Naval Arms Control and Regional Negotiations: Precedents, Issues, and Implications

Keefer, Scott Andrew

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-39645-3_5

Scott Andrew Keefer²

273 Accesses

Abstract

Whereas the previous chapter set out the failure of grand disarmament schemes, this chapter illustrates through concrete examples that Britain recognized the potential of naval arms control. The chapter details two naval arms negotiations at the turn of the century, including a 1901–1903 British endeavour to halt a South American arms race and a renegotiation of an older Anglo-American armaments treaty. The chapter then turns to specific questions of naval arms control, explaining why naval armaments could be realistically limited when land armaments could not, and how arms control reinforced British naval acquisition policies. The Admiralty exploited Britain’s industrial advantages to rapidly respond to naval construction by other countries, relying on an ability to detect rival building programs through existing diplomatic methods, with sufficient time to counter construction with faster domestic production.

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Notes

1.
More recently, on the comparative Franco-Russian and German threats, see Matthew S. Seligmann, “Britain’s Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–1906,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 6 (2012): 861. Seligmann accepted the revisionist view regarding relative Admiralty concern with submarines and torpedo flotilla craft rather than battleships, but held Germany to be a more significant factor in these concerns. Seligmann, The Royal Navy and the German Threat, 1901–1914: Admiralty Plans to Protect British Trade in a War against Germany, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 171.
2.
Ardagh, Memorandum on Hostilities between Turkey and Greece, Mar. 23, 1897, FO 881/6907 (1897); Ardagh, Turco-Greek Frontier Strategical Rectification, June 30, 1897, in Ardagh Papers, Memoranda and Reports, PRO 30/40/14, (1896–1901) at 240.
3.
Zsis Fotakis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910–1919 (London: Routledge, 2005), 14–15. The addition would have allowed Greece to even challenge the Hapsburg Navy on reasonable terms. Fotakis, Greek Naval Policy, 11.
4.
Monson to Salisbury, May 7, 1897, No. 147, in Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of South-Eastern Europe, FO 881/6994 (May 1897); Michel Lhéritier, Histoire Diplomatique De La Grèce De 1821 a Nos Jours, Vol. IV (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1926), 410.
5.
Robert N. Burr, “The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America: An Exploratory Essay,” Hispanic American Historical Review 35, no. 1 (1955).
6.
Donald E. Worcester, “Naval Strategy in the War of the Pacific,” Journal of Interamerican Studies 5, no. 1 (1963).
7.
Moreover, Chile furthered the image by employing German military instructors and adopting the spiked Prussian helmet for the army.
8.
Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money, 131.
9.
In that war, instead of a direct overland assault, Chilean ironclads fought and defeated their Peruvian adversaries, then exploited command of the sea to undertake a direct naval invasion of Lima, followed by an advance inland. Worcester, “Naval Strategy.” Mahan formulated his theories of sea power while stationed at Lima, Peru during the conflict. Larrie D. Ferreiro, “Mahan and the ‘English Club’ of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of the Influence of Sea Power Upon History,” Journal of Military History 72 (2008).
10.
Chile could even challenge the United States in South American waters. A. T. Volwiler, “Harrison, Blaine, and American Foreign Policy, 1889–1893,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 79, no. 4 (1938): 641–42.
11.
Total tonnage of the two fleets were as follows:
Chile
Argentina
1891
24,190
11,734
1896
38,957
25,240
1898
46,207
46,692
1900
50,530
53,532
1903^a
76,056
100,782
1. ^a 1903 figures represent probable levels had purchases made at the height of the arms race been completed. George von Rauch, Conflict in the Southern Cone: The Argentine Military and the Boundary Dispute with Chile, 1870–1902 (London: Praeger, 1999), 150–54
12.
The European governments followed the conference closely, so the diplomatic lesson would have been known to Germany. Moreover, some evidence suggests that Germany sought to prevent the conference from accomplishing its goals. A. Curtis Wilgus, “The Second International American Conference at Mexico City,” Hispanic American Historical Review 11, no. 1 (1931): 43–44.
13.
Id.: 34; Robert N. Burr, “By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830–1905,” University of California Publications in History 77 (1965): 228–44.
14.
As noted by von Rauch, Southern Cone, 184.
15.
Gosling to Salisbury, Apr. 2, 1898, in Chile – Diplomatic, FO 16/316, (1898) at 53.
