Abstract
Most of the recent literature on the European Parliament’s (EP) role in trade policy focuses on the new, post-Lisbon, legislative and ratification powers. This contribution instead analyses the monitoring role and argues that the EP’s incentive to monitor the implementation of EU trade policy has increased significantly after the Lisbon Treaty. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the chapter examines the rationale for the EP’s monitoring of EU trade policy implementation and links this to the different monitoring instruments at the institution’s disposal. It concludes with some of the key findings from a survey conducted on the EP’s monitoring of three areas of trade policy, namely free trade agreements, trade defence instruments and the Generalized Scheme of Preferences.
Dr. Laura Puccio (Bsc, MA, LLM, PhD law) is Policy Analyst for trade law at the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) and teaches at the Institut d’Etudes Européennes of the Université Libre de Bruxelles.
Roderick Harte (BA, LLB, LLM, MA) is Policy Analyst for international trade at the EPRS.
Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the authors.
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Notes
- 1.
The chapter by Poptcheva (2017) in this book tackles the issue of accountability.
- 2.
This contribution does not cover the power of appointment and motion of censure, nor the committees of inquiry or the right of petitions, which are intrinsically linked to the power to hold the executive accountable. It will also not refer to control of the budget via the EP which is particularly important for monitoring development policy but is not a substantial instrument for the monitoring of trade policy as such.
- 3.
We are aware of the fact that there is a double selection bias: (1) we contacted MEPs that participate in committees with an active role in EU trade policy, and (2) it is likely that only those MEPs participating in monitoring would reply. However, these selection biases do not affect our analysis as we are interested in how monitoring is carried out and not on whether monitoring is done by all MEPs.
- 4.
This role is embedded in the implementation, executive and management function enshrined in article 17 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
- 5.
TTIP and the change from Investor-State Dispute Settlement to an Investment Court System are a good example of this rising influence; see L. Puccio and R. Harte, From ISDS to ICS: The evolution of the CETA model, EPRS, June 2017.
- 6.
In this chapter, we also explore softer actions as opposed to the definition of consequences given by Brandsma (2015).
- 7.
The ‘agent’ has information that the ‘principal’ does not possess and needs in order to make a decision.
- 8.
See articles 207(3) and 218 TFEU.
- 9.
It can be found at https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/regdel/#/home.
- 10.
European Parliament, 9 February 2018, MEPs assess implementation of trade agreement with Colombia and Peru, Press Release.
- 11.
INTA meeting of 20 February 2018.
- 12.
INTA meeting of 28 November 2017.
- 13.
Recently, a group of MEPs submitted a motion to object to a delegated act on GSP+ treatment for Sri Lanka, which was rejected by the EP. European Parliament resolution on the Commission delegated regulation of 11 January 2017 amending Annex III to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council applying a scheme of generalized tariff preferences (C(2016)8996 – 2017/2511(DEA)).
- 14.
Decision of the Conference of Presidents on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports of 12 December 2012 as amended in 2016.
- 15.
Report on the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea (2015/2059(INI), 10 April 2017). European Parliament resolution of 18 May 2017 on the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea (2015/2059(INI)).
- 16.
See, as an example, the European Parliament Resolution of 15 June 2017 on Pakistan, notably the situation of human rights defenders and the death penalty (2017/2723(RSP)).
- 17.
The issue was mentioned five times while other factors were mentioned only by one respondent.
- 18.
All issues were mentioned either seven or eight times.
- 19.
All the percentages refer to positive replies to the question as a percentage of the total respondents to the survey (i.e. 13). Nota bene: some respondents sometimes gave more than one answer. For example, a respondent could have mentioned both that they monitored more than once a year but that it also depended on the FTA.
- 20.
See footnote 17 for an example involving Pakistan, or see the discussion surrounding the GSP+ treatment of Sri Lanka in footnote 14.
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Puccio, L., Harte, R. (2019). The European Parliament’s Role in Monitoring the Implementation of EU Trade Policy. In: Costa, O. (eds) The European Parliament in Times of EU Crisis. European Administrative Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97391-3_18
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