Abstract
Silence via storytelling in its multiple dimensions is explained in this chapter, as one of the two pivotal communication phenomena of this study. Ideal flight and actual flight situations are analyzed, experientially, in stages that emphasize silence as a knowledge factor for the flight. Periods of silence are part of the communication process, but the duration of these periods, the way silence breaks into messages, and the consequences of different manifestations of silence are the topics objectified. The protagonists narrate their experiences commenting on scenarios and questions, and the text develops in a dialogic format with conventional alias names: Ikaria Ikaros and Oia Santorinis as ATCs for pilots’ behavior, Eleftherios Venizelos with Ioannis Daskalogiannis as fighter pilots, and Ippokratis Koos as helicopter pilot for the military point of view. All fighter pilots underlined (briefing and) debriefing as an integral part of any mission in the (preflight and) postflight phase. The debriefing is a meta-communication process which retracts the whole flight, provides a mechanism to evaluate human error and safety culture in a systemic way, and cultivates collegiality and leadership. The magic of silence may be needed in some cases, whereas organizational culture and communities practice mindset may dictate corporate fame protection and professional face to be defended. Leadership traits in speaking up and openness in a trusting atmosphere, as well as checklist mnemonics and monitoring with the two-layer redundancy, are explained. Safety culture and situation awareness are also part of the narrative. Knowledge manifestation flows from what is communicated, and actions are knowledge-worthy only when communicated under the circumstances.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Beyond the aviation industry, miscommunication issues are prominent in other mission critical environments like medical practices. Also, lack of a regularized communications system with predefined terminology was identified as a contributing factor in the nuclear accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant operated by Exelon, Dauphin County, PA, in 1979.
- 2.
The aircraft cabin defect log is usually filled by the cabin crew members and the aircraft technical log is filled in by the flight deck members. The two logs combined communicate flight realities to the next shifts and support personnel, whereas the two flight recorders – CVR for voice and FDR for instrument indications and parameters – are the real-time archive of the flight.
- 3.
The controller-pilot data link communications for FAA is explained at http://hf.tc.faa.gov/capabilities/cpdlc.htm. In Canada, airspace has undergone safety and efficiency enhancements with the completion of the national implementation of CPDLC in suitably equipped aircraft flying above 29,000 feet (http://www.navcanada.ca/EN/media/Pages/news-releases-2014-nr10.aspx). Eurocontrol (at http://www.eurocontrol.int/services/controller-pilot-data-link-communications) is using it on a simulation basis. The Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (http://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/2013_FIT_Asia2_RASMAG18/IP04%20Use%20of%20CPDLC%20%20ADS-C%20in%20Australia.pdf) is evaluating that technology after 15 years of use in the oceanic air space.
- 4.
Nine months after the fatal collision of two Boeing 747 s at Tenerife’s accident on 1977, with 583 fatalities, the ICAO Air Navigation Committee took action, issuing 3 reports and implementing radiotelephony changes in 1984. Among the contributing factors, the expression at takeoff determining a position different than expected created a major misunderstanding. Twenty years later and further on, miscommunication still occurs and remains a contributing factor to aviation accidents.
- 5.
In October 2, 1996, the Aeroperu Flight 603 with a Boeing 757 from Lima (Peru) to Santiago (Chile), the maintenance personnel forgot to remove the protective covers of the static ports (the external pressure-sensitive instruments used to sense altitude, wind speed, temperature, etc.) after washing the fuselage of the aircraft. As a result, during the flight, essential indicators were measuring erroneous inputs that leaded to erroneous understanding of the flight parameters. It seems that the oversight could be prevented with the common (for crew members) preflight walk-around the aircraft. The crew did not walk-around that aircraft, and having inadequate situation awareness in the flight from faulty indicators (as well as problems in navigation, standard call-outs, and tactical decisions), they did not prevent the fatal crash in the Pacific Ocean (with the altimeter erroneous indication of 9,700 feet altitude in the impact to the water), and 70 people on board lost their lives. The accident report from the Directorate General of Air Transport (of the Ministry of Transport, Communications, Housing and Construction) of Peru is available at Eurocontrol’s skybrary at http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1719.pdf.
- 6.