16.
Gosling to Salisbury, Aug. 1, 1898, in Chile – Diplomatic, FO 16/317, (1898) at 108. In June, a Chilean newspaper calculated the relative balance of strength of the two navies, finding that Chile still retained a sufficient margin of force to attack. Using an undefined “coefficient” to determine the strength of major fleet units, it arrived at the conclusion that Chile maintained a 510:457 superiority over its rival, although recent acquisitions of armored cruisers favored the latter state, accounting for 100 and 300 points of the respective totals. Gosling to Salisbury, June 28, 1898, in FO 16/316, at 203.
17.
Gosling to Salisbury, Aug. 3, 1898, in FO 16/317, at 113.
18.
Gosling to Salisbury, Mar. 1, 1899, in Chile – Diplomatic, FO 16/324, (1899) at 48.
19.
Ardagh reflected on this risk in advocating Britain shoulder the immediate expenses of surveying the border. “That alone would be a great gain, when the large financial interests of Great Britain in both Chili and Argentina are considered. We must also reflect that if war broke out between those countries, it is not improbable that the conflagration might extend over adjacent states, so, on the whole, the extra cost of a Survey Party would be a well spent insurance.” Memo by Ardagh, Chili–Argentine Arbitration Tribunal, Dec. 28, 1901, in Argentina–Chile Boundary Arbitration, FO 16/356, (1896–1902) Part II, at 372.
20.
Robert Burr, “By Reason or by Force,” at 248.
21.
Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, Jan. 19, 1901, in Chile – Diplomatic, FO 16/331, (1901) at 55.
22.
Barrington to Villiers, July 13, 1898, in FO 16/356, Part I, at 22.
23.
Memorandum by Oakes, Chile–Argentine Arbitration, Nov. 7, 1902, in Argentine–Chile Boundary Arbitration, FO 16/357, (1902) at 399.
24.
“There is always some danger – especially in S. & C. America – of difficulties arising if our diplomatic or Consular officers are permitted to arbitrate.” Foreign Office Memo, Aug. 26, 1901, in FO 16/331, at 316; “It would be a thankless and unsatisfactory office to judge from past history …” Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, Aug. 26, 1901, in FO 16/331.
25.
Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, Dec. 23, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 367.
26.
Argentina maintained that while it called its ambassador home in the midst of the crisis, Chile continued to be represented in Buenos Aires, so there was never a complete rupture. Barrington to Lansdowne, Dec. 22, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 352. However, the underlying message of such an action taken at the height of a crisis, clearly indicated a break in relations.
27.
Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, Dec. 12, 1901, and Dec. 13, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 339, 341.
28.
Barrington to Lansdowne, and Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, both Dec. 22, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 352, 353.
29.
Barrington to Lansdowne, Dec. 27, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, 381.
30.
Lansdowne had prepared a course of action if war appeared imminent, which specifically required approval of the King, who was at Sandringham, and Salisbury, holidaying at Hatfield. They were duly contacted on December 30 when it was feared war had broken out. Viliers to Salisbury, Dec. 30, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 397.
31.
Holdich to Viliers, Jan. 6, 1902, in FO 16/356, Part III, at 453.
32.
Draft Telegram, undated, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 401.
33.
Foreign Office to Cusack-Smith, Dec. 12, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 338.
34.
Boyce has calculated that the expenses for the exchange of two ten-word telegrams between Australia and Great Britain, further away than Chile, but still a comparable distance, cost the equivalent of several weeks’ wages for the average worker. While the government received reductions in return for subsidies, the cost was still extraordinary. Robert W. D. Boyce, “Imperial Dreams and National Realities: Britain, Canada and the Struggle for a Pacific Telegraph Cable, 1879–1902,” English Historical Review 115, no. 460 (2000): 45, 66. This was at a point when fiscal restrictions were so tight, the Chilean legation even asked permission to purchase a flag to replace the weather-beaten Union Jack hanging in front of their office. Gosling to Salisbury, Mar. 7, 1898, in FO 16/316, at 36.
35.
Barrington to Lansdowne, Apr. 24, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 51.
36.
Chilean authorities had already held a lengthy meeting with British naval architect Sir Edward Reed in December, resulting in the order of the two vessels in Britain. Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, Dec. 23, 1901, in FO 16/356, Part II, at 354. The vessels were specially designed for Chile, for delivery in twenty months. Lowther to Lansdowne, Apr. 8, 1902, in FO 16/ 357, at 17.
