Abstract
Nicaragua’s practice under the Optional Clause of the ICJ Statute has coincided with rising numbers of declarations in force and applications instituting proceedings on that basis. The combined creativity of Nicaragua and the Court has propelled those trends by refining the international legal community’s understanding of this conceptually challenging provision of the Statute. In particular, Nicaragua v. United States has influenced the complexity of reservations and conditions in States’ declarations, as well as parties’ argumentative tactics in subsequent disputes. The present chapter reviews the Court’s treatment in that case of the history and features of Article 36(2) of its Statute, assesses the theoretical, jurisprudential, and diplomatic consequences of those decisions, and investigates questions which Nicaragua has posed but not resolved during three decades of Optional Clause practice. The author concludes that the Nicaraguan cases have invigorated this jurisdictional mechanism—and thus the maintenance of international peace and security—beyond what might reasonably be expected from a more rigid system of compulsory dispute settlement.
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Notes
- 1.
Remarks delivered at ‘One View of the Arena: The Agent’s Perspective in International Dispute Settlement’, American Society of International Law, 110th Annual Meeting, 31 March 2016. Cf. remarks delivered by Burlington, Vermont mayor (later U.S. Senator) Bernie Sanders during Liberation Day events in Managua, 19 July 1985 (distilling the essence of the pending case into a rhetorical query): ‘The real issue is a very simple one. Does the government of the United States of America have the unilateral right to destroy the government of Nicaragua because the president of the United States and some members of Congress disagree with the Sandinistas?’ (Remsen 2015).
- 2.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 392 (hereinafter ‘Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction)’).
- 3.
On links between ‘competence’ and ‘jurisdiction’, see Koroma (2003).
- 4.
See Lloyd (1985), pp. 28–29.
- 5.
See Rosenne (2006), pp. 726–727, n. 62.
- 6.
See, e.g., Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 203, para 60.
- 7.
Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1957, pp. 23–24 (hereinafter ‘Norwegian Loans (Judgment)’).
- 8.
See Mackenzie et al. (2010), p. 15.
- 9.
See Torres Bernárdez (1992), pp. 291 and 299.
- 10.
See Szafarz (1993), pp. 55–58.
- 11.
See Thirlway (2015), pp. 1706–1707.
- 12.
See Rosenne (2006), pp. 707–708.
- 13.
International Court of Justice: United States Recognition of Compulsory Jurisdiction (Declaration by the President of the United States signed August 14, 1946), 61 Stat. 1218, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1598, www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000004-0140.pdf (‘1946 Declaration’), pp. 140–141.
- 14.
Letter from Secretary of State George Shultz to the UN Secretary-General, ILM, vol. 23 (1984), p. 670 (hereinafter ‘Shultz Letter’).
- 15.
While the notion of immediate effect appeared to conflict with the express condition of 6 months’ notice in the 1946 Declaration, the United States argued in the alternative: an inherent right to modify declarations with such effect; that a change of circumstances since the advent of the Optional Clause had established this right on an equitable basis; and that the Shultz Letter was effective as a temporary suspension of the 1946 Declaration (see Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 17 August 1984, paras 323, 331–334, 337, 351–383, 391–396 and 398–401 (hereinafter ‘Counter-Memorial of the United States (Jurisdiction)’) (citing the Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard appended to Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1972, p. 102 (hereinafter ‘ICAO Council (Judgment)’). Despite some analogy to the logic of treaties when characterizing the effect of the Shultz Letter, the United States contended in the alternative: that rules of treaty denunciation were irrelevant in this case; that treaty law gave effect to the Shultz Letter; and that its new preference for a ‘negotiated solution’ (in the words of the Shultz Letter) did not violate any principle of good faith that may attach to Optional Clause declarations because it reflected Article 33(1) of the UN Charter (see the above-cited Counter-Memorial of the United States, paras 338–350, 384–390, 397 and 409–410, n. 3 (citing Sir Waldock H, Special Rapporteur, Second report on the law of treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/156 and Add.1–3, YbILC 1963, Vol. II, p. 68, para 18 (hereinafter ‘Waldock, Second report’))).