Launched by the European Commission in 1999, it is the initiative of organizing airspace into functional blocks, according to traffic flows rather than to national borders. The European air traffic management (ATM) system currently handles around 26,000 flights daily, with a projection to double by 2020. With common rules and procedures at European level, its primary aim is to meet future capacity and safety needs through legislation. The Single European Sky second package (SES II) established goals in key areas of safety, network capacity, effectiveness, and environmental impact. The Single European Sky transforms the role of EUROCONTROL, which could become the Network Manager of the European ATM network (description available at https://www.eurocontrol.int/dossiers/single-european-sky).
- 7.
IATA’s director general Tony Tyler is quoted saying: “Regulators are micro-managing our businesses, telling us how we may advertise our services, how long we must hold a reservation that has not been paid for and how we are to manage operational disruptions regardless of the cause. These regulations impose a huge penalty on the economy and ultimately raise the cost of air travel for all consumers” (see September, 20, 2013 at http://www.aviationtoday.com/the-checklist/IATA-U-S-Needs-to-Loosen-Regulatory-Grip-on-Airline-Industry_80223.html#.U_dM6qN0Ykx).
- 8.
The Robert Zemeckis Paramount’s mystery-thriller “Flight” (2012) uses one such abnormal situation scenario when an airline pilot miraculously crash lands his plane after a mid-air catastrophe, saving nearly every soul on board, despite that the investigation into the accident reveals troubling physiological condition issues of the pilot (see more at http://www.paramount.com/flight/). In Greece, as HAF is considered to be part of the everyday lifeworld of the people, a national TV series of Anosis/Errikos Anagnostopoulos called “Silence in the Air (Aerines Siopes, 2000s–2003)” is based on the personal/operations life of some pilots of the 332 Al Weather Squadron of 114CW. Some actions in the 98 3-year episode series are inside the air base. In episodes #55–65, fighter pilots act or comment on nonstandard situations (more at http://www.impdb.org/index.php?title=Aerines_siopes). Silence is featured, as causing major incident in fighter training flights, as understanding your own error (and better not to speak till the debriefing), or as feeling so comfortable with the other with whom you communicate without words. This narrative created a popular perception of the “silence” question in the broader audience. On 2016, the Warner Bros Clint Eastwood’s film “Sully” narrated the “Miracle on the Hudson” when Captain Chesley Sullenberger glided his disabled plane onto the frigid waters of the Hudson River, saving the lives of all 155 aboard. However, even as Sully was being heralded by the public and the media for his unprecedented aviation skill, a NTSB investigation with simulation and manual reenactments took place to clarify the “unexpected event” and pilot’s decision-making beyond any training experience (more at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt3263904/, http://www.sully-movie.com/#home).
- 9.
- 10.
ICAO provisions which are explained at Flight Safety Foundation/Flight Safety Digest, August–November 2000, available at http://flightsafety.org/files/alar_bn2-3-communication.pdf.
- 11.
Urgency is a condition concerning the safety of an aircraft or of some person on board or within sight, but which does not require immediate assistance. Distress is a condition of being threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance.
- 12.
It refers to one of the Aesop’s fables known for rhetorical storytelling and parabolic communication explaining the maxims of quality in communication: “a liar who cannot be believed even when telling the truth.” When emergencies are declared repeatedly and are not real cases, then the expected response deteriorates if when the real emergency occurs. Sometimes it can be a side effect of personnel inaction after too many drills for preparedness or long-lasting readiness shifts. Remaining proactive requires “stopping for real action (an action break)” and then continuing to stay vigilant.
- 13.
As Boeing company describes it, the C-17 Globemaster IIIA high-wing, four-engine, T-tailed military transport aircraft, the multiservice C-17 can carry large equipment, supplies, and troops directly to small airfields in harsh terrain anywhere in the world day or night. The massive, sturdy, long-haul aircraft tackles distance, destination, and heavy, oversized payloads in unpredictable conditions. It has delivered cargo in every worldwide operation since the 1990s (http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-space/military/c17/).
- 14.
Aviation Safety Alliance currently consolidated in Flight Safety Foundation organized a 1-day conference on “Media Coverage of Aviation Accidents” with Barry Glassner as a keynote speaker; airline safety and the media coverage of airline accidents generated exaggerated fears of flying was his topic. More can be found at http://www.c-span.org/video/?156444-1/media-coverage-aviation-accidents.
- 15.
