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Severe Accidents: Singularity of Nuclear Disasters?

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New Ways and Needs for Exploiting Nuclear Energy

Abstract

The risk of nuclear accidents has proven to be low in absolute and relative terms. Nevertheless, the high-energy density fission process and current technology make today’s reactors vulnerable to very severe albeit very rare accident scenarios. The three disasters experienced demonstrated the importance of site conditions, containment systems and severe accident management measures. Not being triggered by a single or combined technical failure in a classical sense, disasters experienced are partly explained as a product of five hierarchical levels of individual and societal human factors. The potentially severe consequences, including costs, of nuclear accidents have played a decisive role in the development of the nuclear power sector, and dominate nuclear risk analysis. However, in terms of cost or loss of life, these accidents are not singular—as other industrial and energy generation sectors have comparable severe accidents.

Despite this, there is a widespread and exceptional human dread of low level radiation exposure that prevents us from facing the real issue of how to improve world prosperity while burning less fossil fuel. To deal with this pragmatically, and operating on the principle that “nuclear power plant safety requires a continuing quest for gain in excellence”, we identify enhanced requirements to take the dread out of nuclear, and to rely less on social stability and long term husbandry of wastes.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It mixes frequency and severity; it limits the score of alarming near-misses to three, a level that can also be attained by e.g. a small release of radioactive gas without a connection to a core damage accident sequence; its discrete limited set of values and lack of measurement of integral consequences make it of limited use for measuring event severity; and different styles of severity assessment allow for subjectivity in scoring of incidents.

  2. 2.

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  3. 3.

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  4. 4.

    Omitted from the count for being a military weapons related facility.

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  13. 13.

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  31. 31.

    Uncertainty aversion refers to the dislike and avoidance of risks for which the probability of occurrence is not known, in favor of risks for which the probabilities can be assessed.

  32. 32.

    Ambiguity aversion refers to the dislike and avoidance of risks that are unknown in their amplitude, in addition to their probabilities.

  33. 33.

    Can the dread that many people hold towards anything related to nuclear be eased? This will require important and continuous efforts, for the reasons exposed above, which link dread to deep-seated fears of the mysteries of invisible radiations and the terror associated with the atomic bomb. After all, our brains are just only slightly more evolved than that of our ape cousins, with the rational cortex being often under the control of the emotional brain, associated with the limbic system also known as the paleo-mammalian cortex (and in particular the hypothalamus and amygdala).

  34. 34.

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  35. 35.

    INSAG-12, IAEA, Vienna, 1999.

  36. 36.

    This requirement was soon adopted for light water and heavy water reactors throughout most of the world. However, early light water reactors in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were provided only with partial containment buildings. It was in the mid-1970s that full containment of newer light water reactors was introduced in Eastern Europe. Lack of a tight, sturdy containment building around large gas cooled reactors (including RBMK) has been compensated for by other design features.

  37. 37.

    Research to provide the necessary engineering base have spanned the past 35 years with the cost equivalent of USD 5000 billion around the world.

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  39. 39.

    On 10 March 2015, a Japanese National Policy Agency report confirmed 15,894 deaths, 6152 injured, and 2562 people missing across 20 prefectures, as well as 228,863 people living away from their home in either temporary housing or permanent relocation, due to the Great Eastern earthquake and tsunami (Wikipedia, visited 30.01.16).

  40. 40.

    Stress tests performed on European nuclear power plants. ENSREG, 24.04.2012.

  41. 41.

    Philosophy to provide an additional independent subset of safety related structures, systems and components, capable of withstanding earthquakes and flooding events significantly beyond design basis.

  42. 42.

    Offered services include Integrated Regulatory Review Services, Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review, Operational Safety Review Team, Independent Safety Culture Assessment, and Emergency Preparedness Review (see iaea.org).

  43. 43.

    As an example, the owner of the Swiss NPP Mühleberg decided on Oct. 2013 to permanently shut down the plant by 20 December 2019 due to economic reasons.

  44. 44.

    Not all plants have bunkered safety equipment and other BDBA-hardened emergency systems, and there is substantial variation in the degree of redundancy and diversity from country to country.