- 16.
Nicaragua refuted the United States’ assertion that State practice supported an unlimited right of modification of Optional Clause declarations, countering: that nearly all of the States cited by the United States had invoked specific grounds for their actions; that the United States’ recourse to rebus sic stantibus established only that principles of treaty law are germane to Optional Clause declarations; and that the 1946 Declaration’s inclusion of an express right of termination implied that the United States’ object and purpose had not included reserving an additional power to modify its declaration (see Memorial of Nicaragua (Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 30 June 1984, paras 104–138 and 142–144 (hereinafter ‘Memorial of Nicaragua (Jurisdiction)’); Oral Arguments, vol. III (Nicaragua), pp. 274 ff (Reichler) (citing Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention) and Memorial of Nicaragua (Merits), 30 April 1985, paras 391, 393 and 408. See further Törber (2015), pp. 137–139.
- 17.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, pp. 417–418, para 58.
- 18.
Ibid., pp. 415–417, paras 52–58.
- 19.
Ibid., p. 418, para 59.
- 20.
Ibid., p. 418, para 60 (citing Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, pp. 253 and 268 (hereinafter ‘Nuclear Tests (Judgment)’)).
- 21.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 419; see further Shaw (2008), p. 1085.
- 22.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), ibid., para 62 (citing Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 23 (hereinafter ‘Interhandel (Judgment)’)).
- 23.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), ibid., pp. 419–420, para 63.
- 24.
On the principle of ‘reasonable time’ in the years prior to the Vienna Convention’s adoption, see the Commentary to Draft Article 53 on the Law of Treaties, YbILC 1966, Vol. II, p. 251. See further McNair (1961), p. 513.
- 25.
See Fitzmaurice (1999), pp. 135–137.
- 26.
Nuclear Tests (Judgment), supra n. 20, p. 268, para 46.
- 27.
Nicaragua would revisit the principle of good faith in the Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras) case. The Court ultimately declined to adjudge Nicaragua’s Optional Clause arguments after finding that it could exercise full jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to the Pact of Bogotá (see the 1988 Judgment in this case, ICJ Reports 1988, p. 69 (hereinafter ‘Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Judgment)’); Counter-Memorial of Nicaragua (Jurisdiction), 22 June 1987, paras 56–59 and 96 (citing Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1957, p. 146 (hereinafter ‘Right of Passage (Jurisdiction)’) and Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 418); Oral Arguments, vol. II (Honduras), p. 21 ff (Bowett) and (Nicaragua), p. 124 ff (Pellet). See further Törber 2015, p. 299. The Court would revisit this aspect of Border and Transborder Armed Actions in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, pp. 872–873, paras 132–134, and Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016, para 43 (citing Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Judgment), p. 84).
- 28.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 418, para 60.
- 29.
Counter-Memorial of the United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 15, paras 402–420.
- 30.
Declaration of Nicaragua (24 September 1929), www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=NI.
- 31.
Memorial of Nicaragua (Jurisdiction), supra n. 16, para 140.
- 32.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 419, para 62. On the Optional Clause reference to ‘accepting the same obligation’, see further Kebbon (1989), p. 259.
- 33.
- 34.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), ibid., p. 419, para 62 (citing Interhandel (Judgment), supra n. 22, p. 23).
- 35.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), ibid., p. 420, para 64.
- 36.
Right of Passage (Jurisdiction), supra n. 27 p. 125; Oral Arguments, vol. IV (India), p. 37 ff (Waldock). See also Törber (2015), p. 187.
- 37.
See further Tomuschat (2012), p. 85.
- 38.
The United States argued that this was ‘intrinsically inequitable and contrary to the Statute’s tenets of reciprocal and equal treatment’ (Counter-Memorial of the United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 15, para 405).
- 39.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, pp. 420–421, para 64.
- 40.
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1953, pp. 119–120 and 124.
- 41.
See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 18, paras 50–52; ibid., Oral Arguments, vol. II (Nicaragua), p. 10 ff (Argüello Gómez); Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgment of 16 December 2015, para 54. See further Reservation of Nicaragua, 24 October 2001 (available at www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=NI).