It is a moral parable from Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse at the end of the fifth century, B.C. The glamor and prestige of the aviation profession (especially for pilots) comes with silence as protection of fame, with the risk of blame, and with the actual risk of a fatal accident even when a flight is smooth till an emergency happens. As Dr. Daniel Mendelsohn, Charles Ranlett Flint, Professor of Humanities in Bard College, explains in his position in National Public Radio “All Things considered,” August 19, 2011 (at http://www.npr.org/2011/08/19/139799434/sword-of-damocles-reference-sometimes-misused).
- 16.
Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority oversees 46 airports all over Greece for a population of less than 11 million (see more at http://www.hcaa.gr/content/index2.asp).
- 17.
Eurocontrol’s skybrary explains: the sterile cockpit/flight deck concept involves the restriction of flight crew member activity to that which is operationally essential during busy phases of flight – taxi out, takeoff, initial climb, intermediate and final approach, landing, and taxi in. FAA has the Federal Aviation Regulation FAR 121.542 (from which the above extract is taken) often referred to as the “sterile cockpit rule,” and EU Commission has EU-OPS 1.085, a less explicit operating regulation, at http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Sterile_Flight_Deck.
- 18.
The acronym (A, acknowledge; S, separate; S, silence nonurgent calls; I, inform supervisors; S, support the crew; T, time) derives from the “Guidelines for Controller Training in the Handling of Unusual/Emergency Situations” at Eurocontrol’s skybrary at http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/15.pdf.
- 19.
Distress and urgency (as perceived by the pilot to the controller) are mentioned to ICAO ANNEX 10 VOL II – 5.3 Distress and urgency radiotelephony, 5.3.2.3 communication procedures – “Imposition of silence: The station in distress, or the station in control of distress traffic, shall be permitted to impose silence, either on all stations of the mobile service in the area or on any station which interferes with the distress traffic.” See at http://www.icao.int/Meetings/anconf12/Document%20Archive/AN10_V2_cons%5B1%5D.pdf.
- 20.
Flight Information Region (FIR): An airspace of defined dimensions within which flight information service and alerting service are provided. A three-dimensional area, in which aircraft are under control of usually a single authority. Internally an FIR is divided into several geographical areas called sectors. Sometimes one or more FIRs have a combined upper area control. It is a Eurocontrol definition at http://www.eurocontrol.int/lexicon/lexicon/en/index.php/Flight_Information_Region.
- 21.
On July 28, 2014, when I last visited Athens “El. Venizelos” airport, I was able to take a note for the upcoming report. This number of flights in a single day corresponds to the (approximately) 14% of the total number of flights in the Eurocontrol Air Space of 38 countries (explained at http://www.acac.org.ma/ar/Workshop%20Presentation/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20Eurocontrol%20Overview-Stefania%20Gazzina.pdf).
- 22.
Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority was founded in 1926 as an independent branch of Transportation Ministry in Greece. Its mission is the organization, development, and control of the country’s air transport infrastructure, as well as the study and laying of proposals to the Minister of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks concerning the overall policy formulation in air transport. Coincidentally, FAA has an institutional history starting on 1926 and grows as an independent branch on 1958 (more data about the chronology is available at https://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/).
- 23.
Vertical and horizontal flight separation standards are laid down by national authorities to facilitate the safe navigation of aircraft in controlled airspace. Observance of these standards ensures safe separation from the ground, from other aircraft and from protected airspace. National separation standards are based on the provisions of ICAO Doc 4444 (Procedures for Air Traffic Management ), especially Chap. 5. Differences from these standards (if any) are published in national aeronautical information publications (extract coming from http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Separation_Standards).
- 24.
A-7E Corsairs were the attack planes used (among others) by the US Navy in the Desert Storm campaign against Iraq on 1991 (details available at http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/gulf-war-20th-desert-storm-was-an-heroic-moment-for-a-7e-corsair-ii/). Then Hellenic Air Force has used them in three combat wings in Greece. When I was serving my duty in 115CW, A-7 s were stationed in three squadrons there.
- 25.
AWACS acronym stands for airborne warning and control system aircrafts which are modified Boeing 707 s airliners used to locate other aircrafts while being airborne and adjust to reconnaissance conditions. The E-3AWACS component is NATO’s first integrated, multinational flying unit, providing rapid deployability, airborne surveillance, command, control, and communication for NATO operations (more at http://www.e3a.nato.int/ and at http://www.boeing.com/boeing/history/boeing/airborne.page). They operate for NATO in Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, and their multinational crew comes from 17 NATO countries.
- 26.