37.
Barrington to Revelstoke, Mar. 25, 1902, in FO 16/356, Part III, at 600. On the banking presence in Chile and Argentina, see Gustavo Ferrari, Conflicto Y Paz Con Chile (1898–1903) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1968), 56.
38.
Cusack-Smith to Lansdowne, June 18, 1901, and Nov. 18, 1901, in FO 16/331, at 138, 236.
39.
Lowther to Lansdowne, Apr. 8, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 12.
40.
Lowther to Lansdowne, Apr. 3, 1902, in Chile – Diplomatic, FO 16/336, (1902) at 70.
41.
Barrington to Lansdowne, Apr. 10, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 29.
42.
Barrington to Lansdowne, Mar. 7, 1902, in FO 16/356, Part III, at 589.
43.
The British role was expressly stated in the preamble to the resulting naval arms control treaty. “Convention between Chile and the Argentine Republic Respecting the Limitation of Naval Armaments, May 28 1902,” American Journal of International Law 1, no. 3 Supplement (1907). [hereinafter 1902 Chilean-Argentine Convention].
44.
See Barrington to Lansdowne, May 17, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 90.
45.
Barrington to Lansdowne, Apr. 19, 1902, and Lowther to Lansdowne, Apr. 20, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 41, 45.
46.
Draft Telegram, Apr. 21, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 47.
47.
Barrington to Lansdowne, Apr. 24, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 51.
48.
Barrington to Lansdowne, Apr. 30, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 63.
49.
The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 forbade the sale of warships to belligerents, but the law did not apply in time of peace. Nonetheless, the British government exercised significant influence over the sales by private firms, as seen in their seizure of dreadnoughts being built for Turkey in 1914.
50.
Lowther to Lansdowne, May 1, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 65.
51.
Barrington to Lansdowne, May 2, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 69.
52.
Lowther to Lansdowne, May 20, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 100.
53.
Barrington to Lansdowne, May 21, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 101.
54.
1902 Chilean–Argentine Convention, Art. I.
55.
Id. Art. II.
56.
Id. Art. II.
57.
Id. Art. I.
58.
Id. Art. III.
59.
“General Arbitration Treaty between the Argentine Republic and Chile, May 28, 1902,” American Journal of International Law 6, no. 2 Supplement (1912).
60.
Explanatory Protocol, ¶ 2, annexed to 1902 Chilean-Argentine Convention.
61.
Id. at 2.
62.
Lowther to Lansdowne, Aug. 10, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 281.
63.
See Speech by Serrano Montaner, on the Arbitration Award, enclosure in Lowther to Lansdowne, Dec. 14, 1902, in FO 16/357, at 505.
64.
“Agreement Concluded and Signed between the Argentine Republic and Chile, Giving Effect to the Terms of the Convention of May 28, 1902, for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, January 9, 1903,” American Journal of International Law 1, no. 3 Supplement (1907): Art. 1.
65.
Id. at Arts. 2, 3, & 7.
66.
Id. at Art. 1.
67.
Id. at Art. 4.
68.
Id. at Art. 5.
69.
Id. at Art. 6.
70.
Lowther to Lansdowne, Jan. 8, 1903, in Argentine–Chile Boundary Arbitration, FO 16/358, Part I, (1903–1905), at 5.
71.
Gardiner, Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1860–1905, 39.
72.
Haggard to Lansdowne, Mar. 25, 1904, in FO 16/358, Part III, at 428.
73.
Cremer, Hansard 4th ser., CXLVII, 867–869 June 6, 1905.
74.
Memorandum, Arbitration and Disarmament Treaty between Argentina and Chile, June 5, 1905, in FO 16/358, Part III, at 448. The memorandum updated a document that had been previously circulated in the Foreign Office in 1903.
75.
Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money, 149.
76.
Dering to Grey, July 25, 1906, in Brazil, FO 371/13, (1906).
77.
Barclay to Grey, Oct. 5, 1906, in FO 371/13, at 246.
78.
Baring to Mildmay, Oct. 12, 1906, enclosure in Minutes, Nov. 28, 1906, in FO 371/13, at 284.
79.
Barclay to Grey, Oct. 15, 1906, in FO 371/13, at 250.
