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The Activities of Interlocutory Coalitions: Mediation, Rule-Making and Implementation

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Beyond Networks - Interlocutory Coalitions, the European and Global Legal Orders

Part of the book series: Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation ((SEELR,volume 8))

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Abstract

This chapter illustrates the activities in which the supranational coalitions of civil society actors are engaged. These activities include mediation, rule-making and implementation. Mediation consists of the discussion of the diverging positions carried out by the coalitions’ participants and the promotion of policy alternatives to supranational decision-makers. From an early stage, coalitions of civil society actors mediate “internally” between the interests of the diverging members; later, they mediate between these interests and the representatives of supranational regulators. The lobbying pursued by the coalitions described herein into the official negotiations of supranational regulator – and/or into the other phases of the policy cycle – often results in them influencing the policies and shaping the strategic direction of European and global regulatory bodies. Coalitions of civil society, for instance, may influence the agenda setting of the supranational regulators; they may work as catalysts in calling for the revocation of rules that no longer work in the common interest; or they may deliberately shift from one legal regime to another (a practice known as “forum shopping”) to stake their claims and influence the building of more amenable policies. Finally, the coalitions of civil society actors may have enforcement powers. They may monitor the compliance of specific norms and rules, they may evaluate the degree to which these rules are successful, and they may report the possible breaches of these rules to the competent bodies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See generally P.J. Simmons, C. De Jonge Oudraat (eds.), Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2001); P.J. Spiro, “New Global Potentates: Non-governmental Organizations and the “Unregulated” Marketplace” (1996) 18 Cardozo Law Review 958; A.M. Clark, “Non-Governmental Organizations and their Influence on International Society” (1995) 48 Journal of International Affairs 507.

  2. 2.

    See A. Alkoby, “Global Networks and International Environmental Lawmaking: A Discourse Approach” (2007–2008) 8 Chicago Journal of International Law; S.C. Schreck, “The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in International Environmental Law” (2006–2007) 10 Gonzaga Journal of International Law 252.

  3. 3.

    See W.E.F. Torrance, A.W. Torrance, “Spinning the Green Web: Transnational Environmentalism” in S. Batliwala, D. Brown (eds.) Transnational Civil Society see chapter 1 at section 6.1, at 101.

  4. 4.

    See D. Eberly, The Rise of Global Civil Society see chapter 1 n 68, at 1.

  5. 5.

    See S. Chesterman, A. Fisher (eds.), Private Security, Public Order: The Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009).

  6. 6.

    In disagreement with this opinion is E. Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance see chapter 1 at section 1, chapter 1 n 10, n 22 and n 96 and text n 33, at 53. Benvenisti describes public-private institutions as institutions that operate almost exclusively in the sphere of health regulation, oftentimes as a result of the efforts put by big pharmaceutical companies to enhance their market shares.

  7. 7.

    See generally C. Menkel-Meadow, “From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context” (2004) 54 Journal of Legal Education 7; “When Litigation is Not the Only Way: Consensus Building and Mediation As Public Interest Lawyering” (2002) 10 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 37.

  8. 8.

    See, for instance, L. Hinojosa, D. Pearce, S. Dumpleton, “Contesting Unfair International Capitalism: Assessment of the Effectiveness and Impact of Campaigning and Advocacy From the NGO Sector” (2007) Brooks World Poverty Institute Working Paper n. 2, available at www.manchester.ac.uk/bwpi, at 3.

  9. 9.

    See, for instance, M. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties” (1973) 78 The American Journal of Sociology 1360.

  10. 10.

    See J. Cohen, C. Sabel, “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy” (1997) 3 European Law Journal 313.

  11. 11.

    See C. Carpenter, Governing the Global Agenda: “Gatekeepers” and “Issue Adoption” in Transnational Advocacy Networks, in A. Peters, L. Koechlin, T. Forster, G Fenner Zinkernagel (eds.), Non-state Actors as Standard Setters see chapter 3 n 18, see text n 32 and see chapter 5 n 31.

  12. 12.

    See F.W. Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: lessons from German Federalism and European Integration” (2007) 66 Public Administration 239; M. Savino, The role of Transnational Committees see chapter 3 n 8, at 13.

  13. 13.

    The document is available at the following web address www.alternativetrademandate.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ATM-Document-Final-EN.pdf.

  14. 14.

    See MB 12/09/2006, No. 6. See also H.C.H. Hofmann, A. Turk, “The Development of Integrated Administration in the EU and its Consequences” (2007) 13 European Law Journal 253, at 260.

  15. 15.

    See M. Ratton Sanchez, “Brief Observations on the Mechanisms for NGO Participation in the WTO” (2006) 4 International Journal of Human Rights 103.

