Abstract
In his chapter, Josh Milburn argues that Robert Nozick considers nonhuman animals in his philosophical writings, but that these discussions are downplayed in animal ethics and Nozick scholarship. This is regrettable, Milburn proposes, as Nozick is far more sympathetic to animal rights than many other libertarians. Milburn thus offers an analysis of Nozick’s animal ethics. Nozick’s arguments concerning vegetarianism and speciesism are considered, and Milburn argues that tensions in Nozick’s political philosophy potentially open the door to animal rights. Whatever their place in his political philosophy, Milburn contends, nonhuman animals find a comfortable home in Nozick’s axiology and ethics, with their value and the significance of our duties towards them affirmed. Milburn concludes that animal ethicists could learn from Nozick’s distinctive arguments and approaches and find an unexpected ally.
With thanks to all who have offered comments on earlier versions of this piece, including David Archard, Jeremy Watkins, Cillian McBride, Fabian Schuppert, Tom Walker, Rudmer Bijlsma and the editors of the present volume. This chapter arises from my PhD research, which was funded by Northern Ireland’s Department for Employment and Learning.
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Notes
- 1.
This has been called the “argument from marginal cases”. This latter name is actually owed ultimately to Narveson – a libertarian critic of animal rights – but is problematic for a number of reasons (cf. Horta, 2014).
- 2.
Though Nozick writes only about flesh, it is fairly clear that his argument works better as one for veganism than vegetarianism, at least insofar as the milk and egg industries inflict death upon NHAs. Indeed, it resembles the basic argument for veganism presented by Gary Francione and Anna Charlton (2013).
- 3.
Robert Garner characterises this as a succinct statement of the ethic of animal welfare (Garner, 2013, pp.26 & 78); indeed, Garner is one of the few animal ethicists to look explicitly to Nozick’s political thought on NHAs, though he rejects it as inadequate.
- 4.
An idea similar to Nozick’s “utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people” is Jeff McMahan’s three-tiered account of the wrongness of killing (McMahan, 2008). If we were to defend Nozick’s maxim, McMahan’s account would be the right place to start.
- 5.
In looking beyond ASU, I implicitly reject a now-old-fashioned view that Nozick abandoned libertarianism (see, e.g. Hailwood, 1996, Chaps. 1 & 10). He certainly later defended elements of a non-libertarian politics – especially his idea of “symbolic utility” (Nozick, 1993, chaps. I-III; cf. Nozick, 2006, chap. 25) – but both defended something like libertarianism in his last book (2001) and professed to remaining libertarian in his last interview (Sanchez, 2001). While his thought undeniably developed, to say that he abandoned libertarianism would be a mistake. I also, partially, reject Thomas Nagel’s widely quoted claim that Nozick offers “libertarianism without foundations” (1981); Nozick does offer a grounding for his rights, but we have to look beyond ASU to find it.
- 6.
The Examined Life was first published in 1989.
- 7.
Nozick tells us that “some people” understand a meaningful life to be one (1) organised according to a plan, that (2) possesses structure and is (3) lived transparently, so that (4) others can learn from it by (5) seeing as positive those features exalted (1981, p.578). This seems to assume a level of mental sophistication perhaps lacking in NHAs.
- 8.
A broadly similar position is taken by Machan. He is opposed to intervention of the government into the life of humans for anything perceived as a moralistic reason; governments exist solely to protect human rights, and not for “animal welfare” (2004, pp.18, 23 & 53). Machan does seem to believe that there are moral constraints on our treatment of NHAs, but this is a separate question to whether they have rights, which, he claims, they do not (1985, p.75; 1991, p.164; 2004, pp.20–21 & 118). Consequently, and though Machan sometimes seems nervous of his own conclusion (2004, p.22), there should not be any direct legal protection of NHAs.
- 9.
For more on Hobbesian contractarianism, see Mark Rowlands’s contribution to the present volume.
- 10.
My focus has been on Nozick’s foundational question of rights-possession rather than his entitlement theory, when, arguably, it is the latter element of his thought that is “most” libertarian.
- 11.
Exploring this fully is beyond the scope of the present chapter. Nozick claims that the means of judging organic unity will vary in different “realms” (1981, pp.418 & 426), so in reality offers a kind of meta-axiology. When it comes, however, to the “realm” of animals – human and otherwise – he seems to think, as indicated, that organic unity is grounded primarily in mental sophistication. Mental sophistication will perhaps not always win out, however, with Nozick claiming that a redwood is more valuable than a mouse ( Ibid , p.415). Simon Hailwood suggests that this could be justified by the age and size of the tree (1996, p.150); though the mouse wins on the primary measure of organic unity, the tree wins on others. Also possible is that Nozick is mistaken. The mouse could be more organically unified, or perhaps the tree and the mouse are of not of the same “realm” – Nozick problematically assumes that they are – meaning that their value could even be incomparable. Though cross-realm comparisons of value are sometimes possible, they are not always (Nozick, 1981, p.419).
- 12.
Disvaluable things are those entities with a destructive telos (Nozick, 1981, p.419). This need not mean – a point Lacey seems to miss (2001, p.81) – that telos is essential to Nozick’s metaphysics or applicable in all “realms”. While the concentration camp is disvaluable (Nozick, 1981, p.419), the volcano need not be. Nozick takes this disanalogy for granted (Hailwood, 1996, p.154).
- 13.
Nozick talks of V verbs (support, respect, affirm, etc.) and anti-V verbs (neglect, dismiss, destroy, etc.). We act ethically, and give meaning to our lives, when we V those things of value and anti-V those things of disvalue.
- 14.
Nozick writes that he is concerned with exploring “the fullest moral basis” for our treatment of other beings, meaning that, in practice, he focuses on humans. He is explicit, though, that this focus does not mean that he denies that NHAs might be owed certain kinds of respectful treatment (1981, p.451). This may be the reason that even those commentators who look to Nozick’s ethics (e.g. Hailwood, 1996, chaps. 11–13) downplay his comments on NHAs.
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Milburn, J. (2017). Robert Nozick on Nonhuman Animals: Rights, Value and the Meaning of Life. In: Woodhall, A., Garmendia da Trindade, G. (eds) Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54549-3_5
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