Abstract
This chapter spells out what is special about our joint acts of feeling-towards together. It does so by pointing to a distinct felt conviction that phenomenologically defines the experiences that are at the heart of a collective affective intentional episode: the conviction that we (the participants) are jointly caring about something. The chapter elucidates what, in two different respects, grounds this felt conviction: what justifies this conviction and what, from a phenomenological point of view, serves as an experiential foundation for it. This allows me to, first, bring to light a distinctive mode of caring-about disclosed by our joint acts of feeling-towards together, and second, argue that certain pre-intentional feelings prepare us to feelingly understand certain circumstances as situations in which we (the participants) are caring about something as a group. In the course of this discussion, I introduce two notions: the notion of caring-with and the notion of feelings of being-together. I show that, leaving aside the image of some ‘fused feelings’, it is possible to develop an account of the phenomenon of collective affective intentionality that satisfies the two basic conditions of adequacy determined in the first part of this book. That is, an account that, first, makes visible that acts of felt understanding are at the heart of collective affective intentionality, and second, permits us to tell apart in a principled way the situations in which the involved individuals are feeling together from the situations in which they merely are feeling alongside each other.
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Notes
- 1.
My reader might be irritated by the unidiomatic use of the verb ‘to care’ in its continuous form. The reason for systematically doing so is that I want to emphasize the temporal aspect—the episodic character—of those acts that bring to light that the relevant subject is guided by the import something has to her.
- 2.
- 3.
I shall refer in my examples mostly to groups of people who are at least partially held together by certain institutional frames and relatively long-term (shared) goals (i.e. a volleyball team or an orchestra). I do not believe, however, that groups that are occasionally constituted as a function of a momentary impulse (and quickly dissolved once the relevant joint act has been accomplished) do not offer the conditions necessary for the participants to come to have an emotional experience of the sort we are interested in. The thoughts I am to articulate in what follows could, thus, be tested by appealing to John Searle’s ([1990] 2002, p. 91) example of a person who, having seen a man pushing a car in an evident effort to get it started, without any explicit agreement, simply begins to push with him.
- 4.
In suggesting that the significance something has for a particular subject can have a public character, I do not mean to suggest that other persons can experience this significance in the very same way the person at issue does. For the other individuals can come to experience the significance the relevant occurrence has for this person only from a second- or third-person point of view. But it is important to observe that this idea that other individuals could have second- or third-personal experiential access to the significance something has for someone is at the heart of the idea that, in virtue of our ability to adopt a personal perspective, we are in principle open to the import disclosed by human emotions. (For a similar claim, see Goldie 2000, p. 16.) I am pointing here to the fact that this ability to grasp the import the emotions of other persons disclose is fundamental to our ability to participate in moments of affective intentional community.
- 5.
Goldie explicitly observes: ‘An expression of emotion is genuine only if it is not done as a means to some further end’ (2000, p. 125).
- 6.
Against the background of an understanding of our emotions informed by evolutionary theory, one could argue that crying serves a purpose and that a genuine act of crying can, correspondingly, be said to be either successful or not. But needless to say, this is not the stance from which we in everyday life make sense of our interpersonal affective exchanges.
- 7.
Helm contends furthermore that we could spell out the idea that our emotions involve an implicit evaluation by specifying the formal object of each emotion in terms of a particular sort of action, thereby making explicit the way in which this emotion may be said to justify the comportment in question. We can, for instance, specify the formal object of the emotion we call fear by characterizing the object affectively experienced as dangerous as something that is worth avoiding (cf. 2001, p. 76).
- 8.
This proposal is in line, I think, with a suggestion Helm made in a presentation entitled ‘Joint Caring, Respect, and Submission to Norms’; a presentation delivered in the context of the seventh Conference on Collective Intentionality (held from August 23rd through 26th, 2010, at the University of Basel, Switzerland). Helm claimed that the focus of certain collective emotions amounts to what he calls a community of respect. (For a development of this idea in the context of an attempt to show that our ability to take responsibility is not intelligible apart from our having a place in such a community—a community in which others hold us accountable—, see Helm 2012.) As already mentioned, in my view, it is not the sameness of the focus, but the peculiar plural character of the for-the-sake-of-which of the relevant emotional responses that determines those emotions by means of which one can participate in a moment of affective intentional community.
