Abstract
This chapter commences part II of this book, which is about what error theorists should do with normative ethics. This chapter introduces the now what question : error theory, and now what should we do with our moral discourse that we use to talk about ethics? It lists the assessment criteria for every prescriptive metaethical theory that aims to answer this question and proceeds to argue that every prescriptive metaethical theory currently discussed in the literature is implausible. These theories are: revolutionary fictionalism , revolutionary expressivism , conservationism , and abolitionism . A new theory that I find plausible will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Kalf, W.F. (2018). Some Solutions to the Now What Problem. In: Moral Error Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77288-2_5
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