80.
Confidential Negotiations with regard to the Brazilian Naval Armaments, enclosure in Minutes, Nov. 28, 1906, in FO 371/13, at 257.
81.
Tornquist to Buchanan, Sep. 28, 1906; Buchanan to Tornquist, Oct. 5, 1906, both enclosures in id. at 261A, 268.
82.
Baring to Mildmay, Oct. 12, 1906, enclosure in id.
83.
O’Sullivan-Beare to Grey, Nov. 10, 1906, in FO 371/13, at 291.
84.
C. Barter, Shipbuilding on the Great Lakes and the Treaty of 1817, Apr. 27 1892, in FO 5/2598.
85.
“A Ship-Building Port,” The New York Times, Jan. 15, 1892, quoted in Shipbuilding on the Great Lakes and the Treaty of 1817, at 38, id.
86.
“How to Shell Chicago,” Chicago Tribune, Dec. 20, 1895, enclosure in Vansittart to Salisbury, Dec. 21, 1895, in FO 5/2598.
87.
1891 Plan of Operations in Case of War with Great Britain, War Portfolios, Navy Department, 1, 8, 13. This 1891 plan called for the arming of merchant steamers on the Great Lakes to circumvent perceived American weakness.
88.
Pauncefote to Salisbury, Apr. 14, 1892, in FO 5/2598. By 1890, Great Lakes shipbuilders launched 40°percent more vessels than those of the coasts, and could build ships up to 400 feet in length, longer than the largest American battleships under construction. “Lake Shipbuilders,” Army and Navy Journal, Jan. 30, 1892, at 395, in FO 5/2598. Great Lakes shipbuilders would still be limited by the canal locks, which limited vessels to 240 feet length in order to pass through the locks. Id.
89.
In 1890, local dignitaries petitioned the government for a modern warship to replace the antiquated Michigan in time for the 1893 Colombian Exposition in Chicago, ultimately having to make do with a full-scale brick replica of an Indiana class battleship. Callahan, Neutrality of the American Lakes, at 18, fn. 1. The Illinois, as it was named, went on to become the headquarters for the state naval militia.
90.
Shipbuilding on the Great Lakes and the Treaty of 1817, at 4, in FO 5/2598.
91.
Pauncefote to Salisbury, May 3, 1892, in American Lakes: Naval Force to be Maintained by United States and Great Britain, ADM 1/7340b (1897–1898), at 6. Specifically, the suggestion was that “any vessel built for the purpose of being used as a Revenue Cruiser or Vessel of War may be constructed so far only as regards the Hull, Masts, Spars etc. but shall not be plated, armed, equipped or rendered available as an armed vessel on the Lakes, and moreover that she shall be compelled to quit the Lakes within a specified time after the completion of her Hull, etc. as being mentioned with a view to her being transformed into an armed vessel at a Port of her nationality on the seaboard.” Id. at 7.
92.
“Baron Herschell is Dead,” New York Times, Mar, 2, 1899, at 5.
93.
Herschell to Salisbury, Aug. 29, 1898, attached to Nathan, Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee, Sep. 16, 1898, in Canada: American Warships on the Great Lakes, ADM 1/7474 (1892–1905).
94.
Nathan, Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee, Sep. 16, 1898, in ADM 1/7474, at 9. Moreover, the parties acknowledged that the current treaty already provided the right to build warships on the lakes, so long as they were not launched and brought into service, in response to circumstances in 1817. Herschell to Salisbury, Aug. 29, 1898, attached to Nathan, Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee.
95.
Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee, supra note 93.
96.
Id. The nuance between categories of vessels was further stretched when the Colonial Defence Committee minuted that no “men-of-war proper” would be allowed, no “actual war vessels” could be used for training, while revenue ships would be in a separate category, By December, Herschell had written home for further clarification, as the term “actual war vessels” in his previous instructions had left naval officers in both countries divided as to what this meant. American delegates also pointed out that guns could be kept on shore for rapid conversion of merchant ships into armed merchant cruisers, weakening the potential restriction. Herschell to Salisbury, Dec. 2, 1898, in ADM 1/7474, at 62.
97.
