(\Sigma \) be two sets, then the symmetric difference, \(\Gamma \Delta \Sigma \), is defined as follows: \(\Gamma \Delta \Sigma = (\Gamma \setminus \Sigma ) \cup (\Gamma \setminus \Sigma )\).

  16. 16.

    Cf. Schurz and Weingartner 2010 for similar characterizations.

  17. 17.

    It is well-known that in propositional logics each formula can be translated into an equivalent formula in conjunctive normal form.

  18. 18.

    The reason for focusing on this measure is that it performed well in the evaluation in Table 1. An extensive survey of different approaches is beyond the scope of the present paper.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Cevolani et al. (20102011) and references therein.

  20. 20.

    Among these are the ones proposed by Kuipers (1982), Oddie (1986), Schurz and Weingartner (19872010), Brink and Heideman (1987) and Gemes (2007). Cf. Cevolani et al. 2011.

  21. 21.

    These logical probability distributions have famously been discussed by Carnap (1962).

  22. 22.

    The same holds if we instead choose the firmness-based measure \(\mathcal{S}_{f}\). However, a detailed investigation of the other measures is beyond the scope of the present paper. The proof of Theorem 5.1 is given in the appendix.

References

  • Bar-Hillel, Y., & Carnap, R. (1953). Semantic information. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 4, 147–157.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bonjour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brink, C., & Heideman, J. (1987). A verisimilar ordering of theories phrased in a propositional language. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 38, 533–549.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brössel, P. (2013). Assessing theories: The coherentist approach. Erkenntnis, 79, 593–623.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R. (1962). The logical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). Chicago: Chicago University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cevolani, G. (2011). Verisimilitude and strongly semantic information. Ethics & Politics, 2, 159–179.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cevolani, G., & Tambolo, L. (2013). Progress as approximation to the truth: A defence of the verisimilitudinarian approach. Erkenntnis, 78, 921–935.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cevolani, G., Crupi, V., & Festa, R. (2010). The whole truth about Linda: Probability, verisimilitude and a paradox of conjunction. In M. D’Agostino et al. (Eds.), New essays in logic and philosophy of science (pp. 603–615). London: College Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cevolani, G., Crupi, V., & Festa, R. (2011). Verisimilitude and belief change for conjunctive theories. Erkenntnis, 75, 183–202.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crupi, V. (2015) Confirmation. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/confirmation/

  • Crupi, V., Tentori, K., & Gonzalez, M. (2007). On Bayesian measures of evidential support: Theoretical and empirical issues. Philosophy of Science, 74, 229–252.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Douven, I., & Meijs, W. (2007). Measuring coherence. Synthese, 156, 405–425.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Earman, J. (1992). Bayes or bust? A critical examination of Bayesian confirmation theory. Cambridge: MIT.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fitelson, B. (2003). A probabilistic theory of coherence. Analysis, 63, 194–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fitelson, B. (2004). Two technical corrections to my coherence measure. http://www.fitelson.org/coherence2.pdf.

  • Floridi, L. (2004). Outline of a theory of strongly semantic information. Minds and Machines, 14, 197–221.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gemes, K. (2007). Verisimilitude and content. Synthese, 154, 293–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glass, D. H. (2002). Coherence, explanation, and Bayesian networks. In M. ONeill et al. (Eds.), Artificial intelligence and cognitive science (pp. 177–182). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Glass, D. H. (2007). Coherence measures and inference to the best explanation. Synthese, 157, 275–296.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Good, I. J. (1984). The best explicatum for weight of evidence. Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation, 19, 294–299.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. (1986). Change in view: Principles of reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horwich, P. (1982). Probability and evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Howson, C., & Urbach, P. (2006). Scientific reasoning. The Bayesian approach (3rd Ed.). Chicago & La Salle: Open Court.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huber, F. (2008). Assessing theories, Bayes style. Synthese, 161, 89–118.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keynes, J. (1921). A treatise on probability. London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. A. F. (1982). Approaching descriptive and theoretical truth. Erkenntnis, 18, 343–378.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. A. F. (1987). A structuralist approach to truthlikeness. In T. A. F. Kuipers (Ed.), What is closer-to-the-truth? (pp. 79–99). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. A. F. (1992). Naive and refined truth approximation. Synthese, 93, 299–342.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. A. F. (2000). From instrumentalism to constructive realism. On some relations between confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers, T. (2009). Empirical progress and truth approximation by the ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method’. Erkenntnis, 70, 313–330.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lehrer, K. (1974). Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meijs, W. (2006). Coherence as generalized logical equivalence. Erkenntnis, 64, 231–252.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, D. (1974). Popper’s qualitative theory of verisimilitude. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 166–177.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I. (1984). Is science progressive?. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I. (1987). Truthlikeness. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I. (1999). Critical scientific realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I. (2011). Scientific progress. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2011 ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/scientific-progress. Accessed 04 Mar 2014.

  • Oddie, G. (1986). Likeness to truth. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Oddie, G. (2008). Truthlikeness. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2014 ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/truthlikeness. Accessed 05 Mar 2014.

