Abstract
Within the social sciences, much controversy exists about which status should be ascribed to the rationality assumption that forms the core of rational choice theories. Whilst realists argue that the rationality assumption is an empirical claim which describes real processes that cause individual action, instrumentalists maintain that it amounts to nothing more than an analytically set axiom or ‘as if’ hypothesis which helps in the generation of accurate predictions. In this paper, I argue that this realist-instrumentalist debate about rational choice theory can be overcome once it is realised that the rationality assumption is neither an empirical description nor an ‘as if’ hypothesis, but a normative claim.
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Notes
- 1.
To avoid misunderstanding right from the outset, this normative account submits that the rationality concept is normative, not that it is ethical or moral.
- 2.
This is an adaptation of Binmore’s (1998: 360–361) definition.
- 3.
I will use the terms ‘preference’, ‘desire’ and ‘end’ interchangeably here.
- 4.
See Popper (1967) for the peculiar position that the rationality assumption is empirical and indeed false, but that we should nevertheless hold on to it, and Lagueux’s (1993) attempt to salvage this position. See Hempel (1962) for the claim that the rationality assumption might be abandoned in tests.
- 5.
Realists’ endorsement of (3) is compatible with the thesis that (RA) is a deliberately false, idealised empirical description (Mäki 2000). Realists’ claim would then be that actual conditions sufficiently approximate these idealised conditions. Since this variation on realism does not affect my argument, I will neglect it here.
- 6.
As Lehtinen (2013) emphasises, only certain interpretations of ‘as if’ signal an instrumentalist outlook.
- 7.
- 8.
Rational choice theory can also be understood as being engaged in the explication of the concept of rationality. If understood along these conceptual lines, analytic and normative readings of the rationality assumption need not be mutually exclusive, as the rationality assumption could be understood as the conceptual specification of the normative concept of rationality.
- 9.
Again, the term ‘metaethics’ should not mislead readers into thinking that the normative account interprets instrumental rationality as an ethical or moral concept. Strictly speaking, ‘metanormativity’ would be a more appropriate label than ‘metaethics’ here.
- 10.
- 11.
Unlike (RA), (RA**) is thus not constitutive of agency: Not pursuing one’s material self-interest, say, does not undermine agency status.
- 12.
It may be argued that there are cases in which (RA) is totally irrelevant because a specific model is ‘robust’ regarding its behavioural assumptions, in the sense that its results remain the same no matter whether we assume rational, habitual or random behaviour, say (Lehtinen and Kuorikoski 2007: 127). Why this should still count as a rational choice explanation, though, escapes me.
- 13.
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Tiefensee, C. (2015). Why the Realist-Instrumentalist Debate About Rational Choice Rests on a Mistake. In: Mäki, U., Votsis, I., Ruphy, S., Schurz, G. (eds) Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23015-3_8
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