Abstract
The aim of this paper is to summarise the standard ‘Constitutional political economy’ approach to fiscal constitutions, focusing on the circumstances in which explicitly fiscal restrictions will be called for, and directing attention to the key concerns and attributes of the standard approach—specifically, the contractarian normative framework and the emphasis on feasibility. That standard approach is then contrasted with an explicitly “Hobbesian” approach, where the feasibility of constitutional contract itself is a matter of contention and where for that reason there are limits to the application of standard contractarian notions. It is arguably more useful within the Hobbesian frame to conceive the constitution as a form of covenant, for which the appropriate analytic framework is the ‘trust’ game rather than exchange as such.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
- 2.
See, for example, “The Relevance of Pareto Optimality”; “Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Political Economy” in Buchanan (1999).
- 3.
Buchanan (1999), p. 228.
- 4.
- 5.
See Buchanan (1991).
- 6.
See “The Relevance of Pareto Optimality” p. 211.
- 7.
As argued, most notably, in Buchanan’s The Limits of Liberty.
- 8.
We have placed “coercion” in inverted commas here because there is a question as to whether what is at stake here is ‘coercion’ at all. It is after all something that by hypothesis all consent to. Perhaps, it can be thought of as the collective equivalent of being forced to pay for the car that one drives off the car lot, or the food one buys in the supermarket. For, note that the (legal) requirement to pay for such things reflects a collectively defined and enforced property order to which the purchaser may not have explicitly consented and perhaps in some (few) cases may not on balance benefit from.
- 9.
Buchanan seems to suppose the opposite in his “Before Public Choice”; this seems to us to be a departure from strict Hobbesian logic.
References
Brennan, G., and J.M. Buchanan. 1980. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, J.M. 1969. (Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.
Buchanan, J.M. (1982). The Domain of Subjective economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy. In Method, Process, and Austrian Economics: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises, ed. M. Kurzner, 7–20. Lexington: D.C. Heath).
Buchanan, J.M. (1991). The Foundations for Normative Individualism. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order, 221–229. Ann Harbor: University of Michigan Press.
Buchanan, J.M. 1999 “The Relevance of Pareto Optimality”; “Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Political Economy”. In The Collected Works, ed. James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press.
Lindahl, E. (1919). Just Taxation—A Positive Solution. In Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, eds. R. Musgrave and A. Peacock (1967). London: Macmillan.
Locke, J. 1689. Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rousseau, J.J. 1762. The Social Contract. London: Penguin Classics.
Wicksell, K. 1896. A New Theory of Just Taxation. In Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, eds. R. Musgrave and A. Peacock (1967). London: Macmillan.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Brennan, G., Eusepi, G. (2016). Hobbesian and Contractarian Constitutions. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S.. The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47471-7_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47471-7_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-47469-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-47471-7
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)