Abstract
It is Frantz Fanon’s argument in his book the Wretched of the Earth (1963) that Africans were conceived, were born, were nurtured and died in colonial violence. In Fanon’s view, colonialism was a violent phenomenon in Africa that sowed and nurtured the seeds of violence in the minds and homes of Africans. He predicts that consistent with the behavioural pattern of avoidance, which puts off the inevitable violent confrontation between the oppressor and the oppressed until later, the violence of colonialism will provoke a counter-violence of tribal warfare and feuds, violent and bloodthirsty quarrels between individuals and collective auto-destruction in Africans. I argue in this chapter that consistent with Fanon’s prediction, available evidence as can be gathered from relevant literature appears to bear out Fanon’s thesis of colonial violence and counter-violence. I argue also that colonial violence, which available evidence suggests has been carried over into post-colonial Africa, has not only precipitated and provoked force and violence in Africans during colonial times; it has also resulted in the violent nature and character of post-colonial African states and politics as well. I argue in this chapter that the violent nature and character of post-colonial African states and politics may be responsible for the present multiplication and spread of violent conflicts on the continent of Africa. To validate this argument, I trace and explain the acquisition of a violent constitution by Africans from colonial times to the time of independence. I also explain how this violent constitution has been perpetuated and continued to be fostered by the violent character of African bourgeois liberal states and politics in the post-colony. I try to show in particular how these factors and institutions of violence combine to shape the creation and subsequent blossoming of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. I therefore conclude by suggesting that an analysis of the insurgency in terms of Fanon’s thesis appears to be a more suitable explanation of the insurgency because available evidence suggests that the violence of the Nigerian state and its politics and the counter-violence of the Boko Haram group are predominant factors in the creation and blossoming of the insurgency.
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Notes
- 1.
Leys (1965).
- 2.
Anifowose (2011), pp. 3–4.
- 3.
Leys (1965).
- 4.
- 5.
Arendt (2015).
- 6.
- 7.
Anifowose (2011), pp. 3–4.
- 8.
Anifowose (2011), p. 4.
- 9.
Anifowose (2011), pp. 5–16.
- 10.
See for instance, Davies (1962).
- 11.
Miller (1941).
- 12.
See for instance, Gurr (1968).
- 13.
- 14.
Anifowose (2011), p. 9.
- 15.
See for instance, Olson (1963).
- 16.
Anifowose (2011), p. 10.
- 17.
See for instance, Olson (1963), pp. 532–547.
- 18.
Olson (1963), pp. 532–547.
- 19.
Anifowose (2011), pp. 11–14.
- 20.
Feit (1968).
- 21.
Feit (1968), pp. 184–192.
- 22.
Feit (1968), pp. 184–192.
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
Fanon (1963), pp. 35–95.
- 27.
Fanon (1963), p. 53.
- 28.
Fanon (1963), p. 53.
- 29.
Fanon (1963), pp. 38–40.
- 30.
Fanon (1963), p. 38.
- 31.
Fanon (1963), p. 58.
- 32.
Fanon (1963), p. 58.
- 33.
Fanon (1963), p. 54.
- 34.
Westley’s study appears to later confirm Fanon’s theory of violence: Westley (1966).
- 35.
Perinbam (1973).
- 36.
Perinbam (1973), pp. 427–432.
- 37.
Perinbam (1973), pp. 427–432.
- 38.
Ake (1976), pp. 228–230.
- 39.
Ake (1996), p. 2.
- 40.
Ake (1996), pp. 2–3.
- 41.
Ake (1996), pp. 2–3.
- 42.
Ake (1996), p. 2.
- 43.
Ake (1996), p. 2.
- 44.
Ake (1996), p. 3.
- 45.
Ake (1996), p. 3.
- 46.
Ake (1996), p. 3.
- 47.
- 48.
Ake (1996), p. 6.
- 49.
Fanon (1963), pp. 181–183.
- 50.
Jackson and Rosberg (1986).
- 51.
Howard (1980), p. 728.
- 52.
Mamdani (1990).
- 53.
Zolberg (1968).
- 54.
Zolberg (1968), pp. 76–77.
- 55.
Zolberg (1968), pp. 76–77.
- 56.
Zolberg (1968), p. 77.
- 57.
Zolberg (1968), p. 77.
- 58.
Mbembe (1992).
- 59.
Mbembe (1992).
- 60.
Mbembe (1992), pp. 5–29.