  16. 16.

    See P. Van den Bossche, NGO Involvement in the WTO see chapter 3 n 29.

  17. 17.

    The EU Commission called upon the European Trade Union Confederation to appoint six members to represent the fields of energy and transport.

  18. 18.

    See UN General Assembly, Enhanced Cooperation Between the United Nations and All Relevant Partners, in Particular the Private Sector. Report of the Secretary General, A/60/214, 2005, available here www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/partnershipreport_a-56-323.pdf

  19. 19.

    See generally www.cleancookstoves.org

  20. 20.

    See generally www.state.gov/s/partnerships/newbeginning/

  21. 21.

    For a definition of “soft law” and an analysis of its virtues See A. Schafer, “Resolving Deadlock: Why International Organisations Introduce Soft Law” (2006) 2 European Law Journal 194.

  22. 22.

    See V. Allee, The Future of Knowledge: Increasing Prosperity through Value Networks (Boston, Routledge, 2003). See also J.L. Martinez, “Communication Conflicts in NGO: A Theoretical Approach” (2002) Instituto de Empresa Working Paper n. WP 2/02, available at www.ie.edu. A second difference between information and knowledge concerns its concrete effects. Information, differently from knowledge, may lead to an “informational paradox”, as argued by Keck and Sikkink. In short, when ICs start to gather public attention towards an issue, before beginning to advocate towards IOs, they contribute to make the issue of their interest more visible. Observers may have the impression that, regardless the activists’ efforts, the problem is getting worst, because information portray the issue as worse than it actually is. This may also have implications in evaluating the networks’ effectiveness.

  23. 23.

    On alternatives to traditional treaty-based law-making See S. Kirchner, “Effective Law-Making in Times of Global Crisis – A Role for International Organizations” (2010) II Göttingen Journal of International Law 267.

  24. 24.

    See generally www.coe.int/t/ngo/events_en.asp

  25. 25.

    See generally www.whiteband.org/en/news

  26. 26.

    See generally www.euclidnetwork.eu/projects/current-projects/european-social-innovation-naples-20.html

  27. 27.

    See S. Lang, NGOs, Civil Society and the Public Sphere see chapter 1 at section 6.2, at 22.

  28. 28.

    See T. Davies, NGOs, A New History of Transnational Civil Society see chapter 1 at section 6.2, chapter 1 n 77 and n 79, at 28.

  29. 29.

    See Keck, Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders see chapter 1 at section 1, chapter 1 n 60 and n 68, chapter 3 n 28 and chapter 6 n 24, at 25.

  30. 30.

    See A. Alkoby, “Global Networks and International Environmental Lawmaking: A Discourse Approach” (2007–2008) 8 Chicago Journal of International Law, at 390.

  31. 31.

    See A.M. Slaughter, A New World Order see chapter 1 at section 1, at 8.

  32. 32.

    See A. Peters, L. Koechlin, T. Forster, G Fenner Zinkernagel (eds.), Non-state Actors as Standard Setters see chapter 3 n 18, see text n 11 and chapter 5 n 31, at 500.

  33. 33.

    See E. Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance see chapter 1 at section 1, chapter 1 n 10, n 22 and n 96 and text n 6, at 57.

  34. 34.

    See M. Evans, J. Davies, “Understanding Policy Transfer: A Multi-Level, Multi-Disciplinary Perspective” (1999) 77 (2) Public Administration 361; D. Stone, Transfer Agents see chapter 3 at section 1.6.

  35. 35.

    See D. Dolowitz, D. Marsh, “Learning From Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy Making” (2000) 13 Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration Vol. 13, 5.

  36. 36.

    See generally D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000). On the relation between networks of NGOs and the formation of international standards See D.B. Hunter, “Civil Society Networks and the Development of Environmental Standards at International Institutions” (2007–2008) 8 Chicago Journal of International Law 437.

  37. 37.

    See T. Macdonald, K. Macdonald, “Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics: Strengthening Democratic Control within the Global Garment Industry” (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 89.

  38. 38.

    See generally www.cleanclothes.org

  39. 39.

    See generally www.ceres.org/about-us/our-history/ceres-principles

  40. 40.

    See generally www.ceres.org/company-network/ceres-roadmap

  41. 41.

    See Peter Sutherland et al. (eds.), The future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (Geneva, WTO, 2004). See also the “Mini-Symposium on the Consultative Board’s Report on the Future of the WTO” (2005) 8 Journal of International Economic Law 287.

  42. 42.

    The document is available at the following address: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_chap5_e.pdf

  43. 43.

