Abstract
In this chapter I turn to the implications of and obvious objections to the idea of derived embodiment. Throughout the account, I have presented a number of examples to grant the idea probability. I have implicitly endorsed the idea of the full-blown and somewhat ideal form of the derived embodiment mechanism to which interactional expertise-like knowledge applies to facilitate analysis. I have also maintained that as process in practice given the engaged involvement of an interlocutor, derived embodiment is somewhat demanding. Understanding interactions that only partly activate derived embodiment processes is still of relevance to explore kinds of knowledge exchange. Hence, I begin this chapter by proposing instances that to some extent entail derived embodiment processes without completely matching the ideal description. In particular, I focus on the role of the interlocutor to stress how the lack of perceptual qualities in, for instance, acquiring a theory of mind depends on the verbal ostensive pointing via designation. The example substantiates the argument that language widely mixes embodied and social processes. It also shows that the social level is highly decisive with respect to interpretations of phenomena that are difficult to grasp by first order linguification processes. The example concerned with acquisition of concepts for mental states is followed by a final discussion on the generality of derived embodiment. Is the mechanism applicable to the acquisition of the concept of ‘weather’? If not, what are the limiting conditions pertaining to the mechanism? In the last section, I focus on the sub-aggregates and back doors in the linguification product. I end by concluding that despite the usability of derived embodiment, the mechanism is chosen only when we have turned down other options. The proposition remains however that derived embodiment mechanisms are significant to the concrete transgression of individual experiences distinctive of human cognition.
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Notes
- 1.
The ability to attribute mental states, such as beliefs, knowledge, intents, emotions, and desires to oneself and others and to understand that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are different from one’s own is named ‘Theory of mind’ (ToM).
- 2.
From behavioural similarities, one cannot deduce similarity in mental states (see Crane 1995). That comes down to the fact that similar perceptual stimuli impinging on subjects may not elicit similar mental experiences. This also goes for observing a green light or bicycles. However, the discussion on the world’s constraints as presupposed in exogenous attention for instance suggests that bottom up activity (i.e. green light) may elicit relevantly similar perceptual activity in observers affected by similar events.
- 3.
The difficulty of determining what behaviours are criterial of which mental states typifies many approaches that depend on both first-person and third-person perspectives. For instance, in self-recognition studies of children (Amsterdam 1972) verbal identification of ‘self’ such as personal pronouns or name (verbal behaviour) in response to the mirror image is emphasised as criterion of self-awareness (see Schilhab 2002).
Likewise, attempts to develop a science of consciousness also rest on verbal behaviours, when validating conscious states in others (e.g. Varela 1996; Velmans 1996; Dennett 2003). The methodology reflects the lack of alternatives to circumvent the asymmetry. One simply has to consent to the epistemological constraints and adopt assumptions of behavioural correlates if one is to address mental states in others.
- 4.
Of course, in everyday interactions and not as may be assumed from laboratory experiments, it may be difficult to decide when a concept is fully acquired. It is not at all unlikely that unfortunate individuals who were not lucky to be enrolled in careful linguistic exchanges might still, however rudimentarily, comprehend and use concepts characteristic of those who have grasped ToM. As we saw, ToM is likely to be acquired by more than one mechanism. Moreover, language is somewhat tolerant with respect to the eloquence of its users. I return to this problem later in this chapter.
- 5.
The instantiations may act like concrete ‘crutches’ to support abstract thoughts. We already touched upon this issue in Chap. 7 on using ‘landscape’ to support the inner focus of patients. The physical world acting like crutches is forcefully demonstrated in an excerpt on ‘Using Concrete Meanings to Support Comprehension of Abstract Concepts’ from the website ‘A Resource for Teachers, Clinicians, Parents, and Students by the Brain Injury Association of New York State’:
“When learning to add and subtract, first graders commonly rely on their fingers or other physical objects to represent the abstract numbers. The children’s conceptual transition into the world of abstract numbers is supported by the representation of those numbers in physical things that can be seen, held, and moved. Similarly, concrete thinking high school students might be able to understand an abstract social arrangement, like the caste system in India, by comparing it to social cliques they are familiar with in their school. Discussing similarities and differences between that which is unfamiliar and distant (i.e., abstract) and that which is familiar and close to home (i.e., concrete) is a valuable way to help students grasp the abstract concept”. Retrieved from http://www.projectlearnet.org/tutorials/concrete_vs_abstract_thinking.html090414.
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Schilhab, T. (2017). Issues to Consider. In: Derived Embodiment in Abstract Language. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56056-4_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56056-4_8
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