Abstract
According to evidentialism, justification is a matter of evidential fit. Some evidentialists analyze the notion of evidential fit in terms of explanation. Applied to perception, the idea is, roughly, that an experience as of p is evidence for you in support of believing p if, and only if, p is either included in, or is a logical consequence of, the set of propositions that explain why you have that seeming. In this paper, I will raise problems for this approach and argue in defense of an alternative proposal.
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Notes
- 1.
For evidentialists defending explanationism, see Conee and Feldman (2008) and McCain (2014). The idea that positive epistemic status, particularly in the context of inductive inference, can be accounted for via inference to the best explanation (IBE) goes back to Harman (1965, 1968). Vogel (1990, 2013) deploys IBE for the purpose of responding to Cartesian skepticism.
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- 3.
We may say that phenomenalism (the ‘phenomenal’ part of PC) is the view that seemings exist and that they can be a source of justification. Universal phenomenalism is the view that all seemings justify and that all justification comes from seemings. (For a defense, see Huemer 2007.) Restricted phenomenalism is the view that, while all seemings justify, not all justification comes from seemings. Pryor appears to defend restricted phenomenalism as far as perceptual seemings are concerned. Finally, phenomenal credentialism is the view that seemings have justificational force only if they are properly credentialed.
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For an elaboration of how memorial seemings constitute evidence of reliability, see Steup (2004).
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Spelling out the details of this approach to analyzing defeat would require additional work that cannot be undertaken here. Consider the following case: Looking at a bent pencil in a glass of water, I have two logically inconsistent seemings: the pencil is straight (S1), and the pencil is bent (S2). Yet it does not seem that S2 defeats S1. Evidentialists have several options for addressing this problem. First, they could argue that only undefeated defeaters succeed in defeating. S2 is defeated by what I remember about previous visual experiences of straight sticks that are immersed in water. Second, they could argue that, since I know S2 to be an optical illusion, S2 has no justificational force for me and thus is not a defeater. McCain (2014) proposes to handle the problem by appeal to explanatory considerations.
- 8.
See McCain (2014, p. 131). McCain takes these to be kinds of simplicity.
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I assume that the envatting aliens deceive Napoleon into believing that his life continues roughly as he would have expected it.
- 11.
See McCain (2014, p. 131).
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The other items on the list don’t strike as promising for the job at hand.
- 13.
To lend further plausibility to the judgment that Zoe is justified in believing No-Disguise, we may assume she has researched the issue carefully and concluded that the likelihood of seeing CDMs instead of zebras is extremely low.
- 14.
According to various theories of knowledge, Zoe cannot know No-Disguise, just on the basis of her background knowledge. There is no need here to settle the question whether Zoe knows that the animals in the pen are not cleverly disguised mules. What’s needed is merely the premise that she is justified in believing this, in the sense that it is more reasonable of her to believe No-Disguise than to suspend judgment on the matter.
- 15.
It seems obvious that my background knowledge does not entail Still There. Explanationists might argue instead that the set of propositions that explains my background knowledge makes Still There probable. This move is problematic for at least two reasons. First, while it seems clear that my background knowledge makes Still There probable, it is not clear that what explains my background knowledge makes Still There probable. Second, since Still There makes no causal contribution to my background knowledge, it has no explanatory power relative to my background knowledge as the explanandum. As a result, the appealed-to probability relation does all the work of accounting for evidential fit. It is difficult to resist the conclusion, therefore, that the proposed solution is explanationist in name only. Third, the making probable relation is, arguably, an epistemic relation. If it is, then the move under consideration violates the NN constraint. For ways in which explanationism can address the problem of the missing entailment relation, see McCain (2015).
- 16.
Earlier versions were presented at 12th Annual Russell Conference in Healdsburg, CA, March, 2016 and a Symposium on Kevin McCain: Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification at the annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco, April 2, 2016. For helpful discussion and comments, I am grateful to Kevin McCain, Bruce Russell, and Jonathan Vogel.
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Steup, M. (2018). Is Evidential Fit Grounded in Explanatory Relations?. In: McCain, K. (eds) Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Synthese Library, vol 398. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_21
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