- 9.
My notion of caring-with (in German: Mitsorge) is the result of merging two Heideggerian notions: the already discussed notion of being-with [Mitsein] and the notion of caring-for [Fürsorge]. I shall contrast the mode of caring-about I call caring-with with the form of concernful circumspection Heidegger calls caring-for below.
- 10.
- 11.
In Chap. 5, I emphasized the continuity that holds between ‘ordinary’ intentionality and collective affective intentionality. There is another continuity that has to be stressed here: that between non-affective forms of collective intentionality and collective affective intentionality. Put another way, while specifying here the central difference that holds between being-in-the-same-world and being-together-in-the-same-world, it is important to be aware that emotionally responding to some occurrence in an joint manner is not the only way we humans have to be together in the world we share. Moreover, it is not accidental that the sorts of groups I usually refer to, in order to illustrate some of my claims, are, as I pointed out, in part held together by institutional frames and long-term shared goals. I suggested (cf. footnote 3 above) that episodes of collective affective intentionality could also emerge spontaneously, as it were. However, even in these ‘spontaneous’ cases it is normally possible to describe some institutional frames and shared goals, principles, and/or believes. This points to a further relationship between collective affective intentionality and other forms of collective intentionality to which I made aware above (in Chap. 3, footnote 46) in suggesting that there normally are historical preconditions of collective affective intentionality. In this chapter, I have been claiming that our capacity to participate in moments of affective intentional community is grounded in a circumstantially specific sense of being-together-in-the-same-world. In so claiming, I am not denying that moments of collective affective intentionality usually occur on the ground of preexistent social structures. My focus on the circumstantial nature of our emotionally expressed acts of joint caring should not obscure the fact that collective affective intentional phenomena are typically recurrent in several areas of social life, as an anonymous reviewer of the manuscript of this book has emphasized. I am grateful to this reviewer for pushing me to make a remark on this important issue, to which I unfortunately cannot offer enough attention in this study.
- 12.
There are situations in which we are caring about another person, but we are not caring about this person as a person (cf. Helm 2008, p. 30).
- 13.
Heidegger writes that in the cases we are dealing with the beings one cares about are not really objects of concern, but rather objects of solicitude (cf. [1927] 1962, p. 157). He writes: ‘Dieses Seiende wird nicht besorgt, sondern steht in der Fürsorge’ ([1927] 2006, p. 121). I believe that something that motivates Heidegger to make this distinction is precisely the fact that a usual way in which one cares about another person as a person is by caring for her about something one takes to be relevant to her wellbeing and flourishing.
- 14.
I do not mean to suggest that in order to come to share a concern with someone else we have to, in a first move, come to care about the wellbeing and flourishing of this person. Indeed, although Helm does not touch on this issue, we could add to the picture of the ‘mechanisms’ by means of which we come to share some concerns with certain other individuals those cases in which, as a consequence of our being involved (as objects of care or solicitude) in normal child rearing practices, we come to respond emotionally in certain manners (and not in others) to some occurrences that have, either in themselves or in view of further possible occurrences, import to those other individuals who care about us. Salmela, I think, is partially addressing these sorts of shared concerns when he points to socially grounded but only moderately collective concerns (cf. 2012, p. 40). In some cases, we can exclusively from a third-person perspective speak of a concern shared by the involved individuals. Moreover, we can do so only because a number of individuals do not have to understand a concern they have as a shared concern in order to share it in an undemanding sense of ‘sharing’.
- 15.
I cannot address here the specific ‘mechanisms’ by means of which we learn to respond emotionally in particular ways (and not in others) to certain occurrences. This is an issue Goldie, to some extent, discusses under the heading of the ‘recognition-response tie’ (cf. 2000, pp. 28ff.).
- 16.
In Emotional Reason, Helm generalizes this point concerning the importance of recognizing that the significance something has can exhibit an instrumental character. He writes: ‘The instrumental principle […] is not a one-way directive, imposing a requirement merely on the necessary means having import for the sake of that end […]. Rather, a failure of the means to have this merely instrumental import is a failure of the coherence of the broader pattern constitutive of the import of the end, and such a failure itself may begin to undermine the import of that end’ (2001, p. 119).