  45. 45.

    The tragedy of the commons refers to a situation within a shared-resource system where individual users tending to maximize their own independent self-interests behave in a way that turns out to be contrary to the common good of all users, and thus of themselves in the end, by depleting or destroying that resource through their collective action. Hardin, G., The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162 (3859), 1243–1248 (1968).

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  50. 50.

    Costs are a mix of actual reported costs and estimated costs, with the aim of capturing the full social cost. All costs are in 2017 US Dollars unless stated otherwise.

  51. 51.

    IAEA PRIS database, available at https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/

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  82. 82.

    However, a detailed analysis suggests that this claim by Gorbachev may have been self-serving and used as an excuse for other mistakes or oversights in the governance of the politburo of the USSR. See D. Chernov and D. Sornette, Man-made catastrophes and risk information concealment (25 case studies of major disasters and human fallibility), Springer (2016).

  83. 83.

    The nuclear program in Belarus has restarted recently, with its first nuclear power plant presently under construction and plans to have it operating from 2019. Financed by Russia, Atomstroyexport is building the 2400 MWe plant, with two VVER-1200 reactors. See world-nuclear.org (accessed 17 Dec. 2017).

  84. 84.

    Another difficulty is to distinguish the responsibility for these costs, as the German decision is highly political and may be considered unwise by some. Should ill-advised political decisions be entirely put on the back of nuclear?

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Annexes

Annexes

5.1.1 A.1 The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)

The INES was introduced in 1990 by the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) in order to enable prompt communication of safety-significant information in case of nuclear accidents, and was refined in 1992 and extended to be applicable to any event associated with radioactive material and/or radiation, including the transport of radioactive material. The most recent user manual was published in 2008.Footnote 48 The scale is intended to be logarithmic, similar to the moment magnitude scale that is used to describe the sizes of earthquakes. Each increasing level represents an event approximately ten times more severe than the previous level. Compared to earthquakes, where the event energy can be quantitatively evaluated, the level of severity of a man-made disaster, such as a nuclear accident, is more subject to interpretation (Fig. 5.4).

Fig. 5.4
figure 4

International Nuclear Event Scale, standard pyramid representation of the 8 levels (INES, IAEA. “The international nuclear and radiological event scale user’s manual 2008 edition.” IAEA and OECD/NEA (2008))

The level of the scale is determined by the highest of scores from three tracks: off-site effects (also called People and Environment), on-site effects (also called Radiological Barriers and Controls), and defense in depth degradation (potential consequences). Effects include health and environmental impact; costs are not considered explicitly. Below, real events are given as examples for INES levels 3–7, scored according to the relevant track.

5.1.1.1 A.1.1 Level 7: Major Accident—Impact on People and Environment

Major release of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures. There have been two such events to date:

  • Chernobyl disaster (Ukraine/former Soviet Union), 26 April 1986. A power surge during a test procedure resulted in a criticality accident, leading to the release of a significant fraction of core material into the environment. See also Sect. 3.4.2.

  • Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, a series of events beginning on 11 March 2011, Japan. Major damage to the backup power and containment system caused by the Tohoku submarine earthquake and induced tsunamis resulted in overheating and leaking from some of the nuclear plant’s reactors. Each reactor accident was rated separately; out of the six reactors, three were rated level 5, one was rated level 3, and the situation as a whole was rated level 7. See also Sect. 3.4.3.

5.1.1.2 A.1.2 Level 6: Serious Accident—Impact on People and Environment

Significant release of radioactive material likely to require implementation of planned counter-measures.

  • Kyshtym disaster at Mayak Chemical Combine (former Soviet Union), 29 September 1957. A failed cooling system at a military nuclear waste reprocessing facility caused a steam explosion with a force equivalent to 70–100 tonnes (metric) of TNT. About 70–80 metric tons of highly radioactive materials were carried into the surrounding environment. The impact on local population is not fully known, but at least 22 villages were affected with doses that may lead to shortened life expectancy due to higher risk of cancer.Footnote 49

5.1.1.3 A.1.3 Level 5: Accident with Wider Consequences

  • Impact on people and environment

    Limited release of radioactive material likely to require implementation of some planned countermeasures. And/or several deaths likely to result from radiation.

