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The Public Health Roulette

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Behavioral Economics and Bioethics

Part of the book series: Palgrave Advances in Behavioral Economics ((PABE))

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Abstract

Changes in life expectancies perturb the balance of justice between the young and the old, prompting reallocation of income and health. The long-term consequences are difficult to predict. I report a case where greater life expectancies create greater health disparity between the generations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Behavioral economists in particular have been using two-generation models in their work on self-command (Schelling 1984), mental accounting (Thaler 1985), generation control (Thaler and Shefrin 1981), and hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997).

  2. 2.

    Schelling (1984, Chapters 3 and 4) sees the old and the young generations trying to resolve conflict through bilateral bargaining. The conflict between the two selves is mediated by the social context in terms of conventions, ethics, laws, and entitlement programs, which penalize a failure to bargain in good faith on the part of any one generation.

  3. 3.

    Here are some accounting details. First, Junior will transfer to Senior a total of $500,000 for retirement ($25,000 × 20), implying a saving rate of 25% ($500,000/$2,000,000). Second, if Junior does not save for retirement, then he pays 40% of the total income, or $800,000, in tax. In this case, the society siphons more than enough of the $2 million to cover Social Security payment to Senior, which is $10,000 a year for 20 years, or $200,000. Indeed the society would end up with a surplus of $600,000 as a result of Junior’s imprudence.

    A Special Note: If Junior and Senior bargain to share both $2 million and 80 years of life expectancy, the terms of the Nash Solution will be exactly those in the “example” in the text: Junior would live for 60 years on $1.5 million; Senior would live for 20 years on $0.5 million. The proof is surprisingly tedious.

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Appendix

Appendix

The Nash Solution with a Fixed Total Resource to Share

Junior and Senior bargain for the biggest share of a resource. The Nash solution to the bargaining problem is the solution to the following mathematical program:

$$MAX\left( {\frac{{R_{y} }}{{T_{y} }} - c_{y} } \right)\left( {\frac{{R_{o} }}{{T_{o} }} - c_{o} } \right)$$
(1)

with respect to R y and R o , subject to a resource constraint \(R = R_{y} + R_{o}\), where

R y  :

resource for Junior (the young generation) if bargaining succeeds

R o  :

resource for Senior (the old generation) if bargaining succeeds

T y :

Junior’s life expectancy

T o  :

 Senior’s life expectancy

c y  :

Junior’s resource if bargaining fails

c o  :

Senior’s resource if bargaining fails

In the Nash Solution, Junior’s and Senior’s annual incomes are, respectively:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{{R_{y} }}{{T_{y} }} = \frac{{R + c_{y} T_{y} - c_{o} T_{o} }}{{2T_{y} }} \hfill \\ \frac{{R_{o} }}{{T_{o} }} = \frac{{R - c_{y} T_{y} + c_{o} T_{o} }}{{2T_{o} }} \hfill \\ \end{aligned}$$
(2)

Case 1

How an increase in Junior’s life expectancy affects income distribution.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{{\partial \left( {\frac{{R_{y} }}{{T_{y} }}} \right)}}{{\partial T_{y} }} = - \frac{{\left( {\frac{{R_{y} }}{{T_{y} }} - \frac{{c_{y} }}{2}} \right)}}{{T_{y} }} < 0 \hfill \\ \frac{{\partial \left( {\frac{{R_{o} }}{{T_{o} }}} \right)}}{{\partial T_{y} }} = - \frac{{c_{y} }}{{2T_{o} }} < 0 \hfill \\ \end{aligned}$$
(3)

Case 2

How an increase in Senior’s life expectancy affects income distribution.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{{\partial \left( {\frac{{R_{y} }}{{T_{y} }}} \right)}}{{\partial T_{o} }} = - \frac{{c_{o} }}{{2T_{y} }} < 0 \hfill \\ \frac{{\partial \left( {\frac{{R_{o} }}{{T_{o} }}} \right)}}{{\partial T_{o} }} = - \frac{{\left( {\frac{{R_{o} }}{{T_{o} }} - \frac{{c_{o} }}{2}} \right)}}{{T_{o} }} < 0 \hfill \\ \end{aligned}$$
(4)

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Lee, L.W. (2018). The Public Health Roulette. In: Behavioral Economics and Bioethics. Palgrave Advances in Behavioral Economics. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89779-0_7

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