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Cross-Species Comparisons of Welfare

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Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues

Abstract

In her chapter, Tatjana Višak notes that the question of how to do Cross-Species Comparisons of welfare (CSCs) is practically relevant on the assumption that the effects of our (possible) actions on welfare are relevant for what we have reason to do. She outlines how three different ethical theories provide fundamentally different answers to the question of how to do CSCs and argues that the theory of welfare as self-fulfillment provides the most plausible answer. It implies, Višak contends, that an individual’s cognitive and emotional capacities do not necessarily determine how well-off this individual can be and thus a maximally well-off dog or squirrel are faring just as well as a maximally well-off human. The implications of this are then briefly explored.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Bentham quotation given in J. S. Mill, 1974, Bentham. In John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism, on Liberty, and Essay on Bentham, ed. M. Warnock. New American Library, p.123.

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Correspondence to Tatjana Višak .

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Višak, T. (2017). Cross-Species Comparisons of Welfare. In: Woodhall, A., Garmendia da Trindade, G. (eds) Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54549-3_15

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