T-2C Buckeye jet trainer aircraft was produced for the US Navy by North American at Columbus, Ohio. T-2C trainers were used by the Naval Air Training Command to conduct basic jet flight training for future Navy and Marine Corps aviators. The trainer established an outstanding record of safety and reliability while providing training for more than 11,000 students to pilot 18 different models of Navy jet aircraft. Buckeyes also were purchased by Venezuela (T-2D) and Greece (T-2E). Data available from Boeing at http://www.boeing.com/boeing/history/bna/t2.page.
- 27.
115 Combat Wing of HAF is described at http://www.haf.gr/en/structure/units/ata/units/115pm.asp and US NSA Souda Bay in Crete at http://www.militaryinstallations.dod.mil/pls/psgprod/f?p=132:CONTENT:0::NO::P4_INST_ID,P4_INST_TYPE:6095,INSTALLATION.
- 28.
TACAN, which stands for tactical air navigation, is a polar-coordinate-type radio air navigation system that provides an aircrew with distance information, from distance measuring equipment (DME) and bearing (azimuth) information (at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/navy/nrtc/14090_ch2.pdf).
- 29.
Azimuth in this case is the horizontal direction expressed as the angular distance between the direction of a fixed point (as the observer’s heading in the flight route) and the direction of the object (on the airport ground, when other concrete fixed points like mountains are around). Data from http://www.airforce.com/PDOP/. So, azimuth (Az) is the angle measured along the horizon from North. With North being 0 degrees, East would be 90 degrees, South 180 degrees, and West 270 degrees, and finally North could again be described as 360 degrees (extracted from http://www.planetary.org/blogs/guest-blogs/jason-davis/3450.html). When there is radar fixed point on the ground, then erroneous indication is possible.
- 30.
Instrument flight rules (IFR) and visual flight rules (VFR) are one of two sets of regulations governing civil aviation aircraft operations; Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) defines IFR as: “Rules and regulations established by the FAA to govern flight under conditions in which flight by outside visual reference is not safe. IFR flight depends upon flying by reference to instruments in the flight deck, and navigation is accomplished by reference to electronic signals.” Visual flight rules (VFR) are a set of regulations under which a pilot operates an aircraft in weather conditions generally clear enough to allow the pilot to see where the aircraft is going. It is also referred to as, “a term used by pilots and controllers to indicate the type of flight plan an aircraft is flying,” such as an IFR or VFR flight plan (data from. http://shebleaviation.com/study-materials/FAA-H-8083-15A-Instrument-Flying-Handbook.pdf).
- 31.
Expressing the thoughts for that question resembles the use of verbal language as triggering instincts to solve “evolutionary significant problems,” in Pinker’s approach of the language instinct.
- 32.
Similar events were projected in the “Silence in the Air” (Anosis SA, 2000) series of the Greek national TV channel “Mega TV” that were mentioned in footnote #14. The stereotypical scenes were describing interventions in the work of female controllers or engineers. The series was another example of the strong affinity that Greek society feels with their aviators that defend the Greek FIR and how their Air Force routine governs everything else in their life.
- 33.
The French Dassault Aviation explains the technology and equipment of Mirage 2000–5 at http://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/defense/customer-support/mirage-2000/mirage-2000-5-mk2/.
- 34.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) has crafted the legislation for zones of economic activity which extends beyond the intangible borderline in the sea (surface, seabed, and continental shelf in a middle line between adjacent states). It is how economy “reads” the maps of border protection, rescue zones, and exploitable resources in territorial waters (as explained at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm.). Greece, for another time, is a distinct case due to the island character of its geography(see Ministry of Foreign Affairs positions at http://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/delimitation-of-the-continental-shelf.html), whereas Turkey is arguing on the closed Aegean Sea which delimitates different borders in mainland and in the islands (rather arbitrarily) as explained from Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-breadth-of-territorial-waters.en.mfa. The question of international law for the maritime environment is analyzed in the respective references.
- 35.
At an organizational level Hofstede’s dimensions are broken down to means-oriented vs. goal-oriented, internally driven vs. externally driven, easygoing work discipline vs. strict work discipline, local vs. professional, open system vs. closed system, employee-oriented vs. work-oriented, degree of acceptance of leadership style, degree of identification with your organization. Hofstedes’s theory and applications are further explained at the senior’s site at http://geert-hofstede.com/organisational-culture-dimensions.html.
- 36.