- 42.
The reservation is commonly named for one of its principal advocates, United States Senator Tom Connally.
- 43.
On the concept of domestic jurisdiction in reservations, see Arangio-Ruiz (1996).
- 44.
By 1984, the United States was in limited company in maintaining an ‘automatic reservation’ to its Optional Clause declaration. As of Nicaragua’s initiation of this case, only five States remained equally adherent to this practice (and still do as of March 2016), while five others had all since withdrawn said reservations—though, as Professor (later Judge) Crawford noted at the time, the precise terms of these automatic reservations varied somewhat. The reservations were declared by Liberia (1952), Malawi (1966), Mexico (1947), the Philippines (1972), and Sudan (1958); those withdrawn were by France, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. See further Crawford (1979), p. 67, n. 5.
- 45.
Nor has the Court been compelled to clearly pronounce upon the validity of such provisions, though in Norwegian Loans it left open the possibility that such reservations are permissible, as several Judges have since implied (see the views of Judges Armand-Ugon and Klaestad in the Interhandel case, both of whom considered reservations to be generally severable from Optional Clause declarations. Interhandel (Judgment), supra n. 22, Dissenting Opinions of President Klaestad, pp. 76–78 and Judge Armand-Ugon, pp. 93 ff; see contra, ibid., Separate Opinion of Sir Percy Spender, pp. 57 and 59; Norwegian Loans (Judgment), supra n. 7, Separate Opinion of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, p. 58.
- 46.
The reservation is commonly named for one of its principal advocates, United States Senator Arthur Vandenberg.
- 47.
See Tomuschat (2012), p. 97.
- 48.
India’s Vandenberg Reservation requires all Contracting Parties to a treaty at issue—not merely those ‘affected by’ the Court’s decision—to be parties to the dispute. While the Court dismissed the case on other grounds (see Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2000, p. 32, para 46 (hereinafter ‘Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Judgment)’), Judge Al-Khasawneh found that the availability of equivalent custom rendered the Vandenberg Reservation irrelevant, even in the more objective form adopted in India’s declaration (see ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, pp. 49–50; Counter-Memorial of India, 28 February 2000, para 82). See further Alexandrov (2001), pp. 119–121.
- 49.
In this case, India distinguishes the Court’s consideration of conventions codifying customary international law in Nicaragua v. United States from those customary obligations which the Marshall Islands views as ‘rooted’ in a multilateral treaty. India also draws a distinction between disputes ‘arising under’ a multilateral treaty (per the United States’ Vandenberg Reservation) and those ‘concerning’ the interpretation or application of a convention (per the version of this clause in India’s Optional Clause declaration). See Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India), Jurisdiction, Counter-Memorial of India, 16 September 2015, paras 77–82 (citing Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, pp. 424–425, para 73).
- 50.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 424, para 72.
- 51.
See, e.g., ibid., p. 423, para 70. See further Separate Opinions of Judge Mosler (pp. 465–466) and Judge Ruda (pp. 455–458).
- 52.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 422, para 68.
- 53.
Ibid., p. 425, para 74. See further Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 38, para 56 and p. 97, para 182 (hereinafter ‘Nicaragua v. United States (Merits)’). See further Törber (2015), p. 152.
- 54.
The only reference in the Court’s jurisdictional analysis to the Vienna Convention as reflecting specific customary norms is a single mention of Article 46 (regarding internal competence to conclude treaties) (see Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 421, para 66). On the analogical application of treaty law in this context, see Törber (2015), pp. 137–139.
- 55.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), ibid., pp. 424–426, paras 72–76; Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), supra n. 53, pp. 95–97, paras 178–182 and pp. 99–100, para 188. See also Amr (2003). Applying for the first time Article 79(7) of the 1978 Rules of Court (currently Article 79(9), concerning the deferral of objections lacking an ‘exclusively preliminary character’), the Court deferred to the merits phase the question of which third-party States might be affected by its decision. See Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, pp. 425–426, para 76. See further Rosenne (2006), pp. 769–771.
