Abstract
Program funding volatility in the Army’s budget is surprisingly insensitive to a program’s functional capability, relative size, manufacturer, number of jobs generated by the program, or the U.S. state in which the program is primarily produced. No single factor can decisively account for unstable budget outcomes; instead, each program’s funding history is a combination of its technical, industrial, and political characteristics.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Some RFPs do require immature technologies. The Ground Combat Vehicle RFP, however, prioritized time available for development and fielding and the ability to integrate the vehicle’s systems with existing technologies, leading the Army to dictate the use of mature technologies.
- 2.
Dollar thresholds in Table 5.2 are based on the amount of budget authority requested during each particular fiscal year, not the total dollar value of the program over time.
- 3.
Of the 175 programs contained in AIM for fiscal year 2007, 5 did not have contractor data.
- 4.
Although it is not as large or diverse a company as the others, Alliant Technologies is the primary supplier of the Army’s ammunition, an increasingly valuable commodity during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- 5.
Adams (1981), p. 7.
- 6.
Mayer (1991), p. 210.
- 7.
Congressional Budget Office (2007), p. 8.
- 8.
Tiron (2010).
- 9.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (2009).
- 10.
See Hall and Frank (1990), who contend that Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions are more influential at the committee level, but still affect only the amount of time and resources a legislator will spend on an issue; Hall and Alan (2006), who find evidence that lobbyists simply support like-minded legislators who already share largely the same objectives as the lobbying effort; Ansolabehere et al. (2003), who argue that we should treat PAC contributions as just another form of political participation; and Baumgartner et al. (2009), who find that lobbyists’ relationships reflect the current power distribution and do no more than protect the status quo.
- 11.
This point is explained in detail by Baumgartner et al. (2009).
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
Office of Management and Budget (2015).
- 15.
Office of Management and Budget (2015).
- 16.
- 17.
Mayhew (1974), pp. 13–77.
- 18.
House Committee on Appropriations, Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2009, and for Other Purposes, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2346, 111th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 111-151. Some program funding for Army uniforms was provided by supplemental appropriations to the base budget. Supplemental funding is used for war-related expenses and is examined only in this example. Data in this analysis includes base funding, not supplemental funding, which has been excluded wherever it can be identified.
- 19.
The difference in price between MultiCam and Universal Camouflage Pattern uniforms is due to the cost of producing individual equipment, such as ammunition pouches and helmet covers, as well as a more expensive cloth treatment for MultiCam-patterned uniforms. MultiCam uniforms are also more costly because the pattern trademark was developed by a private company, whereas the Army owns the rights to the Universal Camouflage Pattern.
- 20.
References
Adams, Gordon. 1981. The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle. New York: Council on Economic Priorities.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, John de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder. 2003. Why is there so little money in U.S. politics? Journal of Economic Perspectives 17:105–130.
Baumgartner, Frank, R., et al. 2009. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Carpenter, Daniel. 1996. Adaptive signal processing, hierarchy, and budgetary control in federal regulation. American Political Science Review 90:283–302.
Congressional Budget Office. 2007. Replacing and Repairing Equipment Used in Iraq and Afghanistan: The Army’s Reset Program.
Fenno, Richard. 1966. The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown.
Fleisher, Richard. 1993. PAC contributions and congressional voting on national defense. Legislative Studies Quarterly 18:391–409.
Goss, Carol F. 1972. Military committee membership and defense-related benefits in the house of representatives. The Western Political Quarterly 25:215–233.
Hall, Richard, and Alan Deardorff. 2006. Lobbying as legislative subsidy. American Political Science Review 100:69–84.
Hall, Richard, and Frank Wayman. 1990. Buying time: moneyed interests and the mobilization of bias in congressional committees. The American Political Science Review 84:797–820.
Knight, Brian. 2008. Legislative representation, bargaining power, and the distribution of federal funds: evidence from the U.S. Congress. The Economic Journal 118:1785–1803.
Levitt, Steven, and James Snyder, Jr. 1995. Political parties and the distribution of federal outlays. American Journal of Political Science 39:958–980.
Mayer, Kenneth. 1991. The Political Economy of Defense Contracting. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Mayhew, David. 1974. The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Moe, Terry. 1987. An assessment of the positive theory of ‘Congressional Dominance’. Legislative Studies Quarterly 12:475–520.
Office of Management and Budget. 2015. Earmarks. https://earmarks.omb.gov. Accessed 2 Nov 2015.
Ray, Bruce. 1981. Military Committee membership in the house of representatives and the allocation of defense department outlays. The Western Political Quarterly 34:222–234.
Rundquist, Barry. 1978. On testing a military industrial complex theory. American Politics Research 6:29–53.
Schick, Allen. 2000. The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Tiron, Roxana. 2010. Company Lobbies Congress Over Lost Trucking Contract. The Hill, Sept 10, 2009. http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/58265-company-lobbies-congress-over-lost-trucking-contract. Accessed 22 Nov 2010.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2009. Decision on Bid Protest by Navistar Defense and BAE Oshkosh, 14 Dec 2009.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Demarest, H.B. (2017). Some Explanations for Budget Volatility. In: US Defense Budget Outcomes. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52301-9_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52301-9_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-52300-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-52301-9
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)