A typical example of the immediacy and efficiency of HAF (despite the economic crisis period) was the accomplished coordination and precision accomplished in the recent national drill “Iniohos 2014,” functioning with the “hot seat” principle for a fighter jet to land, refuel, reequip, and take off again during the 4 days of the most competitive aerial drill in Europe. Another 800 fighter jet takeoffs (day and night) were reported for HAF (at http://www.haf.gr/el/news.asp?id=8703).
- 37.
In the category of organization and human performance, Skybrary repository analyzes the components of safety culture and the connected just culture (at http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Safety_Culture and http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Just_Culture, respectively).
- 38.
Flight data recorder (FDR) – device used to record specific aircraft performance parameters. The purpose of an FDR system is to collect and record data from a variety of airplane sensors onto a medium designed to survive an accident (ICAO Annex 6 “Operation of Aircraft”, Vol. I).
- 39.
Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) – a device used to record the audio environment in the flight deck for accidents and incident investigation purposes. The CVR records and stores the audio signals of the microphones and earphones of the pilots’ headsets and of an area microphone installed in the cockpit (ICAO Annex 6 “Operation of Aircraft,” Vol I).
- 40.
The Hellenic National Defense General Staff is monitoring all violations of National Airspace and Infringements of Air Traffic Regulations (ICAO ) inside Athens FIR. All violating aircrafts are identified and intercepted according to the relevant rules and procedures of international law. The listing is publicly available at http://www.geetha.mil.gr/index.asp?a_id=2779. A detailed explanation of one of these cases that escalated to a crisis is analyzed in Katerinakis, T. Drexel Graduate Portfolio (2009), regarding the Imia crisis available in Drexel Hagerty Library at https://idea.library.drexel.edu/handle/1860/3297. In 2013, during the national military drill “Parmenion,” HAF has implemented 800 takeoffs in a day over the Aegean Sea.
- 41.
The Chinook is a multi-mission, heavy-lift transport helicopter further explained from Boeing at http://www.boeing.com/boeing/rotorcraft/military/ch47d/.
- 42.
The multi-mission AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter is the next-generation version of original AH-64A Apache further explained from Boeing at http://www.boeing.com/boeing/rotorcraft/military/ah64d/.
- 43.
All major manufacturers issue special reports regarding foreign object debris (FOD) at airports or landing spaces. FOD includes any object found in an inappropriate location that – because of being in that location – can damage equipment or injure airplane or helicopter and their personnel. Usual recommendations are sweeping and washing and use of magnetic bars, rumble strips, and FOD containers. This is an example from the Boeing company at http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_01/textonly/s01txt.html.
- 44.
NASA’s helicopter brownout research describes helicopter brownout as a dangerous phenomenon when helicopters land in dusty, wet, or toxic environment “whereby sand or dust particles become swept up in the rotor outwash and obscure the pilot’s vision of the terrain. This is particularly dangerous because the pilot needs those visual cues from their surroundings in order to make a safe landing” (data from http://halfdome.arc.nasa.gov/Research/Programs/brownout.html).
References
Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC). (2006). Safer cities 18: The boy who cried, “Wolf!” or why a community-based alert system is a good idea. Klong Luang Pathumthani: ADPC-USAID/ODPA Case Studies.
Alexander Hamilton Institute (AHI). (2002). Whistleblowing: A new perspective on an old issue. Ramsey.
Allison, T. G. (2017). Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides’s trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Ashman, A., & Telfer, R. (1983). Personality profiles of pilots. Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, 54(10), 940–943.
Bach, G. R., & Wyden, P. (1968). The intimate enemy. New York: Avon.
Barrett, R. (1982). The human equation in operating a nuclear-power plant. In D. Sills, C. Wolf, & V. Shelanski (Eds.), Accident at Three Mile Island: The human dimension (pp. 161–171). Boulder: Westview Press.
Barshi, I. (1997). The effects of linguistic properties and message length on misunderstandings in aviation communication (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation in Linguistics). University of Colorado, Boulder.
Bennis, W. G., & Nanus, B. (2003). Leaders: Strategies for taking charge. New York: Harper Business.
Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Segall, M. H., & Dasen, P. R. (1992). Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bienefeld, N., & Grote, G. (2012). Silence that may kill when aircrew members don’t speak up and why. Aviation Psychology and Applied Human Factors, 2(1), 1–10.
Bradac, J. J., Bowers, J. W., & Courtwright, J. A. (1979). Three language variables in communication research: Intensity, immediacy and diversity. Human Communication Research, 5(3), 257–269.