- 56.
See further Törber (2015), p. 153 (suggesting that the Court would have interpreted the Vandenberg Reservation differently had it referred to domestic material in the manner applied in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1952, p. 93 (hereinafter ‘Anglo-Iranian Oil (Judgment)’)).
- 57.
Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), supra n. 53, pp. 95–96, para 178.
- 58.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 412, para 46.
- 59.
The Agent of Nicaragua surmised this was due to World War II attacks on commercial shipping. See Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, pp. 399–400, para 16. See also Kolb (2013), pp. 386–387.
- 60.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), ibid., pp. 401–402, paras 19–20. See further Kolb (2013), p. 458.
- 61.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), ibid., pp. 403–404, paras 25–26.
- 62.
Ibid., pp. 408–409, paras 35–36.
- 63.
Ibid., p. 404, para 27.
- 64.
Ibid., p. 407, para 32, referring to this as ‘to preserve existing acceptances’ (citing Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 145).
- 65.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, pp. 406–407, para 31. See further Shaw (2008), p. 1083.
- 66.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), ibid., p. 412, para 46 (referring to Nicaragua’s inclusion in the Court’s reports to the UN General Assembly and the Yearbook list, which States had reproduced without objection for decades).
- 67.
Ibid., p. 410, para 39.
- 68.
Ibid., pp. 412–413, para 47 and pp. 414–415, para 51. In response to the United States’ allegations that Nicaragua had over the years made contrary bilateral representations which estopped it from relying upon the 1929 Declaration, the Court found that the allegations failed to meet the North Sea standard for estoppel. Ibid., pp. 414–415, para 51, referring to North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3. See further Rosenne (2006), pp. 721–723.
- 69.
For example, commentators have predicted that the Court’s 1984 Judgment effectively settled the scope of Article 36(5), ensuring that it will no longer give rise to difficulties in future cases. See Tomuschat (2012), p. 108.
- 70.
See Jones (1985), p. 578.
- 71.
See Törber (2015), p. 309.
- 72.
Right of Passage (Judgment), supra n. 27, p. 153.
- 73.
Ibid., pp. 143 and 146.
- 74.
PCIJ Series E, No. 16, p. 337 (France) and p. 339 (United Kingdom).
- 75.
Ibid., p. 333. See also Official Journal of the League of Nations (1939), pp. 407 ff and (1940), pp. 45 ff.
- 76.
- 77.
See Memorial of Nicaragua (Jurisdiction), supra n. 16, para 110 (citing Fitzmaurice 1958, p. 75).
- 78.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 419, para 61.
- 79.
See Tomuschat (2012), p. 75.
- 80.
See Kolb (2013), p. 390.
- 81.
Memorial of Nicaragua (Jurisdiction), supra n. 16, para 110 (citing Waldock 1956, p. 254).
- 82.
Ibid. (citing Fitzmaurice 1957, pp. 230–232).
- 83.
South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 476.
- 84.
See Tomuschat (2012), p. 96.
- 85.
- 86.
In terms of its pure subjectivity, the self-judging nature of this reservation may bear some resemblance to the common reservation of ‘honour and vital interests’ in general treaties of arbitration which preceded the advent of the Optional Clause. The Optional Clause system arguably permitted such unworkable concepts to continue in use after they had waned in treaty form, since the unilateral nature of declarations reduced the likelihood that self-judging reservations would be excised during drafting. A sensible counterpoint was provided by proponents of British accession to the PCIJ’s Optional Clause, who argued that the Optional Clause system marked a necessary advance beyond the sweeping prewar reservations of general treaties of arbitration (see Lauterpach 2004, p. 50; Lloyd 1995, p. 39 (citing League of Nations Union 1928)).
- 87.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, pp. 419–420, para 63.
- 88.
Cf. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Judgment), p. 88, para 41 and p. 90, para 48.
- 89.
- 90.
