Skip to main content

Negotiated Justice and Corporate Crime: An Introduction and Overview

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Negotiated Justice and Corporate Crime

Part of the book series: Crime Prevention and Security Management ((CPSM))

  • 666 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of the book and the contention that ‘accommodation’ of corporate crime—rather than criminal prosecution—is increasingly the ‘new normal’.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 44.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 59.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Press Association, ‘Failing Student Jailed for Trying to Bribe Professor’, The Guardian (April 23, 2013).

  2. 2.

    Note that the word ‘settlement’ is often used by enforcement agencies in this context: see, for example, SFO Press Release, ‘Oxford Publishing Ltd to Pay Almost £1.9 Million as Settlement After Admitting Unlawful Conduct in Its East African Operations’ (July 3, 2012).

  3. 3.

    Contrary to discourse emanating from the Serious Fraud Office. See, for example, Graham Ruddick, ‘Serious Fraud Office Boss Warns Big Names to Play Ball—or Else’, The Observer (April 2, 2017).

  4. 4.

    Celia Wells, ‘Containing Corporate Crime. Civil or Criminal Controls?’, in James Gobert and Ana-Maria Pascal (eds), European Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability (Routledge, 2011), p. 16.

  5. 5.

    Edwin H. Sutherland, White Collar Crime : The Uncut Version (Yale University Press, 1983), p. 7.

  6. 6.

    James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths, 2003), p. 4. See also David O. Friedrichs, Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society (4th ed, Wadsworth, 2009).

  7. 7.

    We deliberately do not engage with CROs against individuals nor with criminal prosecution of officials from corporates (see, for example, prosecutions of former senior employees of the F.H. Bertling group: SFO Press Release, ‘Three Men Sentenced in $20m Angolan Oil Corruption Case’ (October 20, 2017)). It is also worth noting that DPAs can only be agreed with corporates, they are not available to individuals.

  8. 8.

    E.g. Nicholas Lord, Regulating Corporate Bribery in International Business: Anti-corruption in the UK and Germany (Ashgate, 2014).

  9. 9.

    E.g. Colin King, ‘Using Civil Processes in Pursuit of Criminal Law Objectives: A Case Study of Non-Conviction Based Asset Forfeiture’, International Journal of Evidence and Proof (2012), 16(4): 337.

  10. 10.

    Nicholas Lord and Colin King, ‘Negotiating Non-Contention: Civil Recovery and Deferred Prosecution in Response to Transnational Corporate Bribery’, in Liz Campbell and Nicholas Lord (eds), Corruption in Commercial Enterprise: Law, Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2018).

  11. 11.

    This book was submitted for publication in January 2018. By the time of publication, David Green will have stepped down as Director. See Lucy Burton and Christopher Williams, ‘SFO boss David Green kicks-start talks with legal giants as successors circle’, The Telegraph (November 4, 2017).

  12. 12.

    Lord Roskill (Chair), Fraud Trials Committee Report (HM Stationery Office, 1986); Michael Levi, ‘Fraud in the Courts: Roskill in Context’, British Journal of Criminology (1986), 26(4): 394.

  13. 13.

    Criminal Justice Act 1987, Part 1.

  14. 14.

    John Moylan, ‘Serious Fraud Office: A Chequered History’, BBC News (August 22, 2012).

  15. 15.

    Tom Harper, ‘Victor Dahdaleh Corruption Case: Billionaire’s Fraud Trial Collapses After Key SFO Witnesses Refuse to Give Evidence’, The Independent (December 10, 2013).

  16. 16.

    Simon Bowers, ‘SFO Abandons Corruption Inquiry into Tchenguiz and Kaupthing’, The Guardian (October 15, 2012).

  17. 17.

    Rob Evans, ‘Serious Fraud Office Admits Losing Thousands of Documents Linked to BAE’, The Guardian (August 8, 2013).

  18. 18.

    Nils Pratley, ‘Rolls-Royce’s SFO Settlement Is Big, Ugly and Serious’, The Guardian (January 16, 2017).

  19. 19.

    Graham Ruddick and Julia Kollewe, ‘Tesco to Pay £129m Fine Over Accounting Scandal’, The Independent (March 28, 2017).

  20. 20.

    Caroline Binham and Jane Croft, ‘Tories Pledge to Abolish Serious Fraud Office—Manifesto’, Financial Times (May 18, 2017).

  21. 21.

    Alan Tovey and Ben Martin, ‘SFO Granted a Reprieve from Plans to Scrap It a Day After Barclays Charges’, The Telegraph (June 21, 2017).

  22. 22.

    Christopher Williams, ‘Theresa May Abandons Plans to Scrap Fraud Office’, The Telegraph (September 16, 2017).

  23. 23.

    SFO Press Release, ‘New SFO Director David Green’ (April 23, 2012).

  24. 24.

    SFO Press Release, ‘10th Annual Corporate Accountability Conference’ (June 14, 2012).

  25. 25.

    SFO Press Release, ‘Cambridge Symposium 2012’ (September 3, 2012).

  26. 26.

    Nick Kochan, ‘Airbus in Talks to Settle Fraud Claims for £1 Billion’, Evening Standard (September 15, 2017). Others, however, suggest that the SFO investigation could take years: see ‘Airbus Faces Lengthy Probe, No Quick Fine: Sources’, Reuters (September 15, 2017).

  27. 27.

    See SFO Press Release, ‘Unaoil Investigation’ (July 19, 2016).

  28. 28.

    It is noticeable, though, that the investigation into Barclays will not result in a DPA: see SFO Press Release, ‘SFO Charges in Barclays Qatar Capital Raising Case’ (June 20, 2017); Caroline Binham, ‘Position Taken by Barclays Ruled Out DPA Deal with Fraud Agency’, Financial Times (June 22, 2017).

  29. 29.

    A traditional law or criminology article would not allow us to go into the depth that we want. Moreover, the inherent delay from writing to publication of a journal article was an important consideration. Furthermore, rather than spend two years or so on a monograph of approximately 100,000+ words, we wanted to feed into the literature as it is developing.

  30. 30.

    These issues are discussed further in Chapter 6.

  31. 31.

    See, for example, Ministry of Justice, Corporate Liability for Economic Crime, Call for Evidence (Cm 9370) (January 2017).

  32. 32.

    See Nicola Padfield, ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreements’, Archbold Review (2012), 7: 4.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Colin King .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

King, C., Lord, N. (2018). Negotiated Justice and Corporate Crime: An Introduction and Overview. In: Negotiated Justice and Corporate Crime. Crime Prevention and Security Management. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78562-2_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78562-2_1

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-78561-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-78562-2

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics