Re-Assessing Finland’s Integration Policy: The End of Domestic Consensus?

Abstract

Pragmatism and adaptability are the qualities most often associated with Finland’s European policy. In the European context, they manifest themselves in the political elite’s view that national interests can best be pursued through active and constructive participation in EU decision-making. Finnish integration policy has thus stood in quite striking contrast with the EU policies of Denmark and Sweden, both of which have been far less supportive of further integration. Finland has pursued what has often been labelled as a model pupil strategy, a policy which has made it characteristically pro-mainstream and anti-awkward. Re-assessing this traditional image of Finland, we argue that beneath the veil of domestic consensus were strong disagreements over Europe, regarding both policy and procedure, or how the EU was approached domestically. The post-2010 situation has brought the disagreements into light. The euro crisis has shaken the foundations of this pro-integrationist approach, bringing to the surface the internal divisions that exist among both political parties and the public over Europe and even affecting EU-level bargaining. Moreover, the war in Ukraine and Russia’s actions in the neighbourhood have led to questions about Finland’s foreign and security policy, especially about the extent to which Finnish external relations and relations with Russia are tied to European level decisions. Party-political contestation over the EU sets stronger constraints on government behaviour in Brussels and lessening political consensus paves the way for more potential changes and unexpected behaviour, and thus a certain awkwardness. At the same time, we see continuity: even if more critical than before, Finland might still be firmly in the mainstream, because the mainstream itself has changed. The gains and losses caused by integration are now more thoroughly calculated, and the commitment of member states to the goals of the Union has arguably weakened. For Finland, the euro crisis and the deteriorated security situation have underlined the importance of the European framework for advancing national interests.

The authors would like to thank Ilmari Uljas for apt research assistance.