See Rosenne (2006), pp. 790–792 (citing Sir Lauterpacht H, Special Rapporteur, First report on the law of treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/63, YbILC 1953, Vol. II, pp. 90–162; Paragraph 6 of the Commentary to Draft Article 1 on the Law of Treaties, YbILC 1959, Vol. II, p. 93 and Sir Waldock H, Special Rapporteur, First report on the law of treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/144, YbILC 1962, Vol. II, pp. 27–80).
- 91.
Waldock (1956), p. 254 (‘[W]hile the relation established between States by their declarations is for most purposes bilateral, it also has a multilateral aspect. The easiest course is, perhaps, to call it a consensual relation which is sui generis’).
- 92.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, Separate Opinion of Sir Robert Jennings, p. 546 (‘[T]he Optional-Clause régime is sui generis. Doubtless some parts of the law of treaties may be applied by useful analogy; but so may the law governing unilateral declarations […]’).
- 93.
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, p. 453, para 46 (hereinafter ‘Fisheries Jurisdiction (Judgment)’).
- 94.
The distinction between these two meanings of ‘sui generis’ appears somewhat conflated even in the work of esteemed scholars of the Optional Clause. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice (1999), pp. 134–135 (analogizing between the aforementioned statements of Sir Humphrey and Judge Jennings).
- 95.
See Lamm (2014), p. 88.
- 96.
- 97.
See Törber (2015), pp. 153–154.
- 98.
See Kolb (2013), p. 390.
- 99.
See discussion in Orrego Vicuña (2002), p. 472 (referring to Judge Oda and Ambassador Rosenne).
- 100.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 418, para 59.
- 101.
Right of Passage (Judgment), supra n. 27, pp. 143 and 146.
- 102.
Anglo-Iranian Oil (Judgment), supra n. 57, p. 105.
- 103.
See Orrego Vicuña (2002), p. 474.
- 104.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, pp. 412–413, para 47.
- 105.
See Kolb (2013), p. 390.
- 106.
See discussion in Orrego Vicuña (2002), p. 478.
- 107.
See, e.g., Farmanfarma (1952), p. 67.
- 108.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 418, para 59. See further Quintana (2015), p. 96.
- 109.
See Tomuschat (2012), p. 107.
- 110.
- 111.
See, e.g., Kebbon (1989), p. 261.
- 112.
Cf. Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 418, para 60 (emphasizing ‘good faith and confidence in particularly unambiguous terms’).
- 113.
Oda (1988), p. 18.
- 114.
Waldock (1956), p. 265 (‘On principle, therefore, there is no right of unilateral termination of a declaration under the Optional Clause unless the right has been expressly reserved in the declaration’).
- 115.
See Waldock, Second report, p. 68, para 18 (‘State practice under the Optional Clause declaration […] seem only to reinforce the clear conclusion to be drawn from the treaties of arbitration, conciliation and judicial settlement, that these treaties are regarded as essentially of terminable character’).
- 116.
See, e.g., Memorial of Nicaragua (Jurisdiction), supra n. 16, para 137 (referring to Sir Humphrey’s earlier view on irrevocability when arguing for the continued force of the 1946 Declaration’s 6-month notice provision).
- 117.
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1961, pp. 17 and 31.
- 118.
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, p. 291, para 25 (hereinafter ‘Cameroon v. Nigeria (Jurisdiction)’). See further Fitzmaurice (1999), pp. 142–143. The Court would again embrace Nicaragua v. United States as part of a lineage of case law in Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999, while at the same time immunizing itself from the 1984 Judgment’s critics by emphasizing that the onus is on States to finely tailor their declarations insofar as they wish to restrain the Court’s creative faculties. See Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Judgment), supra n. 49, p. 29, para 36 (citing Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 74, p. 23 and Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 418).
- 119.
See Fitzmaurice (1999), pp. 145–146.
- 120.
- 121.
- 122.
See Fitzmaurice (1999), pp. 145–146.
- 123.
Declaration of Nigeria, 30 April 1998 (available at www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=NG).
- 124.
Cameroon v. Nigeria (Jurisdiction), supra n. 118, pp. 283–289, paras 18–19. See further Fitzmaurice (1999), pp. 142–143.