  • Impact on radiological barriers and control

    Severe damage to reactor core (more than 1% of inventory); release of large quantities of radioactive material with a high probability of significant public exposure. This could arise from a major criticality accident or fire.

    • Windscale fire (UK), 10 October 1957. Annealing of graphite moderator at a military air-cooled reactor caused the graphite and the metallic uranium fuel to catch fire, releasing radioactive pile material as dust into the environment.

    • Three Mile Island accident near Harrisburg (USA), 28 March 1979. A combination of design and operator errors caused a gradual loss of coolant, leading to a partial meltdown. See also Sect. 3.4.1.

    • First Chalk River accident (Canada), 12 December 1952. Reactor core damaged.

    • Lucens (INES level 4–5) partial core meltdown accident (Switzerland), 21 January 1969. A test reactor build in an underground cavern suffered a loss-of-coolant accident during a startup, leading to a partial core meltdown and massive radioactive contamination of the cavern, which was then sealed.

    • Goiânia accident (Brazil), 13 September 1987. An unsecured cesium chloride radiation source left in an abandoned hospital was recovered by scavenger thieves unaware of its nature and sold at a scrapyard. 249 people were contaminated and 4 died.

5.1.1.4 A.1.4 Level 4: Accident with Local Consequences

  • Impact on people and environment

    Minor release of radioactive material unlikely to result in implementation of planned countermeasures other than local food controls. At least one premature death from radiation.

  • Impact on radiological barriers and control

    Fuel melt or damage to fuel resulting in more than 0.1% release of core inventory. Release of significant quantities of radioactive material within an installation with a high probability of significant public exposure.

    • SL-1 Experimental Power Station (USA), 1961, reactor reached prompt critically, killing three operators.

    • Saint-Laurent Nuclear Power Plant (France), 1969, partial core meltdown; 1980, graphite overheating.

    • Buenos Aires (Argentina), 1983, criticality accident on research reactor RA-2 during fuel rod rearrangement killed one operator and injured two others.

    • Tokai-mura nuclear accident (Japan), 1999, three inexperienced operators at a reprocessing facility caused a criticality accident; two of them died.

5.1.1.5 A.1.5 Level 3: Serious Incident

  • Impact on people and environment

    Exposure in excess of ten times the statutory annual limit for workers; non-lethal deterministic health effect (e.g. burns) from radiation.

  • Impact on radiological barriers and control

    Exposure rates of more than 1 Sv/h in an operating area. Severe contamination in an area not expected by design, but with a low probability of significant public exposure.

  • Impact on defense-in-depth

    Near-accident at a nuclear power plant with no safety provisions remaining. Lost or stolen highly radioactive sealed source. Highly radioactive source in the wrong or unexpected place without adequate procedures in place to handle it.

    • THORP plant, Sellafield (UK), 2005; leak of uranium and plutonium dissolved in nitric acid into stainless steel containment structure.

    • Paks Nuclear Power Plant (Hungary), 2003; fuel rod damage in cleaning tank

    • Vandellos Nuclear Power Plant (Spain), 1989; fire destroyed many control systems; the reactor was shut down safely.

    • Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (USA), 2002; negligent inspections failed to record corrosion through 15.24 cm of the carbon steel reactor head leaving only 9.5 mm of stainless steel cladding intact that was holding back the high coolant pressure of 17 Mpa.

      Table 5.5 Radioactive releases compared (numerical values in TeraBecquerel = 1012 Bq, % of core inventory) for Chernobyla, Fukushimab, TMIc, and Windscaled. Empty values mean nothing measured

5.1.2 A.2 Breakdown of Rough Integral Cost Estimates

5.1.2.1 A.2.1 On-site

Emergency management, mitigation, capital loss, and remediation/clean-up.