- 61.
Mehler (2007).
- 62.
Mehler (2007), pp. 201–208.
- 63.
Mehler (2007), pp. 204–206.
- 64.
Mehler (2007), p. 206.
- 65.
Mehler (2007), pp. 206–207.
- 66.
Mehler (2007), p. 207.
- 67.
Mehler (2007), pp. 207–208.
- 68.
Mehler (2007), p. 209.
- 69.
The above point is succinctly explained by Ake thus: ‘Colonial politics was power politics in the most literal sense of the phrase. Those in power used their power with little or no restraint to maintain their privileges, and to repress those out of power who wanted to replace them. Those who were not in power sought power with the same indifference to restraints, and with the same indifference to the ‘rules of the game’. The colonial political culture to which the nationalist leaders were socialised was one characterised by a lack of public-spirited restraint in the quest for, and the exercise of, power.’ Ake (1973), p. 358.
- 70.
- 71.
- 72.
Pateman (1970), pp. 105–111.
- 73.
- 74.
Manin et al. (1987), p. 360.
- 75.
- 76.
Mouffe (2005).
- 77.
Mouffe (2005), p. 30.
- 78.
Mouffe (2005), pp. 64–88.
- 79.
Nigeria has spent 29 out of 54 years of its existence to date under military rule: from 1966 when the first military government took over the reins of government to 1979; again from 1984 until May 29, 1999 save for a brief spell of military imposed Interim National Government which ran for only 82 days from 26 August 1993 to 17 November 1993. The constitution was usually suspended during these periods of military interregnum and there is robust literature which confirmed that despite their pretenses to the contrary, the nature and character of military regimes during these periods of time in Nigeria was the very anti-thesis of the tenets of democracy. See, for instance, Olukoshi (2000), pp. 21–23; Olowu (2013), pp. 322–331; Jegede (2013), pp. 339–345.
- 80.
See Anifowose (2011), pp. 73–141 for a more detailed discussion of the riots.
- 81.
Anifowose (2011), p. 92.
- 82.
Anifowose (2011), p. 92.
- 83.
Anifowose (2011), p. 92.
- 84.
Anifowose (2011), p. 94.
- 85.
Anifowose (2011), p. 95.
- 86.
Anifowose (2011), pp. 95–97.
- 87.
Anifowose (2011), pp. 99–100.
- 88.
Anifowose (2011), p. 124.
- 89.
Anifowose (2011), p. 128.
- 90.
Anifowose (2011), pp. 130–131.
- 91.
Anifowose (2011), p. 131.
- 92.
Anifowose (2011), p. 131.
- 93.
Anifowose (2011), p. 132.
- 94.
Frederick et al. (2013), p. 123.
- 95.
‘The life and death of Ken Saro-Wiwa (2015).
- 96.
Owolabi and Okwechime (2007), p. 4.
- 97.
See Owolabi and Okwechime (2007), pp. 5–10 for a catalogue of some of the violence and repression the Nigerian state meted out to the Niger Delta agitators.
- 98.
See for instance, ‘The life and death of Ken Saro-Wiwa (2015).
- 99.
Owolabi and Okwechime (2007), p. 5.
- 100.
‘The life and death of Ken Saro-Wiwa (2015).
- 101.
See for instance, Council on Foreign Relations (2015).
- 102.
- 103.
Aghedo (2012), pp. 270–271.
- 104.
- 105.
See for instance, Frederick et al. (2013).
- 106.
Ering and Akpan (2012).
- 107.
Prices of PMS was increased from 8.4 kobo to 15.37 kobo per litre in 1978; from 15:37 kobo to 20 kobo per litre in January 1982; from 20 kobo to 39.50 kobo per litre in March 1986; from 39:50 kobo to 42 kobo per litre in April 1988; from 42 kobo to 60 kobo per litre for private cars in January, 1989; from 60 kobo to 70 kobo per litre in March 1991; from 70 kobo to N5.00 per litre in November 1993 but reduced to N3.25 kobo per litre after nation-wide protests; from N3.25 kobo to N15.00 per litre in October 1994 but reduced to N11.00 per litre 2 days later after widespread protests; from N11.00 to N25.00 per litre in December 1998, later reduced to N20.00 per litre after much protests by Nigerians; from N20.00 to N30.00 per litre in June 2000 only to be reduced to N22.00 per litre after massive protests and strikes by organised labour and civil society organisations; from N22.00 to N26.00 per litre in January, 2002; from N26.00 to N40.00 per litre in June 2003; from N40.00 to N70.00 per litre in 2007 but later reduced to N65.00 per litre; from N65.00 it was increased to N141.00 per litre in January of 2012 pursuant to a policy of total deregulation of the downstream of Nigerian oil sector but was later reduced to N97.00 per litre after weeks of massive and widespread protests by organised labour and civil society organisations.