Bruhn, J. (2005). The sociology of community connections. New York: Springer.
Burgoon, J., Guerrero, L. K., & Floyd, K. (2010). Nonverbal communication. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Chalmers, L., & Keown, P. (2006). Communities of practice and professional development. International Journal of Lifelong Education, 25(2), 139–156.
Christakis, N. A., & Fowler, J. H. (2009). Connected: The surprising power of our social networks and how they shape our lives. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
Cookson, S. (2009). Zagreb and Tenerife: Airline accidents involving linguistic factors. Australian Review of Applied Linguistics, 32(3), 22.1–22.14.
Crampton, S. M., Hodge, J. W., & Mishra, J. M. (1998). The informal communication network: Factors influencing grapevine activity. Public Personnel Management, 27(4), 569–584.
Cushing, S. (1994). Fatal words: Communication clashes and aircraft crashes. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Degani, A., & Wiener, E. L. (1993). Cockpit checklists: Concepts, design, and use. Human Factors, 35(2), 345–359.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2002). Reconstructing human contributions to accidents: the new view on error and performance. Journal of Safety Research, 33, 371–385.
Dekker, S. W. A. (2011). Systems thinking 1.0 and systems thinking 2.0: Complexity science and a new conception of “cause”. Aviation in Focus: An International Aeronautical Journal, 2(2), 21–39.
DeVito, J. A. (2012). Human communication the basic course (12th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Dismukes, R. K., & Berman, B. (2010). Checklists and monitoring in the cockpit: Why crucial defenses sometimes fail (NASA Technical Memorandum (NASA TM-2010-216396)). Moffett Field: NASA Ames Research Center.
Dismukes, R. K., Berman, B. A., & Loukopoulos, L. D. (2007). The limits of expertise: Rethinking pilot error and the causes of airline accidents. London: Ashgate Publishing.
Doak, S., & Assimakopoulos, D. (2010). Tacit knowledge: A needed addition to SOPs, in a forensic science environment. Forensic Science Policy & Management: An International Journal, 1(4), 171–177.
Dominguez, C., Vidulich, M., Vogel, E., & McMillan, G. (1994). Situation awareness: Papers and annotated bibliography. Armstrong Laboratory, Human System Center, ref. AL/CF-TR-1994-0085.
Eden, D. (1992). Leadership and expectations: Pygmalion effects and other self-fulfilling prophecies in organizations. The Leadership Quarterly, 3, 271–305.
Ehrenhaus, P. (1988). Silence and symbolic expression. Communication Monographs, 55(1), 41–57.
Endsley, M., & Jones, D. (2012). Designing for situation awareness: An approach to user-centered design (2nd ed.). London: Taylor and Francis.
Foushee, H. C., & Helmreich, R. L. (1988). Group interaction and flight crew performance. In E. L. Wiener & D. C. Nagel (Eds.), Human factors in aviation (pp. 189–227). San Diego: Academic Press.
Fry, G. E., & Reinhardt, R. F. (1969). Personality characteristics of jet pilots as measured by the Edwards personal preference schedule. Aerospace Medicine, 40(5), 484–486.
Fuller, E. (2011). You can’t lead with your feet on the desk. Hoboken: Wiley & Sons.
Gaba, D. M., Singer, S. J., Sinaiko, A. D., Bowen, J. D., & Ciavarelli, A. P. (2003). Differences in safety climate between hospital personnel and naval aviators. Human Factors, 45(2), 173–185.
Gladwell, M. (2011). Outliers: The story of success. New York: Little, Brown & Company.
Glassner, B. (1999). The culture of fear: Why Americans are afraid of the wrong things. New York: Basic Books.
Gordon, T. (1975). PET.: Parent effectiveness training. New York: New American Library.
Grote, G. (2014). Promoting safety by increasing uncertainty – Implications for risk management. Safety Science. Available online 1 March 2014, ISSN 0925-7535, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.02.010.
Habermas, J. (1991). The structural transformation of the public sphere. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Habermas, J. (1998). Between facts and norms. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hackman, M. Z., & Johnson, C. E. (1991). Leadership: A communication perspective. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press.
Handelman, D. (1990). Models and mirrors: Towards an anthropology of public events. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hayward, B. (1997). Culture, CRM and aviation safety. ANZSASI, Asia Pacific Regional Air Safety Seminar, Brisbane.