Herschell was inclined to accept these demands: “the jealousy of the individual States is such that each will exert great pressure to have a training ship for its exclusive use. And inasmuch as it will probably not be practicable to give what they would regard as their legitimate share of the ship-building trade to the ship-builders, I think this would afford an additional motive for complying with the wishes of the States. Any one who has not lived for some time in this country can, I think, scarcely realize the force of pressure which local interest brings to bear upon the Executive, and how apt they are to yield to such pressure, or how very difficult it is for them to resist it.” Id.
98.
Given the attention to wording apparent throughout the negotiations, the division between “naval armament” and “vessels of war” would indicate an intent to regulate other weaponry such as mines or torpedoes, as these had been discussed in negotiations.
99.
Proposal respecting Naval Vessels on the Great Lakes, enclosure in Herschell to Salisbury, Dec. 2, 1898, in ADM 1/7474, at 63. The term “armour-plated” had been substituted for the simpler American wording “plated” out of concern that the latter would ban the construction of iron-hulled vessels. Herschell to Salisbury, Dec. 2, 1898, in ADM 1/7474, at 62.
100.
The United States further suggested that the treaty be promulgated for a set period of years, and then be maintained unless the one year notice was given, although these details were not finalized in the draft. Id.
101.
Herschell to Salisbury, Aug. 29, 1898, in ADM 1, 7474, at 11.
102.
Not only did Salisbury know of the agreement, but Fisher and Ardagh were both involved in discussions of Canadian defences on the Great Lakes prior to serving on the British delegation at the First Hague Peace Conference. See, for instance, Lake to Fisher, Nov. 17, 1897, and following correspondence in ADM 1/7340b; Herschell to Salisbury, Dec. 2, 1898, and Foreign Office to Admiralty, Sep. 1898, in ADM 1/7474, at 6, 62.
103.
Colonial Office to Admiralty, Mar. 8, 1905, in ADM 1/7474, at 118; Grant-Duff, Armed Vessels on the Great Lakes, Defense and Operational Plans, WO 106/40/B1/15, (Nov. 1907); see also Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, at 335.
104.
In 1904, the United States operated three vessels on the Great Lakes, including the Essex, a 1375 ton vessel, built in 1876. Villiers, Memorandum, Mar. 8, 1905, in FO 5/2598, at 280; Fiddian to Villiers, Mar. 17, 1905, in FO 5/2598. In the early 1900s, the British operated two vessels in the Great Lakes exceeding the treaty limitations, the Constance and the Curlew. H.R. Doc. No. 56-471, Feb. 27, 1900, Message of the President of the United States, War Vessels on the Great Lakes, (1900) at 65. The British were careful to make sure their vessels were always smaller than their American counterparts, to avoid an arms race. Villiers, Memorandum, at 283.
105.
Grant-Duff, Armed Vessels on the Great Lakes, supra note 103, at ¶12. The War Office discussed the possibility of conveying torpedo boats and submarines to the lakes via railroads in time of emergency, and both sides contemplated arming merchant vessels as auxiliary cruisers. Percy Lake, Naval Action in Defence of the Question of the Great Lakes, Mar. 28, 1896, in Sir John Ardagh, Naval Action in Defence of the Question of the Great Lakes, in WO 106/40/B1/5 (1896); G.S. Admiralty Memo on the Defence of Canada, WO 106/40/B1/10, (Mar. 24, 1905).
106.
Cyprian Bridge, Minutes attached to Naval Force to be Maintained by United States and Great Britain on the American Lakes, May 20, 1892, in ADM 1/7340b, at 34. See also Defence of Canada: Memorandum by the Admiralty, Feb. 24, 1905, CAB 38/8/13, at 13 on the American construction of “Ninety-Day Warships” during the Civil War. The same issue of construction on the rivers had also been present in the Black Sea discussions in 1856.
107.
Cyprian Bridge, Minutes attached to Naval Defence of the American Lakes, July 14, 1892, in ADM 1/7340b, at 47; Minutes attached to Construction by the United States of Two Steam Revenue Cutters of the 1st Class for Service on the Great Lakes, Dec. 17, 1896, in ADM 1/7340b at 78. Moreover, the Admiralty expressed a belief that construction would be difficult to conceal. “If, for example, after a past of comparative neglect of her defences, the Dominion of Canada should suddenly display great activity in the preparation of a flotilla for service on the Great Lakes or in the formation of a permanent military force, other than for the defence of her seaports against a Maritime Power with which Great Britain might be at war, the secret could not be kept.” Observations by the Admiralty upon the War Office Memorandum of Dec. 13, 1904, on Defence of Canada, Jan. 6, 1905, attached to CAB 38/8/13, at 8.
