Abstract
In this chapter I argue that the relation of supervenience is insufficient to account for the normative dimension of the law. I begin by analyzing in some detail the traditional ways of relating normative (especially legal) and non-normative (natural) facts or properties: separation and reduction. Having identified their flaws, I consider the possibility of rendering the relationship in question with the use of the concept of supervenience. It transpires, however, that the claim that legal facts (properties) supervene on natural facts (properties) has limitations of its own. In particular, it cannot explain the normative character of legal rules, but rather presupposes it. Therefore, supervenience turns out to be insufficient when it comes to providing a full account of the normativity of law.
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Brożek, B. (2017). Law, Normativity, and Supervenience. In: Brożek, B., Rotolo, A., Stelmach, J. (eds) Supervenience and Normativity. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 120. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61046-7_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61046-7_7
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