Abstract
In this chapter is the theory of contributory and interactional expertise introduced to present an example of knowledge that challenges the explanations provided by embodiment theories. The sociological theory spells out in detail what must be addressed for a neurobiological perspective to be convincing. Emphasis is on the understanding of language as a vehicle for knowledge sharing and addresses questions such as “What is linguistic immersion?”; “What is the role of the body in linguistic competence?” and “Are similarities in contributory and interactional expertise at the conversation level generalizable when addressing, for instance, specific word classes?” From these considerations it is clear that interactional expertise-like knowledge is powerful in abstract knowledge acquisition and must be given a sincere neural interpretation. This is provided by the derived embodiment mechanism, which realises the integration of the individual and the social.
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Notes
- 1.
The narrative of A and B and some parts of the chapter were originally published in Schilhab (2011).
- 2.
To Collins and Evans, contributory expertise is not considered a superior kind of knowledge due to contributory experts being bodily engaged in their practice, even if this is how people conceive of the superiority of contributory knowledge. Within society, recognition of expertises seems to some extent at least, to arise from the current sociological status the expertise provides the individual with. It includes the ability to apply for particular job positions and the time spent on their particular specialty (e.g. Collins, 2004). It is hardly surprising that the degree of expertise is correlated with the amount of time spent on activities reserved for experts, i.e. conversations, cognitive rationalisations and the like, with that particular expertise. However, there is no reason to assume that the quality of knowledge is defined by time spent on practising that knowledge.
- 3.
Thanks to Professor Frederik Stjernfelt for providing this example.
- 4.
Example of a conversation that leads a judge with perfect pitch to correctly guess the identities behind A and B (Collins and Evans 2007, p. 101).
“Question 3: How do you pick up a single voice in a crowded room?
Participant A: By hearing the individual pitch of the given person’s voice, although it does depend on the volume of the individual voices as well.
Participant B: By trying to concentrate on that voice.
Question 4: Would you rather use a score to arrange a piece of music or dictate by ear?
Participant A: Dictate by ear.
Participant B: Use a score, probably”.
Here A was the contributory expert.
- 5.
To some extent the reduced value of activating the individual body in the acquisition of language is possible only at the expense of increased importance of everyone else’s body. For interactional expertise to appropriately function, everyone is part of a community of learning bodies, on which any individual member depends, and therefore every individual body is crucial to the learning of society as a whole (Schilhab et al. 2008). In the words of Collins (2004, p. 138): “One of the characteristics of interactional expertise, as opposed to contributory expertise, is that it cannot be passed on through the generations without continual linguistic refreshment from those with contributory expertise”.
- 6.
Throughout this account, unless otherwise stated, I will stick to Collins and Evans original concept of interactional expertise and its connotations to avoid confusion.
- 7.
In a quote from Pinker (1996), 14-year-old Denyse, who suffers from ‘Williams Syndrome’, demonstrates the intricate relation between eloquence and meaningful language use. Subjects suffering from the disease are gregarious, smiling people who enjoy talking but with IQs of about 50. Denyse refers eloquently to ‘bank statements’ and a ‘joint bank account’ that she shares with her boyfriend, even if she has no boyfriend and only a very peripheral understanding of the concept.
According to Pinker (ibid., p. 51), Denyse: “obviously had only the most tenuous grasp of the concept ‘joint bank account’ because she complained about the boyfriend taking money out of her side of the account”.
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Schilhab, T. (2017). Interactional Expertise. In: Derived Embodiment in Abstract Language. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56056-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56056-4_2
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