- 17.
Heidegger differentiates two forms of solicitude (or caring-for). He writes that an act of solicitude ‘can, as it were, take away “care” from the Other and put itself in his position in concern: it can leap in for him. […] In contrast to this, there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him [ihm vorausspringt] in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his “care” but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time’ ([1927] 1962, pp. 158–159). None of these two forms of solicitude corresponds necessarily to what I call caring-with, but there probably are acts which are at the same time comprehensible as acts of caring-for and as acts of caring-with.
- 18.
In particular, I do not believe that behavioral, experiential, or neurophysiologic synchrony of the participants can be seen as a sufficient and/or necessary condition for collective affective intentionality. As to the non-sufficient character of this condition, it may be argued that an alignment of bodily feelings, behavioral segments, and/or neuronal activity is also thinkable in situations in which the involved individuals are experiencing a similar emotion in a merely parallel way. Concerning the non-necessary character of this condition, one could appeal to the case of a number of individuals (e.g. the members of a revolutionary party) who, on the basis of a shared attitude (e.g. rage against the oppressing system of a country), on different occasions, i.e. in a non-synchronous way, emotionally respond to certain worldly events as members of this party, thereby contributing to their emotional response to certain occurrences that have significance to them.
- 19.
The point is not that the mode of caring-about I call caring-with has a for-the-sake-of-which that goes beyond the relevant subject of concern, as it were. As already pointed out, while caring with certain others about something we are not caring about this thing for the sake of someone or something else, but for our own sake insofar as we understand ourselves as members of the relevant group; for the sake of a group we constitute.
- 20.
Here, I am illustrating the point by appealing to a case of collective affective intentionality that is at the same time understandable as a case of shared emotion. But, as we shall come to see, I could have offered an example that involves emotions of different kinds—provided these emotions were understandable as affective acts that express a mode of caring-about whose for-the-sake-of-which corresponds to the group at issue.
- 21.
The thought just developed allows us to begin to dismantle an epistemological worry which is related to the suggestion that at the bottom of our acts of feeling-towards together we find a felt conviction to the effect that we (the involved individuals) are, in the circumstances at issue, caring about something together. The worry concerns the insight that one could always be mistaken in taking the relevant others to also be experiencing the sort of felt conviction that is at issue here. It is undeniable that one’s felt conviction to the effect that we (the participating individuals) are, in a given circumstance, caring about something together can always be misleading. And this is definitively not a minor point. For participating in an episode of collective affective intentionality, as mentioned above (at the end of Chap. 3, footnote 46), cannot simply be a matter of experiencing some affectively based togetherness in the presence of certain others (and in relation to a given occurrence). At a minimum, it has to mean to experience this togetherness together with these others. But it is important to note that the suggestion that we can, if required, justify this felt conviction is not a puzzling one. The reason is because this suggestion is not based on the idea that we can somehow compare our feelings with the feelings of the relevant others. Rather, it is based on the idea that there are situations in which the responses of the relevant others are best understood as acts that express that they are caring about something on behalf of the group we (the participants) jointly constitute. This is not a mere consolation. For not every behavior can be said to be best understood in this way. Indeed, a number of behaviors do not allow for such an interpretation.
- 22.
This suggestion to the effect that the ultimate for-which of a collective affective intentional act is always a group—a group the participants take themselves to constitute—amounts to an elaboration on a number of ideas developed (in different terms) by Helm in a series of contributions to which the present proposal, as it has been repeatedly acknowledged, owes much. Elaborating on Schmid (2014a), I am developing these thoughts by claiming that it is not the focus of the relevant emotions, but their for-the-sake-of-which (which only sometimes corresponds to the focus of these emotions) that is ultimately shared. This suggestion that the emotions of the participants in an episode of collective affective intentionality do not necessarily have the same focus, but, as a matter of necessity, refer back to the same pluripersonal subject of concern is probably the only important respect in which the picture of collective affective intentionality developed in this book departs from the inspiring view of shared emotions developed by Helm (2008, 2010).
- 23.