- 125.
Cameroon v. Nigeria (Jurisdiction), ibid., pp. 298–299, para 43.
- 126.
- 127.
On this aspect of Land and Maritime Boundary, see Fitzmaurice (1999), pp. 150–151.
- 128.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, p. 418, para 59.
- 129.
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Judgment), supra n. 93, pp. 455–456, para 54.
- 130.
Ibid.
- 131.
Should a reservation be held invalid, the Court could determine the severability of such provisions from the essential consent of the declaration—a question it sidestepped as regards Portugal’s expansive but not per se invalid reservation in Right of Passage (supra n. 27, pp. 143 and 146), and into which the United States had decided not to venture regarding the Connally Reservation in Nicaragua v. United States. Insofar as a reservation might be invalid, the question of its severability from the declaration may be treated under the law of treaties. Under Article 44(3) of the Vienna Convention, severability requires that the reservation not concern the ‘essential basis of the consent’ in the declaration. The analogical application of this standard was presaged by Judge Lauterpacht in Norwegian Loans, and has since been adopted by some scholars (see Norwegian Loans (Judgment), supra n. 7, Separate Opinion of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, p. 59 and Kolb 2007, p. 884).
- 132.
See Rosenne (2007), p. 172.
- 133.
See reference in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 10 May 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 172, para 6.
- 134.
See American Convention on Human Rights (San José, 22 November 1969), Article 62(1).
- 135.
See discussion in Orrego Vicuña (2002), p. 465.
- 136.
Constitutional Court v. Peru (Competence), IACHR Series C, No. 55, Judgment, 24 September 1999, (hereinafter ‘Constitutional Court v. Peru’), para 52. See further Törber (2015), p. 310.
- 137.
Constantine et al., IACHR Series C, No. 82, Judgment, 1 September 2001, para 42.
- 138.
Ibid., para 83.
- 139.
- 140.
See, e.g., Mobil Corp. and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, 10 June 2010.
- 141.
- 142.
See D’Amato (1985), p. 385 (considering whether the rules of international law as a whole are in the United States’ national interest); Scott and Carr (1987), pp. 57, 69 and 76 (questioning whether international adjudication remains a generally appropriate mechanism for settling disputes between nations).
- 143.
See Shaw (2008), pp. 1081–1082.
- 144.
Merrills (2009), p. 444.
- 145.
See Simma (2009), p. 458.
- 146.
See Oude Elferink (2015), n. 119.
- 147.
See Merrills (2009), pp. 434–435.
- 148.
See Törber (2015), pp. 188–189.
- 149.
See Merrills (2009), pp. 434–435.
- 150.
This highly varied group of States consists of Australia, Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar, the Marshall Islands, Nigeria, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Slovakia, Timor-Leste, and the United Kingdom.
- 151.
These States are Bulgaria, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Norway, Poland, and Suriname. Of the remainder, one was filed for an initial 5-year period which has since expired (Declaration of Cameroon (3 March 1994)), and one provides a ‘fluid’ 6-month notice period, offered on the express condition of reciprocity and pegged to the notice period provided by the opposing declarant State (if less than six months) (Declaration of Spain (20 October 1990)).
- 152.
These States are Dominica, Estonia, Georgia, and Paraguay.
- 153.
See Tomuschat (2012), p. 76. Cf. Border and Transborder Armed Actions, Counter-Memorial of Nicaragua, supra n. 27, para 96 (arguing that a twelve-month notice period is ‘reasonable’, by analogy to Article 56(2) of the Vienna Convention).
- 154.
See note appended by the Registry of the Court to Declaration of Nicaragua (24 September 1929) and Reservation of Nicaragua (24 October 2001) (available at www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=NI), referring to a 9 January 2002 communication transmitted from Costa Rica to the UN Secretary-General.
- 155.
See Alexandrov (2001), p. 116.
- 156.
See Tomuschat (2012), p. 96.
- 157.
These States are El Salvador, India, Malta, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United States. See Alexandrov (2001), pp. 119–121.
- 158.
Declaration of 2 September 2005 (available at www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=DJ).