Hofstede, G. J. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International differences in work related values. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Hofstede, G. J. (2009). Research on cultures: How to use it in training? European Journal of Cross-Cultural Competence and Management, 1(1), 14–21.
Hofstede, G., & Hofstede, G. J. (2005). Culture and organizations: Software of the mind (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hwang, W. Y., Hsu, J. L., Tretiakov, A., Chou, H. W., & Lee, C. Y. (2009). Intra-action, interaction and outeraction in blended learning environments. Educational Technology & Society, 12(2), 222–239.
Jacovides, A. (2012). Delimitation practice in the eastern mediterranean (Rhodes Academy of Maritime Law and Policy). Charlottesville: University of Virginia.
Jandt, F. E. (2004). Intercultural communication (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Janis, I. (1983). Victims of group thinking: A psychological study of foreign policy decisions and fiascoes (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Jaworski, A. (Ed.). (1997). Silence: Interdisciplinary perspectives. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Job, M. (1994). Air disaster (Vol. 1). Weston Ck: Aerospace Publications.
Johnson, S. D., & Bechler, C. (1998). Examining the relationship between listening effectiveness and leadership emergence: Perceptions, behaviors and recall. Small Group Research, 29(August), 452–471.
Kariotis, T. (Ed.). (1997). Greece and the law of the sea. Berlin/New York: Springer.
Katz, S. B. (1992). The ethic of expediency: Classical rhetoric, technology, and the Holocaust. College English, 54(3), 255–275.
Klein, S. M. (1992). Employee involvement and the communication process. In S. M. Klein & J. S. Niblock (Eds.), Proceedings of the 1992 Conference of the Midwest Management Society (pp. 111–14).
Kochan, J. (2009, December 10). HCEP lecture: ‘In search of the expert pilot- A research Odyssey in human factors’. Drexel Human Cognition Enhancement Program (HCEP at http://www.drexel.edu/research/humancognition/). Online Video File at: http://media.irt.drexel.edu/mediasite/Viewer/?peid=8f7355a186f947798bd6bf7db224fefe. Accessed 6 May 2010.
Koestler, A. (1973). The tree and the candle. In W. Gray & N. D. Rizzo (Eds.), Unity through diversity: A festschrift for Ludwig von Bertalanffy (pp. 287–314). New York: Gordon and Breach.
Konstantaras, D. (2007). 24 Seconds (24 Defterolepta). Athens, Greece: Kastaniotis Publications.
Lesser, E. L., & Storck, J. (2001). Communities of practice and organizational performance. The IBM Systems Journal, 40(4), 831–841.
Leveson, N. (2002). A new accident model for rengineering safer systems. MIT Engineering Systems Division Internal Symposium, Boston: 1–27, MIT.
Leveson, N. (2012). Engineering a safer world: Applying systems thinking to safety. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Leveson, N., de Villepin, M., Srinivasan, J., Daouk Neogi, N., Bachelder, E., Bellingham, J., Pilon, N., & Flynn, G. (2002). A safety and human-centered approach to developing new air traffic management tools. In Proceedings of the 4th USA/Europe Air Traffic Management Seminar, 3–7 December 2001, Santa Fe.
Lewin, K. (1947). Human relations. New York: Harper and Row.
Loukopoulos, L. D., Dismukes, R. K., & Barshi, I. (2001). Cockpit interruptions and distractions: A line observation study. In R. Jensen (Ed.), Proceedings of the 11th international symposium on aviation psychology. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Loukopoulos, L. D., Dismukes, R. K., & Barshi, I. (2003). Concurrent task demands in the cockpit: Challenges and vulnerabilites in routine flight operations. In Proceedings of the 12th international symposium on aviation psychology (pp. 737–742). Dayton: The Wright State University.
Loukopoulos, L. D., Dismukes, R. K., & Barshi, I. (2009). The multitasking myth: Handling complexity in real-world operations. Farnham: Ashgate.
Loyarte, E., & Rivera, O. (2007). Communities of practice: A model for their cultivation. Journal of Knowledge Management, 11(3), 67–77.
Merrin, A. C. (1996). National culture and work attitudes in commercial aviation: A cross-cultural investigation (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). The University of Texas at Austin.
Nardi, B. A., Whittaker, S., & Bradner, E. (2000). Interaction and outeraction: Instant messaging in action. In Proceedings of the 2000 ACM Conference on CSCW (pp. 79–88).
