Abstract
Nikolai Vasiliev offered a systematic approach to the development of a class of non-classical logics, which he called “Imaginary Logics”. In this paper, I examine critically some of the central features of Vasiliev’s approach to logical theory, suggesting its relevance to contemporary debates in the philosophy of logic. I argue that there is much of significant value in Vasiliev’s work, which deserves close philosophical engagement.
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Notes
- 1.
Note that Vasiliev uses the term ‘suzhdenie’, which, strictly speaking, means ‘judgment’, but Roger Vergauwen and Evgeny Zaytsev, the English translators of Vasiliev’s article on imaginary logic, preferred to adopt the term ‘proposition’ instead (see their note * on p. 132 of Vasiliev [1912/2003]). Thus, in the passages from Vasiliev’s work quoted below, one should not interpret ‘proposition’ in a heavily metaphysical way.
- 2.
It is not surprising that Vasiliev’s idea of imaginary logic(s) could, in principle, be used as logics of fictional discourse, in which inconsistencies are sometimes found. In this context, it would be worth comparing Vasiliev’s and Alexius Meinong’s approaches, and the similar attitudes they seem to adopt toward fictional entities. In both cases, a domain of objects is introduced, and inconsistencies are allowed for fictional (imaginary) objects. In both cases, the actual world is consistent, and fictional objects do not exist. Several logics of fiction are possible based on Vasiliev’s and Meinong’s writings, with their own philosophical motivations (for some discussion, see Arruda (1977) and Jacquette (2015)). But this is a task for another occasion.
References
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Acknowledgements
My thanks go to Jean-Yves Béziau, Walter Carnielli, Newton da Costa, Itala D’Ottaviano, Venanzio Raspa, Vladimir Vasyukov, and Dmitry Zaitsev for many illuminating discussions or correspondence about Vasiliev’s work. I should thank Zaitsev, in particular, for creating the opportunity for me to write this paper, for organizing several stimulating conferences on logic and its philosophy in Moscow (in one of them, focused on Vasiliev’s work, this paper was originally presented), and for the wonderful hospitality during my visits to Russia. My thanks are also due to an anonymous reviewer for insightful comments on an earlier version of this work.
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Bueno, O. (2017). Vasiliev and the Foundations of Logic. In: Markin, V., Zaitsev, D. (eds) The Logical Legacy of Nikolai Vasiliev and Modern Logic. Synthese Library, vol 387. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66162-9_4
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