Abstract
Super-power leaders, Regan and Gorbachev, had just signed the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in Washington. Signing INF marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War, two years before the November 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, 3 years before the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) was signed in 1990 and 5 years before the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed.
Trust, but verify.
[President Ronald Reagan to General-Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, 8 Dec. 1987]
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Hafemeister, D. (2016). Verification and Arms Control Treaties. In: Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism in the Post-9/11 World. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25367-1_6
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