Nembhard, I. M., & Edmondson, A. C. (2006). Making it safe: The effects of leader inclusiveness and professional status on psychological safety and improvement efforts in health care teams. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27, 941–966.
Oral, N. (2009). Non-ratification of the 1982 LOS Convention: An Aegean dilemma of environmental and global consequence (Vol. 1). Publicist (on-line) publication of the Berkeley Journal of International Law, The Regents of the University of California.
Orasanu, J. M., Fischer, U., McDonnell, L. K, Davison, J., Haars, K. E., Villeda, E., & VanAken, C. (1998). How do flight crews detect and prevent errors? Findings from a flight simulation study. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 42nd Annual Meeting (pp. 191–195). Santa Monica: HFES.
Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pressfield, S. (2011). The warrior ethos paperback. New York: Black Irish Entertainment.
Ragins, B. R., & Kram, K. E. (Eds.). (2007). The handbook of mentoring at work: Theory, research, and practice. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Reinhardt, R. F. (1970). The outstanding jet pilot. American Journal of Psychiatry, 127(6), 732–736.
Retzlaff, P. D., & Gibertini, M. (1987). Air force pilot personality: Hard data on the right stuff. Multivariate Behavioural Research, 22, 383–389.
Rich, J. (1995). War and society in the Greek world. New York: Routledge.
Roberts, J. (2006). Limits to communities of practice. Journal of Management Studies, 44(3), 621–622.
Roitsch, P. A., Babcock, G. L., & Edmunds, W. W. (1978). Human factors report on the Tenerife accident. Washington, DC: Air Line Pilots Association.
Roulston, M. S., & Smith, A. (2004, April). The boy who cried wolf revisited: The impact of false alarm intolerance on cost–loss scenarios. Weather and Forecasting, 19. American Meteorological Society.
Schafer, M., & Crichlow, S. (2002). The process-outcome connection in foreign policy decision making: A quantitative study building on groupthink. International Studies Quarterly, 46, 45–68.
Schwappach, D. L. B., & Gehring, K. (2014). Trade-offs between voice and silence: A qualitative exploration of oncology staff’s decisions to speak up about safety concerns. BMC Health Services Research, 14, 303.
Shuang, L., Gallois, C., & Volčič, Z. (2010). Introducing intercultural communication: Global cultures and contexts. London: Sage Publications.
Sturken, M. (1998). The wall, the screen, and the image: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial. In N. Mirzoeff (Ed.), The visual cultural reader (pp. 163–178). London: Routledge.
Triandis, H. C., & Suh, E. M. (2002). Cultural influences on personality. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 133–160.
Tsolakis, A. D. (2013). Dare! A way of life (Tolma! Enas Tropos Zois). Athens: 11Aviation Publications.
Turner, V. (1969). The ritual process: Structure and anti-structure. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Vakola, M., & Bouradas, D. (2005). Antecedents and consequences of organizational silence: An empirical investigation. Employee Relations, 27, 441–458.
Vasterman, P., Yzermans, C. J., & Dirkzwager, A. J. E. (2005). The role of the media and media hypes in the aftermath of disasters. Epidemiology Review, 27, 107–114.
Weinberg, H. L. (1958). Level of knowing and existence. New York: Harper & Row.
Wellman, B. (1983). Network analysis: Some basic principles. Sociological Theory, 1, 155–200.
Wellman, B. (Ed.). (1999). Networks in the global village: Life in contemporary communities networks in the global village. Boulder: Westview Press.
Wenger, E., McDermott, R., & Snyder, W. (2002). Cultivating communities of practice: A guide to managing knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Wilson, D., & Sperber, D. (1988). Mood and the analysis of non-declarative sentences. In J. Dancy, J. Moravcsik, & C. Taylor (Eds.), Human agency: Language, duty and value (pp. 77–101). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Woods, D., & Cook, R. (1999). Perspectives on human error: Hindsight biases and local rationality. In R. S. Durso et al. (Eds.), Handbook of applied cognition (pp. 141–171). New York: Wiley.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Katerinakis, T. (2019). Knowledgeable Sounds of Silence or When Silence Is Not Golden. In: The Social Construction of Knowledge in Mission-Critical Environments. Innovation, Technology, and Knowledge Management. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91014-7_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91014-7_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-91013-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-91014-7
eBook Packages: Business and ManagementBusiness and Management (R0)