  • Olsson, E. J. (2002). What is the problem of coherence and truth? The Journal of Philosophy, 99, 246–272.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and refutations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1968). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge. An evolutionary approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roche, W. (2013). Coherence and probability. A probabilistic account of coherence. In M. Araszkiewicz & J. Savelka (Eds.), Coherence: Insights from philosophy, jurisprudence and artificial intelligence (pp. 59–91). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schupbach, J. N. (2011). New hope for Shogenji’s coherence measure. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62, 125–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schurz, G., & Weingartner, P. (1987). Verisimilitude defined by relevant consequence elements. In T. Kuipers (Ed.), What is closer-to-the-truth? (pp. 47–77). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schurz, G., & Weingartner, P. (2010). Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem holds for possible-world-accounts but not for consequence-accounts to verisimilitude. Synthese, 172, 415–436.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shogenji, T. (1999). Is coherence truth conducive? Analysis, 59, 338–345.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thagard, P. (1989). Explanatory coherence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12, 435–467.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thagard, P., & Verbeurgt, K. (1998). Coherence as constraint satisfaction. Cognitive Science, 22, 1–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tichý, P. (1974). On Popper’s definition of verisimilitude. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 155–160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zalabardo, J. (2009). An argument for the likelihood-ratio measure of confirmation. Analysis, 69, 630–635.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zamora-Bonilla, J. P. (1996). Verisimilitude, structuralism and scientific progress. Erkenntnis, 44, 25–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zamora-Bonilla, J. P. (2002). Verisimilitude and the dynamics of scientific research programmes. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 33, 349–368.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zamora-Bonilla, J. P. (2013). Why are good theories good? Reflections on epistemic values, confirmation, and formal epistemology. Synthese, 190, 1533–1553.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zwart, S. D. (2001). Refined verisimilitude. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Schippers .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Appendix: A Proof of Theorem 5.1

Appendix: A Proof of Theorem 5.1

Let \(e_{\Pr }\) be a distribution of probabilities \(\Pr (c\vert e)\) for each constituent \(c \in \mathcal{C}\). The degree of coherence between c and an arbitrary c-theory \(t = p_{i_{1}} \wedge \ldots \wedge p_{i_{k}}\) is given by the following formula:

$$\displaystyle{ \mathcal{O}(t,c,\overline{c}) =\log _{2}\big[\mathcal{O}(\bigwedge t_{c}^{+},c)\big/\mathcal{O}(\bigwedge t_{c}^{-},\overline{c})\big] }$$
(1)

It can easily be shown that the following identity holds:

$$\displaystyle\begin{array}{rcl} \mathcal{O}(t,c,\overline{c})& =& \log _{2}\left [ \frac{1} {\Pr (\bigwedge t_{c}^{+}\vert c)} + \frac{1} {\Pr (c\vert \bigwedge t_{c}^{+})} - 1\right ]^{-1}{}\end{array}$$
(2)
$$\displaystyle\begin{array}{rcl} & & -\log _{2}\left [ \frac{1} {\Pr (\bigwedge t_{c}^{-}\vert \overline{c})} + \frac{1} {\Pr (\overline{c}\vert \bigwedge t_{c}^{-})} - 1\right ]^{-1}{}\end{array}$$
(3)

Now for conjunctive theories, both \(\Pr (\bigwedge t_{c}^{+}\vert c)\) and \(\Pr (\bigwedge t_{c}^{-}\vert \overline{c})\) are equal to 1. Hence, Eq. 2 reduces to the following formula:

$$\displaystyle{ \mathcal{O}(t,c,\overline{c}) =\log _{2}\Pr (c\vert \bigwedge t_{c}^{+}) -\log _{ 2}\Pr (\overline{c}\vert \bigwedge t_{c}^{-}) }$$
(4)

Exploiting Bayes’ theorem, we get (remember that \(\Pr\) is the logical probability \(\Pr ^{{\ast}}\)):

$$\displaystyle{ \mathcal{O}(t,c,\overline{c}) =\log _{2} \frac{\Pr (c)} {\Pr (\bigwedge t_{c}^{+})} -\log _{2} \frac{\Pr (\overline{c})} {\Pr (\bigwedge t_{c}^{-})} = \vert t_{c}^{+}\vert -\vert t_{ c}^{-}\vert }$$
(5)

Hence, \(\mathcal{O}(t,c,\overline{c})\) is strictly increasing in | t c + | and strictly decreasing in | t c  | for each constituent c. The same obviously holds for Vs(t, c). Therefore, for each pair of c-theories \(t,t^{{\prime}}\) and each constituent the following equivalence holds:

$$\displaystyle{ \mathcal{O}(t,c,\overline{c}) \geq \mathcal{O}(t^{{\prime}},c,\overline{c})\quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \mathrm{Vs}(t,c) \geq \mathrm{ Vs}(t^{{\prime}},c) }$$
(6)

Hence, (5), (6) and the definition of Vs together entail that

$$\displaystyle{ \sum _{c\in \mathbb{C}}\Pr (c\vert e) \times \mathcal{O}(t,c,\overline{c}) \geq \sum _{c\in \mathbb{C}}\Pr (c\vert e) \times \mathcal{O}(t^{{\prime}},c,\overline{c}) }$$
$$\displaystyle{ \Leftrightarrow }$$
$$\displaystyle{ \sum _{c\in \mathbb{C}}\Pr (c\vert e) \times \mathrm{ Vs}(t,c) \geq \sum _{c\in \mathbb{C}}\Pr (c\vert e) \times \mathrm{ Vs}(t^{{\prime}},c) }$$

Thus, we get the desired result that if \(\mathbb{E}(\mathcal{O}(t,e)) > \mathbb{E}(\mathcal{O}(t,e))\), then \(\mathrm{EVs}(t,e) >\mathrm{ EVs}(t^{{\prime}},e)\) (and also vice versa). □ 

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Schippers, M. (2015). Coherence and (Likeness to) Truth. In: Mäki, U., Votsis, I., Ruphy, S., Schurz, G. (eds) Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23015-3_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics