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Hardware Trojan Attacks in FPGA and Protection Approaches

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The Hardware Trojan War

Abstract

Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are integrated circuits (ICs) containing programmable logic components that can be reconfigured by an end-user post manufacturing. Similar to ICs, FPGAs are also susceptible to supply-chain attacks, especially insertion of hardware Trojans. In this book chapter, we explain how attackers can insert Trojans into FPGAs. We present a Trojan taxonomy that is tailored to FPGA supply chain. We then discuss the main classes of Trojans in FPGAs and explain the different ways of inserting these Trojans in detail. Finally, we present the various countermeasures that have been developed to target Trojans that are FPGA specific.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Translate and map processes are the terms used by Xilinx, an FPGA vendor. These processes may use different names/terms.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. New York University, New York, NY, USA

    Vinayaka Jyothi

  2. The University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, TX, USA

    Jeyavijayan (JV) Rajendran

Authors
  1. Vinayaka Jyothi
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  2. Jeyavijayan (JV) Rajendran
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Vinayaka Jyothi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA

    Swarup Bhunia

  2. Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA

    Mark M. Tehranipoor

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Jyothi, V., Rajendran, J.(. (2018). Hardware Trojan Attacks in FPGA and Protection Approaches. In: Bhunia, S., Tehranipoor, M. (eds) The Hardware Trojan War. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68511-3_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68511-3_14

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-68510-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-68511-3

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