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Non-Cartesian Dualism and Meso-relational Media

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Physics of the Human Mind

Part of the book series: Understanding Complex Systems ((UCS))

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Abstract

In Chap. 1 (Sect. 1.7) I have introduced the concept of effective dualism as a useful approach to developing mathematical models of human behavior. Within this approach the human person is considered to be composed of two complementary components, objective and subjective ones, which possess their own properties and are governed by their own laws. It is essential that these properties and laws belong to a macrolevel description regarding human individuals as whole entities. Thereby any question about how the objective and subjective components are related to each other at physiological, biochemical, or even deeper levels is beyond the scope of this approach. So a reader may pose a question as to whether the effective dualism is something more than a merely epistemological approach introduced for the sake of convenience. The main goal of this chapter is to ague for the existence of a certain ontological ground of effective dualism. In particular, in this chapter we discuss fundamental reasons for considering the objective and subjective components ontologically irreducible to each other.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Zoroastrianism is the ancient pre-Islamic religion of Iran. In India this religion known under the name Parsiism appeared due to the descendants of Zoroastrian Iranian (Persian) immigrants. Founded by the Iranian prophet and reformer Zoroaster in the sixth century BC, Zoroastrianism contains both monotheistic and dualistic features. It influenced the other major Western religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Duchesne-Guillemin 2015).

  2. 2.

    The religious groups conventionally classified as gnostic did not belong to a single movement, they could differ remarkably in organization, teachings, and rituals; their common feature is a mythology that distinguishes between an inferior creator of the world (a demiurge) and a more transcendent god (e.g., Williams 2015).

  3. 3.

    A reader may raise an objection to the counter-intuitiveness argument just appealing to the history of physics. In the beginning, quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity also made assertions seemed to be counter-intuitive at that time. Responding to this argument let us note that quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity were developed when physicists started to deal with phenomena arising on atomic or astronomic scales, respectively, and people just had no relevant experience. As far as human mind is concerned, the situation is just opposite, at least, at the beginning of the last century there appeared several academic disciplines devoted to mental and cognitive activity of human beings in addition to the Western philosophy of mind with its long-term traditions of secular investigations.

  4. 4.

    Aquinas assumes that all the living beings except for humans possess only material souls (forms).

  5. 5.

    Heraclitus (c. 535–c. 475 BC), a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, is often cited as the father of process philosophy whose view was shared in part by Plato and Aristotle.

  6. 6.

    There is another point of view proposed by Melnyk where the concept of supervenience as extrinsic to the physical language is replaced by the idea that every token event or phenomenon is either itself physical or a physically realized token of a functional type. A reader interested in the corresponding version of “retentive realization physicalism” may be referred to monograph by Melnyk (2003).

  7. 7.

    The role of the analysis-synthesis strategy in the context of emergence has been discussed previously, here I return to it again in order to elucidate the basic premises of my version of dualism.

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    Ihor Lubashevsky

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Lubashevsky, I. (2017). Non-Cartesian Dualism and Meso-relational Media. In: Physics of the Human Mind. Understanding Complex Systems. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51706-3_5

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