- 108.
See Lasisi and Augoye (2012) for more detail.
- 109.
Vanguard (2012).
- 110.
See This Day Live (2011) for a detailed discussion of the position of the different stakeholders on the removal of fuel subsidy at different fora.
- 111.
- 112.
See also National Mirror (2014) where the mass protest was described as unprecedented.
- 113.
National Mirror (2014).
- 114.
- 115.
See for instance, Channels Television (2014a).
- 116.
Recent reports indicate that Nigerian politicians may be buying into the suicide bombing modus operandi of Boko Haram to deal with political opponents. See for instance, Channels Television (2015c) which reports that a suicide bomber went to the house of a politician where a political meeting was being held and blew himself up killing six people.
- 117.
Ugochukwu (2012), pp. 543–544.
- 118.
- 119.
See for instance, Harper v Virginia State Board of Elections 383 US 663 at 667 (1966).
- 120.
Laakso (2007).
- 121.
Laakso (2007), pp. 227–228.
- 122.
Laakso (2007), pp. 227–228.
- 123.
Laakso (2007), p. 228.
- 124.
Laakso (2007), pp. 228–230.
- 125.
See for instance, Human Rights Watch (2014).
- 126.
Dudley (1965), p. 22.
- 127.
Dudley (1965), p. 23.
- 128.
Dudley (1965), p. 23.
- 129.
Onebamhoi (2015).
- 130.
Ologbenla (2003).
- 131.
Ologbenla (2003), p. 70.
- 132.
Ologbenla (2011).
- 133.
Ologbenla (2011), pp. 20–22.
- 134.
Ologbenla (2011), p. 20.
- 135.
Ologbenla (2011), p. 21.
- 136.
Fagbule (2014).
- 137.
Fagbule (2014).
- 138.
Bratton (2008).
- 139.
- 140.
- 141.
Channels Television (2015e).
- 142.
Channels Television (2015d).
- 143.
See for instance, News24 Nigeria (2015).
- 144.
This prediction was in fact only averted through the unprecedented concession of defeat by the incumbent President, former President Goodluck Jonathan on the night of 31st March 2015 when from all indication it appeared that the incumbent had lost the election. This unprecedented concession of defeat by an incumbent in Nigeria is generally acknowledged by all and sundry as what averted impending political crisis and violence in the election. See for instance, This Day Live (2015) and The Punch (2015d).
- 145.
- 146.
Onuoha (2015).
- 147.
USIP (2015).
- 148.
USIP (2015), p. 2.
- 149.
- 150.
- 151.
USIP (2015), p. 4.
- 152.
Last (2008–2009).
- 153.
Agbiboa (2014), p. 56.
- 154.
Cook (2015), pp. 10–12.
- 155.
USIP (2015), p. 4.
- 156.
USIP (2015), p. 2.
- 157.
USIP (2015), p. 12.
- 158.
- 159.
The Punch (2015a).
- 160.
See for instance, Amnesty International (2014a).
- 161.
Yahoo News (2014).
- 162.
Solomon (2012).
- 163.
Solomon (2012), p. 9.
- 164.
See for instance, Pointblanknews.com (2015).
- 165.
247 UReports (2015).
- 166.
See for instance, Al Jazeera (2015).
- 167.
USIP (2015), p. 2.
- 168.
Channels Television (2014b).
- 169.
Channels Television (2014b).
- 170.
Channels Television (2014b).
- 171.
Baca (2015).
- 172.
Baca (2015).
- 173.
See for instance, Last (2008–2009), p. 8.
- 174.
Agbiboa (2014), p. 57.
- 175.
USIP (2015), pp. 3–4.
- 176.
- 177.
Mamdani (2002), p. 5.
- 178.
Mamdani (2002), p. 5.
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Akintayo, A.E. (2018). Vipers Are Offsprings of Dragons: A Fanonian Analysis of Violent Conflicts in Africa with Specific Reference to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. In: Iyi, JM., Strydom, H. (eds) Boko Haram and International Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74957-0_3
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