Abstract
The fourth chapter discusses various challenges that have been brought forth against different version of 4-dimensionalism. I explicate a positive taxonomy of those questions the sensible 4-dimensionalist needs to answer in order to provide an adequate theory of persistence. In particular, I discuss: the no change objection, the objection from “a crazy metaphysics”, modal concerns, and the argument from motion in homogeneous masses.
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, ….
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Notes
- 1.
For a brief summary of the different theories, I refer to Zimmerman (2005b, 401–405).
- 2.
This idea can be traced back to Thomas Aquinas (1976, 5–8) and Aristotle.
- 3.
Only in a figurative sense can this be called a ‘dispute.’
- 4.
I will not be able to discuss the motivations behind Parmenides’s and Heraclitus’s ontologies of persistence, but will only present briefly their central theses.
- 5.
These arguments are only tentative. They shall motivate the problem of change, not give a complete formal and substantial account. I will address this question, when discussing the recent analytic debate.
- 6.
Please note that I am going to employ a loose definition of the concept of change in the following discussion and arguments. A detailed one follows in the subsequent section
- 7.
The notion of real change is used intuitively. Real change involves something staying the same while changing in a relevant way. I will discuss the notion of change in more detail below.
- 8.
A concise summary of this argument has been provided by Peter Geach in his paper on Some Problems about Time (1972, 309).
- 9.
Within the following table, x and y denote concrete particulars or temporal parts. C might be any characteristic of a concrete particular. The remaining symbols are used according to their normal definitions.
- 10.
Perhaps the most famous example of this issue is the case of the black spheres that are discussed in the controversy between bundle-theorists and proponents of bare-substrata
- 11.
Logically speaking this is to be treated as an exclusive ‘or’ (XOR).
- 12.
I will exclude here any position defending 4-dimensionalism and non-material souls or similar.
- 13.
I.e. Doctrine of Temporal Parts or 4-dimensionalism.
- 14.
Again, we need to use motion and change equivalently.
- 15.
There are different formulations of this puzzle. In a recent paper, Robin LePoidevin (2011, 462–463) defends a formulation similar to that given here, from the perspective of time, consciousness, causation, and free will. LePoidevin’s formulation relies on the following assumption. Causally efficacious acts of free will is necessarily tied to consciousness, which is temporally extended. However, the concept of the present is necessarily instantaneous (the A-theory). There seems to be a basic inconsistency between the basic relation of times and consciousness.
I think that this puzzle mirrors the puzzle addressed here: Just like the A-theory has been shown to conflict with human freedom (LePoidevin 2011, 464), I have argued that both 3-dimensionalism as well as 4-dimensionalism conflict with change.
- 16.
- 17.
Although, it needs to be noted that there are some philosophers denying that there is genuine problem of change – see for example Pablo Rychter (2009, 7–22).
- 18.
The quotation has been modified to fit the example used in this re-formulation: ‘H’ has been replaced by ‘C’, ‘alpha’ by ‘l old ’ and ‘beta’ by ‘l new ’.
- 19.
This is in fact a problem that is applicable to almost any theory of persistence. Considering the question of the persistence of human persons; John Hawthorne argues along these lines, see for example (2006, 186).
- 20.
A similar definition has been quoted by Matti Eklund – originally the idea stems from Elizabeth Barnes: “Sentence S is ontically vague iff were all …content precisified, there would be an admissible precisifaction …such that …the sentence would still be non epistemically indeterminate in a way that is sorites susceptible.” (Eklund 2011, 154). I decided to formulate my definition of sharp temporal boundaries in a more straight-forward way, but I think that – basically – both definitions are analogous.
- 21.
I am going to provide a short, partially-formalized version of my respective claims at the end of each bullet point. Here are the relevant logical termini used in the argument:
The predicate E(x,t) denotes that some entity, x, exists at some temporal location, t. Nota bene: I am aware that, since Kant, ‘to exist’ has not been commonly treated as an ordinary predicate. Nevertheless, for the sake of the clarity of my argument, I am going to allow ‘existential-predication’. This seems to be rather unproblematic, because the predicate E is restricted to ‘spatio-temporal existence’ and is, thus, not equivalent to unrestricted existence claims. For a detailed analysis of restricted and unrestricted existence-predicates, see Priest (2005, 105–115).