TMI

Unit 2 was destroyed within 1 year of operation, having cost USD 2B (Billion) to build, 7 years of downtime were caused at unit 1,Footnote 50 and substantial contamination led to nearly USD 2.5B in cleanup.Footnote 51 We find USD 5-10B to be reasonable, although higher estimates exits.Footnote 52

Fukushima

The six-unit site, taken into operation in the 1970s, was lost. Shutting down the near 50 reactor fleet for 7 years already led to further loss of capital. As of the end of 2017, 5 reactors have restarted and 21 are currently subject to approval to restart. TEPCO estimates for cleanup and decommissioning costs are USD 10-20B.Footnote 53 Thus, overall USD 20-30B is reasonable, but the more than 30 years planned for decommissioning, and ample uncertainty, leaves room for unforeseen costs.

Chernobyl

In 1986 and 1987, some 440,000 recovery operation workers were employed at the Chernobyl site.Footnote 54 The Ukrainian government claims USD 20–30B on accident management and decontamination so far.Footnote 55 Unit 4, less than 4 years into its life, was lost. Despite contamination, units 1–3 (each producing about 6 TWh/year) resumed operation by the end of 1987. The new confinement structure, built over the remains of Unit 4, cost 2B USD. Also allowing for further future costs, the total on-site cost is USD 25-35B.

5.1.2.2 A.2.2 Life and Health

Health impact and trauma due to radiological exposure, emergency response, relocation, continued displacement, and so on. Details on late cancer fatalities in Sect. 4.3.

TMI

Despite stress due to media and poor communication,Footnote 56 human consequences were relatively negligible due to successful containment. There was a minor release (Table 5.5) from the plant’s auxiliary building to relieve pressure on the primary system, such that less than 1 additional death from cancer was expected.Footnote 57 Total payout for a class-action settlement was around USD 0.1B.Footnote 58

Fukushima

The Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami killed over 18,500 people from effects unrelated to destruction of the reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Long-term displacement of more than 164,000 people, attributed to the nuclear accident is blamed for around 2000 early deaths,Footnote 59 largely effecting the elderly (90% older than 66), costing USD 2–3BFootnote 60 for years of life lost (YOLL). Attested to be of lower order are the long term expected radiological fatalities: Linear no-threshold (LNT)-based estimation allows for on the order of 100 eventual fatalities due to cancer, and therefore an expected YOLL of >1000, and a cost of about USD 1B.Footnote 61 Traumatic effects (suffering, isolation, etc.) are more difficult to estimate, with >100,000 people still displaced as of 2016, and increased health and psychological issues identified. Compensation of approx. 10 thousand USD per person per year displaced were specifiedFootnote 62, gives about USD 11B. This impact is the subject of overall compensation, covered in the following category. Overall here: USD 3–4B + 11B (“trauma”).

Chernobyl

The human impact of the major accident at Chernobyl was immense, and its assessment remains contentious. As discussed in Sect. 4.3, a range of 4000–16,000 eventual radiological fatalities have been put forth in serious studies—giving USD 3.6–11B for YOLL. Chernobyl led to more than 220,000 people being relocated. As for Fukushima, allowing 10,000 USD per person per year displaced, here limited to a 10-year period, gives 22B. Overall: USD 3.6–11B + 22B (“trauma”).

5.1.2.3 A.2.3 Public Economic

Economic costs suffered by the public (incl. loss of property and income).

TMI

Negligible in relative terms, and potentially already covered within the USD 0.1B payout.

Fukushima

Compensation liabilities are currently estimated at USD 50–100 BillionFootnote 63, also intended to cover life and health impacts due to displacement (above). TEPCO is expected to pass these costs onto consumers in the future with higher rates. The once 1100 square km evacuation area is already less than half of its original sizeFootnote 64 as Cs-137 decays and is transported by rainfall to the sea.

Chernobyl

A 2600 square km exclusion zone formed, the majority of which is now safe for settlement and economic activity. Total losses (not limited to this category) reported for Ukraine and Belarus are USD 210–224B. For this category, in UkraineFootnote 65,Footnote 66, there have been about USD 18B in capital losses, USD 20B in social costs (to date), and economic losses due to loss of natural resources and agriculture of USD 70B, totaling about USD 110B. A rough estimate to cover also Belarus and Russia is then USD 150-250B.

