Abstract
We outline the structure of the book and present its main theme, the interaction between households (household formation and household decisions) and competitive markets for commodities. Differences between the traditional treatment of households as single consumers and multi-member household models are emphasized. The general equilibrium perspective is underscored.
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We develop a comprehensive framework that allows the integration of three allocative mechanisms involving households.
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We stress the role of multi-member households in a general equilibrium context.
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We summarize the content of subsequent chapters.
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Notes
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In some instances, club admission fees can be negative so that there are transfers between club members, mimicking a joint budget constraint. Still, after receiving a budget share, each club member shops for his own private consumption bundle.
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Gersbach, H., Haller, H. (2017). Introduction. In: Groups and Markets. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60516-6_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60516-6_1
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