- 159.
See Damrosch (1987), p. 396.
- 160.
- 161.
South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1966, p. 6.
- 162.
Nuclear Tests (Judgment), supra n. 20, p. 268, para 46.
- 163.
Nicaragua v. United States (Jurisdiction), supra n. 2, pp. 419–420, para 63.
- 164.
Cf. the views of Judge Nieto-Navia of the Appeals Chamber for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (2001), pp. 12–13 (considering the ‘fulfillment in good faith of international obligations’ as a non-derogable ‘norm of general interest to the international community as a whole’, without express analogy to the law of treaties).
- 165.
See Kooijmans (1986), p. 77.
- 166.
See Thirlway (2015), p. 1701.
- 167.
- 168.
See Törber (2015), p. 299; see Border and Transborder Armed Actions, Counter-Memorial of Nicaragua, supra n. 27, para 96.
- 169.
See Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra n. 137, para 52. See further Törber (2015), p. 310.
- 170.
Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), supra n. 54, pp. 32–34, paras 45–46.
- 171.
On the Court’s duty to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction, see ICAO Council (Judgment), supra n. 15, pp. 52–61, paras 13–26.
- 172.
1946 Declaration, p. 140.
- 173.
This conclusion is supported as well by the Court’s thorough treatment of the Vandenberg Reservation in its Judgment on the Merits, after the United States had ceased participating in the proceedings.
- 174.
On the notion of a ‘fully’ non-participating Respondent, consider two recent decisions administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration: see The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia), PCA Case No. 2014-2, Procedural Order No. 4 (Bifurcation), 21 November 2014 (hereinafter ‘Arctic Sunrise’), p. 3 (treating a Note Verbale sent from Russia to the PCA asserting the State’s non-participation as a ‘plea concerning the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction’) and The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 29 October 2015 (hereinafter ‘Philippines v. China’), pp. 11–12 (treating a Position Paper publicized by China and certain communications to the PCA asserting the State’s non-participation as ‘constituting, in effect, a plea concerning jurisdiction’).
- 175.
See Treves (2008), p. 172; Bodansky (2008), pp. 309 et seq. See also Fitzmaurice (1958), p. 88 (‘[N]othing undermines confidence in the process of international adjudication so quickly and completely as the feeling that international tribunals may assume jurisdiction in cases not really covered by the intended scope of the consents given by the parties’).
- 176.
Indeed, it is difficult to consider the contemporary incidence of powerful States refusing to participate in proceedings initiated unilaterally—such as China in the Philippines v. China case, and Russia in the Arctic Sunrise case—without recalling the United States’ unfortunate reactions to the Court’s jurisdictional conclusions in that seminal case. See Philippines v. China, Press Release of 30 November 2015, p. 2 (available at http://www.pcacases.com); Arctic Sunrise, Press Release of 24 August 2015, p. 1 (available at http://www.pcacases.com).
- 177.
Cf. UNCLOS Articles 287(1)/(5) and 309. Nicaragua’s 3 May 2000 declaration upon ratification of UNCLOS appears to take liberties with this restrictive approach to reservations, as it ‘accepts only recourse to the International Court of Justice as a means for the settlement of disputes’, to the implied exclusion of other fora. Conversely, the declaration’s subsequent statement—that Nicaragua consents to the Court as the only forum for disputes falling under Article 298(1)’s enumerated subject-matter exceptions—is facially valid, as that Article provides that a State may ‘declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures’ available for dispute settlement.
- 178.
See Kebbon (1989), pp. 278–279.
- 179.
Annex to the Letter dated 24 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (Handbook on accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: model clauses and templates, UN Doc. A/68/963, 19 August 2014).
- 180.
Simma (2009), p. 457.
- 181.
See ibid., p. 456.
- 182.
See Joyce (2008), p. 34.
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McGarry, B. (2018). Nicaragua’s Impacts on Optional Clause Practice. In: Sobenes Obregon, E., Samson, B. (eds) Nicaragua Before the International Court of Justice. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62962-9_8
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