This is not to suggest that these forms of shared affectivity are less common or that they play a less important role in our everyday life. The point is only that they are not understandable as forms of collective affective intentionality. The reason is because they do not fit to the basic definition of a collective affective intentional episode offered at the beginning of our inquiry. Just to recall, I have proposed in a first move (and drawing on Scheler) that in a collective affective intentional episode the involved individuals can be taken to feel affectively connected to one another as an immediate result of their being emotionally related to one and the same worldly occurrence in a particular way.
- 24.
There probably are ‘less exemplary’ cases of emotional convergence in which the involved individuals come to experience some togetherness. But I think that what makes them to be less exemplary is precisely the fact that in these cases one could allege either that the involved individuals have some understanding of themselves as members of a sort of social group or that an additional intentional act of another sort has brought them to understand themselves as individuals who are affectively close to one another.
- 25.
To be sure, there are certain forms of caring-for we can also immediately rule out as candidates of collective affective intentionality. I mean those forms of solicitude that are related to situations in which in the context of a concrete occurrence we come to care about the wellbeing of another person precisely because this person is not able to care about this wellbeing. This is a common experience among parents (or caregivers more generally) of infants, children, and even adolescents, who seem to not yet be able to ‘see’ some risks associated with a number of situations and behaviors. Indeed, one could say that the less the (beloved) person for whom one is caring is able to care about her own wellbeing, the more one tends to care about it (and for this person).
- 26.
Note that it is utterly irrelevant that the project at issue is one that primarily concerns Claude’s existence.
- 27.
In a real-life case one would probably encounter a mixed picture. On the one hand, one would encounter persons who are jointly responding as members of a ‘freshly constituted’ group to the significance of this disaster (and of a number of related events). On the other hand, one would encounter sets of individuals who are feeling alongside each other in the face of this occurrence; an occurrence that certainly affects them all, but to which they are not responding in a joint manner—we should prefer to say that this occurrence affects ‘each of them’.
- 28.
I am grateful to Fanny Gómez for drawing my attention to these sorts of cases.
- 29.
Gilbert would probably take this account to be unsatisfactory as an account of a collective guilt feeling. The reason is because, as we have seen, in her view, we can talk of a genuinely collective feeling of guilt just in case we can attribute this emotional attitude to the group itself (to the plural subject). But, as I have been trying to show, appealing to a clear criterion—namely whether or not the involved individuals can be said to be caring with one another (or as members of a group)—, my account allows us to tell apart in a principled way those cases we would on an intuitive basis classify as belonging to two different categories. I believe that to this extent, my account should be taken to be ‘clarifying enough’. There is a point, however, Gilbert could wish to stress in order to show that her view has more explanatory power: her account, she could argue, permits us to explain why we are inclined to speak of a shared guilt feeling in cases in which most of the individuals alluded to do not really feel guilt. Personally, I think that we do not have grounds to speak in these cases of a collective guilt feeling. It is just a common way of talking.
- 30.
Recall that, according to Scheler, the feelings of grief of the individuals involved in the situation he describes constitute one and the same feeling-act [dieselbe Gefühlsregung], in the sense of constituting an act of feeling-together [Miteinanderfühlen] (cf. the discussion in Sect. 1.1).
- 31.
I believe that this is in line with Schmid’s proposal that the solution to the Problem of Shared Feelings is phenomenological, and not metaphysical, in nature. As already mentioned, the problem I see is that Schmid’s phenomenological solution is probably not able to calm the philosophical anxieties of someone who expects the solution of a metaphysical problem to also be metaphysical. This is why, in an attempt to take seriously Scheler’s suggestion, I have preferred to develop an argument that indirectly shows that, in order to offer a phenomenologically adequate account of collective affective intentionality, we do not have to neutralize some metaphysical worries the Problem of Shared Feelings may be (erroneously) taken to point out.
- 32.
As I have been arguing, they could be said to do so to the extent to which some group they constitute may be taken to amount to the shared for-the-sake-of-which of their emotions.
- 33.
