Abstract
A once commonplace view is that only a semantic theory that interprets sentences of a language according to what their utterances intuitively say can be correct. The rationale is that only by requiring a tight connection between what a sentence means and what its users intuitively say can we explain why, normally, those linguistically competent with a language upon hearing its sentences uttered can discern what they say. More precisely, this approach ties the semantic content of a sentence to intuitions about “says that” reports. Cappelen and Lepore (1997, 2004) forcefully argued against this approach. But given their criticism, what constraints are there on a correct assignment of semantic conent to sentences of a language? Two choices are available regard: either give up the strategy of identifying semantic content by looking at indirect speech reports, or, conclude that the intuition about the connection between meaning and intuitions about indirect reports is basically on the right track, but needs to be further constrained. We will explore both strategies and argue that ultimately we should reject the intuitions about indirect reports as tests on semantic theory, and propose a more direct strategy for identifying semantic content.
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Notes
- 1.
We are not using what’s said and what’s uttered in any technically loaded sense. For instance, we are not using it in the technical sense of Grice (1957), or Kaplan (1989), where these notions are defined as the semantic content, or literal meaning of a sentence. It is however in the spirit of both Grice and Kaplan to request that their notion of what is said, as the semantic content, will conform to ST, and this is what much of the subsequent literature endorsed as well. Although Kaplan was sensitive to the issue of whether his technical notion of what’s said is suited to play the intuitive notion of what’s said, the worry was precisely motivated by a need for a tight connection between the two. See Kaplan (1989).
- 2.
Note, ST is only a necessary condition on adequacy, and so, is compatible with further constraints on full adequacy.
- 3.
We will be using “interpretation” and “content” interchangeably throughout; we hope this doesn’t create any confusions.
- 4.
Some argue (e.g. Farkas & Brasoveanu, 2007.) that reports like (1b)–(2b) are generally infelicitous. All we need to register our point, though, is that there are contexts in which such reports are both licensed and perfectly felicitous. And indeed, there are (as we show below).
- 5.
Of course, in a quest for adequacy, it is slightly uncomfortable to reject ST on these grounds. The obvious rejoinder is: inadequate according to which criterion? We might reply that any theory predicting such massive context-sensitivity would not only be surprising and inelegant. Of course, this is not a decisive argument against contextualization: whether any particular item is context-sensitive or not is a matter of an empirical enquiry. But it is a challenge: a theory that posits such contextualization has to provide a systematic account of how semantic contents vary with context in such unexpected ways.
- 6.
A distinct criticism of ST (not pursued until §2 below) derives from the fact that certain aspects of interpretation that many theorists are inclined to include under semantics seem not to register on what’s said. Consider (6)–(7):
(6)
a. A: Mary stopped smoking.
b. #B: A said that Mary used to smoke.
(7)
a. A: John’s sister lives in New Jersey.
b. #B: A said that John has a sister.
(6a)–(7a) presuppose the complement clauses of (6b)–(7b) respectively, and these presuppositions are linguistically triggered, and therefore, many theorists conclude that somehow these presuppositions are a part of the semantics of (6a)–(7a), but, just the same, they are not said by A. Accordingly, (6b)–(7b) would be deemed false.
There’s linguistic support for this conclusion; if you want to deny what A said with her utterance in (6a) or (7a), you can do so by protesting, “No, I disagree” or “No, that is false”, but your denials do not deny that Mary used to smoke nor John having a sister. These data suggest that, however presupposition is linguistically encoded in (6a) or (7a), it is not a part of what’s said. If this is right, it would seem to follow that not all the semantic properties of a sentence track or are part of what’s said by its utterances.
- 7.
Note that for the reason it won’t do to tailor a particular (artificial) notion of literally says that, it won’t do to tailor a particular notion of says that either. We cannot rely on a theoretical notion as an intuitive guide for delimiting semantic content.
- 8.
Both claims have been challenged, but for reasons irrelevant to our discussion: the fact is that “now” and “here” also have a demonstrative use as well as an indexical use.
- 9.
Though there might be counterexamples to (i) – (iv), they are not relevant for our discussion here, so we set them aside.
- 10.
Whatever the relevant notion of the demonstration is. We shall not fuss about that here.
- 11.
Thanks to David Braun, Kirk Ludwig and Matthew Stone for this suggestion.
- 12.
One might be a little uncomfortable with this use of “object” here, since arguably we can use demonstratives to refer to things we wouldn’t naturally call objects [e.g. events, etc.]. Perhaps, the more neutral “thing” would be better.
- 13.
This is intended as the broadest distinction. Subdivisions are possible. Different types of information might get on the record in virtue of an extant linguistic convention, in different ways. We do not pursue the possible subdivisions here.
- 14.
Of course, there needs to be mutual recognition as well. See Lewis (1969).
- 15.
It’s crucial for Lewis’ idea that Y exists. That follows from how coordination problems are defined.
- 16.
Interlocutors without a shared convention can still solve coordination problem, but it would be plain luck or an innate alignment that accounts for their success because there’s no reason except for convention to choose one regularity over another in facing a coordination problem (i.e., communication is “a consequence of conventional signaling” (Lewis 1969, p. 150)).
- 17.
Perhaps, this might include expressive content, conventional implicatures, presuppositions and other non-at-issue information. Though we will not argue here that any one, or all, of these aspects are conventional, we leave it open whether some (or all) of them might be. (Though see Stojnić (forthcoming), who argues that a dynamic layer of content should be included, which in turn governs the resolution of context-sensitivity as a matter of language-specific conventions. See also Lepore and Stone (2015) for an argument that a wide set of interpretive patterns traditionally characterized as conversational implicatures are in fact underwritten by conventionalized mechanisms of discourse and information structure. If they are right, these should be included as well.) There also remain interesting questions about how, if these aspects are conventional, this framework can explain, for example, the difference between it entering the record that Harry is in pain after he utters “Ouch!” vs. its entering the record after his uttering “I am in pain.” Or, how can it explain the difference between its entering the record that Mary used to smoke after an utterance of “Mary stopped smoking” vs. an utterance of “Mary used to smoke”; or it entering the record that there’s a contrast between being French and brave, after an utterance of “Dan is brave but French” vs. an utterance of “There’s a contrast between being brave and French.” It might be that there are many ways for the speaker and audience to coordinate (as a matter of convention) on the same proposition, even if these different ways do not encode meaning in the same way. How to explain or even describe this in Lewis’ framework is a topic for another discussion.
- 18.
Note that we are not trying to settle, in the present paper, how linguistic conventions come about. Nor are we claiming that they cannot change with time. We are only interested in how we can tell when a semantic theory captures the information an adequate semantic theory should capture.
- 19.
Solutions that occur by mere luck would here obviously be irrelevant, so we set them aside.
- 20.
In fact, this is precisely what the proponents of semantic two-dimensionalism would advocate.
- 21.
We are not claiming anything surprising by claiming that what an adequate semantic theory should capture is all and only what’s conventionally linguistically encoding. Most theorists would agree with this. What is more important in our claim, and what has been missed in the debate so far, is that by appeal to an appropriate notion of a convention (analyzed in terms of coordination) and the conversational record we gain a direct route to the semantic content.
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Stojnic, U., Lepore, E. (2019). Semantics and What is Said. In: Capone, A., García-Carpintero, M., Falzone, A. (eds) Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 19. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78771-8_2
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