108.
“It would also be in the power of the Americans, whilst adhering to the letter of the Agreement, to develop naval construction in places comparatively remote from the Lakes and avail themselves of the facilities afforded by existing water communications. Therefore they may be credited with ability to put on the Lakes forces which, in the end, would greatly outnumber any which we are likely able to oppose to them. Still their Lordships are of opinion that some advantages may remain to us if complete abrogation of the Agreement is avoided, though modifications may be introduced into it. They consider that naval requirements would be best met by leaving the United States’ government the responsibility for altering or terminating an arrangement which, as long as it is maintained, frees us from demands for naval protection which it might be difficult to resist and which would not be likely to lead to an effective distribution of our forces if complied with.” Draft of Cyprian Bridge to Colonial Office, May 31, 1892, ADM 1/7340b, at 37–38.
109.
See, for example, The Defence of Canada, Mar. 17, 1905, in WO 106/40/B1/10 (1905); Observations by the Admiralty upon the War Office Memorandum of Dec. 13, 1904, on Defence of Canada, Jan. 6, 1905, attached to CAB 38/8/13, at 12.
110.
Grant-Duff, notes attached to WO 106/40/B1/15.
111.
Extract from Meeting of Committee of Imperial Defence, July 13, 1905, in WO 106/40; Transport of Torpedo Boats by Rail to the Great Lakes, Canada, Feb. 28, 1898, in ADM 1/7340b.
112.
Lowther to Earle, Feb. 15, 1912, War Vessels on the Great Lakes, CO 537/496, (Mar. 7, 1912). Attached notes indicated Foreign Office approval of Lowther’s opinion.
113.
Earle to Lowther, Mar. 6, 1912, CO 537/496.
114.
Id.
115.
In fact, the British consul at the Dardanelles expressed suspicions about Russian warships passing the Straits in 1857, because they were pierced for more guns than their commander disclosed, it being noted that while they were within the size limits, it was impossible to verify the size of guns they carried. FO 881/1825, at 1.
116.
Buchanan to Granville, Dec. 12, 1870, FO 881/1901.
117.
FO 881/1825, at 2. The Russians inaugurated the Odessa Steam Navigation Company to provide vessels which could be quickly converted into warships. Palmerston fretted that Russia could surreptitiously violate the Black Sea Treaty in this manner, but believed preventing it would be impossible. W. E. Mosse, “Russia and the Levant, 1856–1862: Grand Duke Constantine Nicolaevich and the Russian Steam Navigation Company,” Journal of Modern History 26, no. 1 (1954): 40, 46.
118.
C. I. Hamilton, Anglo-French Naval Rivalry 1840–1870 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 29; McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, 225–27.
119.
“The interest of Europe is not that any one country should exercise a peculiar influence, but the true interest of Europe is to come to some one common accord, so as to enable every country to reduce those military armaments which belong to a state of war rather than of peace.” Sir Robert Peel, Hansard, 3rd ser., LIX, 403–404, Aug. 27, 1841. See also Sir Charles Napier, Hansard, 3rd ser., CLVI, 989, Feb. 13, 1860; Benjamin Disraeli, Hansard, 3rd ser., CLXIV, 1678–1682, July 26, 1861; Richard Cobden, The Political Writings of Richard Cobden, Vol. II (London: William Ridgway, 1867), 220–21, 84, 415–16.
120.
Tate, The Disarmament Illusion, 32–34. See, generally, Nicholls, “Cobden and the International Peace Congress Movement,” 363–64.
121.
Cobden, Writings, 432–33.
122.
Id., 259–60, 399–400. The latter visit fueled a naval panic when it was revealed that France had fifteen ironclads under construction, yet what remained noteworthy was that the information had been shared.
123.
Id., 431. Proposals centered on a bilateral solution to the Anglo-French race rather than a multilateral treaty. This reflected naval competition, as in 1860 Britain possessed 53 steam ships-of the-line with an additional nine blockships, while France operated 35. The next nearest naval competitor, Russia, manned nine steam ships-of-the-line. Data compiled from Jan Glete, Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860 (Stockholm: Historiska Institutionen, 1993), Vol. II.
124.