There is a difficulty one faces while trying to philosophically make a strong case for the existence of the feelings I call feelings of being-together. Given the non-intentional (i.e. merely pre-intentional) nature of existential feelings, it is difficult to recognize from a first-person perspective whether a background feeling of familiarity, for instance, has its root in our sharing some concerns with the other participants or in other conditions that define the situation at issue. Put another way, a pre-intentional feeling of familiarity just is a feeling of familiarity (and not a feeling of familiarity concerning this or that particular occurrence). It should be possible, however, to determine empirically whether or not such a sense of familiarity is related in a sufficiently consistent way to the presence of a particular group of individuals who share a series of concerns. This empirical work still has to be conducted. Here, I only argue for the conceivability of the sorts of existential feelings I call feelings of being-together.
- 34.
This idea is at the root of what Husserl calls ‘genetic phenomenology’ as well as of a late development of Husserl’s philosophy Anthony Steinbock (1995) calls ‘generative phenomenology’.
- 35.
Antonio Calcagno offers a different picture of what Walther is ultimately after. He takes Walther to be pointing to ‘a deep psychological structure of habit that allows us [the members of some group] to continue to experience ourselves as a community […] even though we are not always conscious of [being a community]’ (Calcagno 2012, p. 89). To point to this possibility is relevant against the background of the view Calcagno attributes to Walther, according to which ‘any full and real experience of community must be defined in terms of [a] conscious, lived experience of being one with others, being similar to them and feeling together as one’ (p. 91).
- 36.
This image of people who are on the same wavelength could serve as an entry into a certainly important topic with which I do not deal in this study. This topic concerns some of the psychological and neurophysiologic mechanisms that, as it has been argued, correlate with situations in which feelings of solidarity, rapport, affiliation, and/or interpersonal liking arise. Salmela suggests that the study of these mechanisms is required ‘to explain the collectivity of [shared] emotional experience’ (2012, p. 41). In line with this suggestion, an anonymous reviewer of the manuscript of this book has invited me to revise the existing body of empirical evidence concerning the association of some of the feelings just mentioned with different types of synchrony of the interacting individuals, such as synchronized motor representations (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004), body postures and gaze patterns (Shockley et al. 2009), facial expressions (Chartrand and Bargh 1999; Bourgois and Hess 2008), and/or heart rate (Vikhoff et al. 2013). This reviewer seems to take this literature to be central to the present discussion; the point being that, on the basis of this body of empirical evidence, one could argue that physiological and behavioral synchrony between individuals is experienced as mutual feelings of togetherness. The study of these sorts of mechanisms could definitively complement the present discussion on the experiential background structures of collective affective intentionality. But a phenomenological elucidation of that which serves as a ground for certain sorts of experiences is, as discussed above (cf. the discussion in Sect. 1.3), not the study of certain causes, mechanisms, and/or processes that might be argued to correlate with or even ‘underlie’ these experiences. I furthermore disagree that the existing empirical evidence to the effect that we mimic facial, vocal, and postural expressions of emotion more with those with whom we affiliate by virtue of a shared group membership than with out-group members (cf. Hess et al. 2014) could be taken to show that the synchronization of the participants’ emotions is an essential aspect of typical instances of collective emotions, as this reviewer has objected to my claim that synchronization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for collective affective intentionality (cf. footnote 18 above). I believe, however, that this literature could support the idea that there are certain feelings properly so called, i.e. somatosensorically based felt manners of understanding a situation, that are at the core of our circumstantially specific sense that we are a part of some community. Moreover, in line with the suggestion that there typically are historical preconditions of collective affective intentionality, it would be interesting, as proposed by this reviewer, to take a look, for instance, at the processes of synchrony that operate in small-scale, egalitarian joint action with little specialization of roles and high stability of the co-agents (cf. Pacherie 2014). For these processes may be argued to facilitate instances of collective emotions. Such a discussion could give some flesh to the claim that it is normally in virtue of their having taken part in shared enculturation processes and previous interactions that people come to be prepared to actualize in particular situations their natural ability to feel-towards together.
- 37.
This is in line with Calcagno’s claim that Walther is pointing to the fact that ‘there are noetic and noematic sides to the oneness, which ultimately determine the quality of communal consciousness’ (2012, p. 93).
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Sánchez Guerrero, H.A. (2016). Being Together and Caring-With. In: Feeling Together and Caring with One Another. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33735-7_6
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