    As explained by Jonathan Kuyper, the regulation of intellectual property rights at the international level is shared between the WTO and the WIPO. Although the WIPO and the WTO have agreed on some harmonised policies, on many others (e.g. open-source innovation or access to medicines) there is disagreement. For further details See J.W. Kuyper, “The Democratic Potential of Systemic Pluralism” (2014) 3 Global Constitutionalism 170.

  44. 44.

    See Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (New Zealand v France), Special Arbitration Tribunal (1990), 82 ILR 499.

  45. 45.

    Formal implementation has already received significant attention in international legal scholarship. See P. Alston, J. Crawford (eds.), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000); S. Jasanoff, “NGOs and the Environment: From Knowledge to Action” (1997) 18 Third World Quarterly 579; R. Charlton, R. May, “NGOs, Politics, Projects and Probity: A Policy Implementation Perspective” (1995) 16 Third World Quarterly 2; J. Smith, R. Pagnucco, G.A. Lopez, “Globalizing Human Rights: The Work of Transnational Human Rights NGOs in the 1990s” (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 379.

  46. 46.

    More widely on the relationship between the Aarhus Convention and international environmental law See T.S Mullikin, N.S Smith, M.T Champion, “Inextricably Intertwined – Environmental Management and the Public” (2004–2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 421; S. Atapattu, “The Public Health Impact of Global Environmental Problems and the Role of International Law” (2004) 30 American Journal of Law and Medicine 291; C. Noteboom, “Addressing the External Effects of Internal Environmental Decisions: Public Access to Environmental Information in the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm” (2003) 22 NYU Environmental Law Journal 246.

  47. 47.

    See generally www.traffic.org

  48. 48.

    See generally www.cites.org

  49. 49.

    On the concept of legality and its evolutions See P.S. REINSCH, “The Concept of Legality in International Arbitration” (1911) 5 American Journal of International Law 604; E. BLANKENBURG, “The Waning of Legality in the Concept of Policy Implementation” (1985) 4 Law & Policy 481; M. BENNETT, “The Rule of Law” Means Literally What it Says: The Rule of the Law: Fuller and Raz on Formal Legality and the Concept of Law” (2007) 32 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 90.

  50. 50.

    A comprehensive analysis of amicus curiae in international courts is provided by D. Shelton but see also N. Leroux, “NGOs at the World Court” (2006) 8 International Community Law Review 203.

  51. 51.

    See D. Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations, see text in this section.

  52. 52.

    See for instance A. Bianchi, Non state Actors in International Law, see chapter 1 n 72 and chapter 3 n 31.

  53. 53.

    See, respectively, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, No. WT/DS58/AB/R; European Communities – Measures Affecting the Prohibition of Asbestos and Asbestos Products, No. WT/DS1135/AB/R; European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, No. WT/DS231/AB/R. On the submission of amicus curiae briefs before the WTO DSU, See A. Appleton, “Amicus curiae Submissions in the Carbon Steel Case: Another Rabbit From the Appellate Body’s Hat?” (2000) 3 Journal of International Economic Law 91; S. Dinah, “The Participation of Non-governmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings” (1994) 88 American Journal of International Law 611; A.K. Schneider, “Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus Brief Battle at the WTO” (2001) 7 Widener Law Symposium Journal 87; A. Reinisch, C. Irgel, The participation of non-governmental organisations see chapter 1 n 51; G. Zonnekeyn, “The Appellate body’s Communication on Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Asbestos Case: An Echternach Procession?” (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 553; P.C. Mavroidis, “Amicus Curiae Briefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing” (2001) Jean Monnet Working Paper 2, available at www.centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet.

  54. 54.

    See Case T-135/96, UEAPME v Council, 1998.

  55. 55.

    See C.A. Odinkalu, C. Christenses, “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Development of its Non-State Communication Procedures” (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 235.

  56. 56.

    See H. Cullen, “The Collective Complaints Mechanism of the European Social Charter” (2000) European Law Review 25; F. Sudre, “Le protocole additionnel à la charte européenne prévoyant un système de réclamations collectives” (1996) 3 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 715.

  57. 57.

    See S. Kravchenko, “The Aarhus Convention and Innovations in Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements” (2007) 1 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 7; M. Stallworthy, “Whither Environmental Human Rights?” (2005) 7 Environmental Law Review 14.

  58. 58.

    See PCIJ Rep Series C No 12, at 261.

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    Gianluca Sgueo

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Sgueo, G. (2016). The Activities of Interlocutory Coalitions: Mediation, Rule-Making and Implementation. In: Beyond Networks - Interlocutory Coalitions, the European and Global Legal Orders. Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28875-8_4

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