Abstract
While the previous chapter considered empathy and compassion, this chapter looks at some reasons for why empathy and compassion sometimes fail to prevail. What could be the reasons that some dismiss or even lack empathy? Furthermore, where does free will come in? Is there something like free will or is free will always relative to a specific factor? Is free will equal to being free? In my opinion having free will and being free is not entirely the same. For instance, a drug addict may have freely chosen to start taking drugs, but after some time it is the drug that chooses the addict who is no longer a free person. Take the following example. I am completely free to choose what I want to do today, I may choose to continue writing on my book or I may choose to do something entirely different. However, I am not free from my duty to submit the book in time. Then, of course, one could try to refrain from making a choice, thinking in terms of ‘what has to happen also happens’. However, that will not work, one will end up making a choice because “[w]e cannot think away our free will” (Searle 2007: 43). However, that we cannot think away our free will does not mean that we have absolute free will. In turn, this does not mean that free will is an illusion. As Searle expresses, “free will is a genuine feature of the world” (Searle 2007: 58). Therefore, it needs to have neurological correlations. The choices we make cannot be detached from our neurological set-up. This implies that human free will to do good or bad is at least partly hardwired in the brain.
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Notes
- 1.
My translation from Danish.
- 2.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/accessed 5 February 2016.
- 3.
The difference between Kant’s moral philosophy and Utilitarianism is that Kant sees the good will as an end while Utilitarianists see the good will as a means, i.e. in a derivative sense.
- 4.
Kant does not believe in the doctrine that Jesus Christ took away the guilt of previous evil (vicarious atonement) but argues that we should see Christ’s actions as an example (exemplary atonement).
- 5.
Perhaps this note is unnecessary but Kant did not have access to psychological or neuroscientific studies on moral behavior as we have today.
- 6.
Of course, a lack or loss of empathy and an increase of violence may also be caused by drug abuse.
- 7.
The amygdala which is located in the middle part of the temporal lobes is one of the oldest structures in the brain and controls and mediates virtually all high-order emotional functions. However, as argued above, one should be aware of the fact that no neural activity stands alone. Amongst other neural functions the amygdala is connected to frontal lobe activity which is maintained to be responsible for higher cognitive functions. Epileptogenic focus is the area of the cerebral cortex (the outer portion of the brain) responsible for causing epileptic seizures.
- 8.
Also in the superior temporal sulcus, the anterior insular, and the areas of the premotor cortex. Both the cognitive (frontal) and affective (limbic) processes are interwoven in neural networks that participate in mediating the empathic response (high-level empathy).
- 9.
fMRI studies on the perception of pain in others also showed that there is a difference in neural activity when evaluating the pain of others compared to evaluating one’s own pain.
- 10.
I have already shown the importance of the amygdala, the frontal and temporal cortex and the insula for empathy to emerge. The striatum, or neostriatum or striat nucleus is a subcortical part of the forebrain and very significant for the reward system.
- 11.
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/jonestown1.html accessed 15 February 2016.
- 12.
We are not discussing the sect-leaders, only the members.
- 13.
http://www.neh.gov/humanities/2014/marchapril/feature/the-trial-hannah-arendt accessed 21 Aug. 2014.
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Runehov, A.L.C. (2016). Free Will, Responsibility and Moral Evil. In: The Human Being, the World and God. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44392-8_6
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