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Wittgenstein, Ryle, and the Language of Commonsense Psychology

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The Non-Reificatory Approach to Belief
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Abstract

Here I explain the birth of the non-reificatory approach out of the ordinary language philosophy movement in the middle of the twentieth century. I look at some of the shared features of the work of Wittgenstein and Ryle, focusing on their metaphilosophical approach and how this informs a certain way of treating the relevant problems of philosophy of mind. The upshot, it is argued, is that if we understand psychological language correctly, questions about what beliefs are and where they are located do not make sense; the term “belief” does not refer to an inner particular.

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Correspondence to Richard Floyd .

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Floyd, R. (2017). Wittgenstein, Ryle, and the Language of Commonsense Psychology. In: The Non-Reificatory Approach to Belief . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59873-4_2

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