See debate of July 29, 1859 and particularly the speeches of Cobden, Sir John Packington, and Lord Clarence Paget, Hansard, 3rd ser., CLV, 676–728, July 29, 1859.
125.
Cobden, Writings, 299. In reality, the blockships were far more capable than critics originally claimed. Hamilton, Anglo-French Rivalry, 27–28.
126.
Sir William White, “Modern Warships,” Journal of the Society of the Arts 54 (1906): 868.
127.
Lord George Eversley, “Naval Scares,” Contemporary Review 90 (1906): 632–33; Marder, ed., Fear God and Dread Nought, Vol. II, No. 351, at 431.
128.
Britain attempted to limit other naval weapons which posed challenges to its battle fleets. British delegates advocated limits on submarines and torpedoes at The Hague in 1899, and also espoused the limitation of naval mines and auxiliary merchant cruisers at The Hague in 1907.
129.
Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy.
130.
“[T]he two navies would still have entire liberty to construct not only large vessels but also vessels of another type, perhaps hardly smaller, and that in unlimited number, by which the strength of such a fleet would perhaps become quite different from what it would be expected to be, according to the proportion fixed in the agreement. In fact the English have already placed under construction such an intermediary type, from which I infer that the idea of considering as a basis of the agreement the number of large vessels has already taken a greater hold upon them than upon us.” Von Ahlefeld, “A Basis for an Anglo-German Agreement,” Deutsche Review, May 1912, as quoted in Wehberg, Limitation of Armaments, 63, 64.
131.
Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution.
132.
Id. at 9, 15, 17–20, 135, 165, 166. Lambert claimed that Liberal politicians had less knowledge about how sea power worked than Balfour and the earlier Unionist government, 165–166. Sumida did point out that Balfour had been informed of the threat posed by torpedoes to battleships in narrow seas, and that Fisher had tried to convince Balfour to replace battleships with battlecruisers. Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, 55, 58. Nonetheless, professional opinion remained mixed about the value of the battleships, with no clear consensus on their obsolescence. Even Fisher recognized that a radical move such as immediately ending battleship construction in 1904 would be rejected by the Admiralty. Id. 52–53. There seems to be a clearer consensus among historians that Fisher only selectively shared information with politicians and colleagues, rarely providing anyone with his full plans or opinion.
133.
Thomas G. Otte “Grey Ambassador: The Dreadnought and British Foreign Policy,” in The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age, Robert J. Blyth, Andrew Lambert, & Jan Ruger, eds. (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 70.
134.
Theodore Ropp claimed that France possessed the ability to match British construction times in the 1880s, yet acknowledged that in practice the British completed battleships in around three years while France took ten to twelve. Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy, 59.
135.
Cobden, Writings, 219–20.
136.
Matthew S. Seligmann, Spies in Uniform: British Military and Naval Intelligence on the Eve of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 106–10; see also John F. Beeler, British Naval Policy in the Gladstone–Disraeli Era, 1866–1880 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 209; Hamilton, Anglo-French Rivalry, 275–77.
137.
Hamilton, Anglo-French Rivalry, 275.
138.
Arthur Otway, ed., Autobiography and Journals of Admiral Lord Clarence E. Paget (London: Chapman & Hall, 1896), 194–96.
139.
Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, 258–60.
140.
See, for example, British discussion of the likely effect of Canadian violations of the Rush-Bagot Agreement. CAB 38/8/13 at 8–9.
141.
“The most hopeful interpretation which can be placed upon this strange phenomenon is that naval and military rivalries are the modern substitute for what in earlier ages would have been actual wars; and just as credit transactions have in the present day so largely superceded [sic] cash payments, so the jealousies and disputes of nations are more and more decided by the mere possession of war power without the necessity for its actual employment.” Speech of Mr. Churchill, House of Commons, Parl. Deb., 5th ser., 1912, xxxv, 1573, Mar. 18, 1912.

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Bournemouth University, Poole, UK
Scott Andrew Keefer

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Keefer, S.A. (2016). Naval Arms Control and Regional Negotiations: Precedents, Issues, and Implications. In: The Law of Nations and Britain’s Quest for Naval Security. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39645-3_5

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39645-3_5
Published: 15 November 2016
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	Chile	Argentina
1891	24,190	11,734
1896	38,957	25,240
1898	46,207	46,692
1900	50,530	53,532
1903^a	76,056	100,782