The term \(\exists\) C1 …C n : E(z) denotes that there are conditions C 1 …C n explaining the relevant matter of fact z. It is important to note that E(z) is in fact a meta-predicate. It provides information about whether some relevant term can be explained coherently within the context of a certain theory.
- 22.
Another prominent argument against vague existence has been proposed by Ted Sider in various papers: Sider (2001, 120) and Sider (2003, 135–146). However, Sider’s argument has been proposed in a synchronic fashion. Thus, it seemed necessary to apply the basic ideas of his argument to persistence-problems.
- 23.
For an explanation of the symbols used in this formalization, please refer to the second step of my argument about the incompatibility of realistic vagueness and 4-dimensionalism (see Argument 4.3 – 1).
- 24.
Number in […] are insertions by the author.
- 25.
Again, passages in italics are my accentuations
- 26.
Translation by Kemp-Smith (1929).
- 27.
- 28.
Translated by me.
- 29.
- 30.
I borrow this phrase from van Inwagen (1990b, 253).
- 31.
The basic idea here is that sums of temporal parts constitute new individuals – i.e. temporally extended wholes – as discussed in the Lesniewskian approach to mereological summing. A detailed introduction can be found in Simons’s Parts (1987, pt. 1 ch. 2).
NB: As of now, I will be using Simons’s terminology for mereological questions. Nevertheless, \(\mathbb{C}\) still denotes temporally extended wholes and C denotes temporal parts of temporally extended wholes.
- 32.
NB: This argument is in fact a reconstruction of van Inwagen’s original ideas. I tried to make van Inwagen’s point as strong as possible. Nevertheless, I refrain from the assertion that this argument is a perfect mirror of van Inwagen’s original idea.
- 33.
It is apparently impossible to obtain the early volumes of The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly in Germany. This is why I will be citing a re-print of this paper from Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics.
- 34.
For a concise example of such an argument, see Kearns (2005, 3–8).
- 35.
A classical argument for this assertion can be found in Kripke (1971, 135/72). Nevertheless, as Kripke’s paper shows even this claim has not gone undisputed.
- 36.
For another, similar interpretation of this matter of fact, see Hawley (2001, 191–194). Nevertheless, Hawley’s count of the respective approaches differs from mine.
- 37.
Credit should be given to Jonathan Jacob’s Causal Powers (2007, 165–183) that contributed heavily to the ideas sketched here.
- 38.
In fact, we have seen that the concept of natural vs. negative possibility gets extremely complex very fast. For a short systematic introduction into truthmaking and possibility within the context of a similar version of actualism, I refer to Robert Adams’s Actualism and Thisness (1981, 20–38).
- 39.
In fact, this is a move that has been popular among Aristotelian philosophers.
- 40.
Some philosophers have wondered whether Aristotelian modest realism is consistent with a 4-dimensional ontology of persistence. I agree that this is indeed an interesting question. Recall our previous discussion: 4-dimensionalists believe that concrete particulars persist by having temporal parts. I already argued that 4-dimensionalists are not forced to assert the priority of the B-series (see Taxonomy of 4D – Step 1.3). And I defended the idea that 4-dimensionalists should be either eternalists or growing blockers (see Taxonomy of 4D – Step 2.4). Neither of these criteria seem to conflict with Aristotelian modest realism. This is why I think that 4-dimensionalsts can safely adopt the Aristotelian framework of modality. Nevertheless, I do not think that 4-dimensionalists should adopt the Aristotelian theory of concrete particulars. I think that the alleged inconsistency of Aristotelian modal theory and 4-dimensionalism stems from the fact that people think that Aristotelian modal theory entails the theory of ousiai. That is not the case.
- 41.
The following discussion stems from my summary of the following articles. Anybody interested into RDA should take a look at those papers: Zimmerman (1998, 265–288), Lewis (1999b, 209–212), Zimmerman (1999, 213–215), Scala (2002, 393–397), Zimmerman (2002, 398–405) and most importantly Butterfield (2006, 1–45)
- 42.
Any similarity to living philosophers is purely incidental.
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Jaskolla, L. (2017). Toward a Positive Taxonomy. In: Real Fourdimensionalism. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 130. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65927-5_4
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