5.1.2.4 A.2.4 Replacement Power

The increased cost of provision of electricity, incurred by the utility, but also by the public, through higher electricity prices. According to the NRCFootnote 67, for a generic NPP unit being shut down, the replacement power costs are estimated to be approximately USD 17B, and 40B for a new unit in a pool with above average replacement energy costs—thus posing a major financial risk.

TMI

Reliance on nuclear power to meet demand was high, and the accident triggered a financial crisis for the utility due to high-cost (primarily oil generated) replacement power. The cost of this replacement was later allowed to be passed onto customers through a near doubling of the rate.Footnote 68 The resulting increment in cost of electricity was up to USD 0.9B per year, for up to the 6 years of downtime of both units.Footnote 69 On this basis, a range of USD 5–15B can be taken, with the upper limit more in line with NRC guidelines.

Fukushima

Suspending Japanese nuclear power (250 TWh/year, 30% of annual generation) required importing natural gas at an increased cost of USD 20B (1.9 trillion YenFootnote 70) per year (excl. potential health impacts). With the uncertainty about when the NPPs will be turned back on, the cost is USD 100B–150B.

Chernobyl

There was sufficient need for power that operation at the (highly contaminated) site resumed within the year. The Ukrainian government claims that the Chernobyl accident led to a loss of 62 thousand TWh, much of which was not replaceable, resulting in a larger economic loss of USD 28B, giving a range of USD 10-30B.

5.1.2.5 A.2.5 Industry Response: A Cost or a Benefit?

The nuclear sector is somewhat unique in the extent to which major accidents drive increases in regulatory rigor worldwide, and costly retrofits. On the other hand, it should make the plants safer and potentially improve operational efficiency.

TMI

The “TMI Action Plan”Footnote 71 retrofits implemented substantial improvements in operations, plant design, and regulation.Footnote 72 The retrofits in the US alone were roughly estimated to be between 10 and 60 Billion USD—i.e., between 100 and 600 million USD per unit.53 The costs of delays and retrofits to the >50 operating US units and 40 units under construction, were estimated at more than USD 90B.Footnote 73,Footnote 74 This indicates a total (global) cost in the range of USD 100–200B.

Fukushima

This major accident strengthened scrutiny of nuclear power, triggering many safety initiativesFootnote 75 including the European “Stress Test”, the IAEA “Vienna Declaration”, and other activities.Footnote 76 The retrofits are estimated to cost USD 60B in Japan, USA, and France aloneFootnote 77, resulting in a similar figure of USD 0.2B per reactor from Japan.Footnote 78 A Swiss unit (KKM) was required to undertake > USD 0.4B of retrofitting, causing the plant to close. Extrapolating the 0.15–0.3 B globally gives a total of about USD 60–120B.

Chernobyl

Major retrofits to all 19 RBMK reactors were required. The cost for this is unknown but, within a factor of two of the 0.2B number from Fukushima, provides a range of USD 2–8B.

5.1.2.6 A.2.6 Beyond/Limitations

Deeply uncertain costs and potential benefits.

TMI

this accident caused an inflection point in the industry, killing growth of the nuclear industry and leading to a new regulatory-economic regime.Footnote 79 In this regard, TMI may have been the most influential nuclear accident of all.

Chernobyl

As stated by the IRSNFootnote 80, such an event can durably stun/affect a nation and an economy. It is difficult to be convinced that a cost estimate is complete in such a case. In particular, the accident may well have contributed to the downfall of the USSR.Footnote 81 It also galvanized the “environmentalist movement” against nuclear power. Other things excluded are the resulting suspension of the Belorussian nuclear programFootnote 82, and contributions to the shutdown of former USSR units.

Fukushima

This accident renewed and strengthened political scrutiny of nuclear power. In particular, excluded above are the potential costs of the German shutdown of 40% of the German nuclear power capacity since 2011.Footnote 83 These costs are particularly difficult to estimate due to future uncertainties about the potential performance of future nuclear and new renewables. Official cost estimates range from tens to hundreds of billions of EurosFootnote 84, with rates expected to briefly peak at about 50% above baseline.Footnote 85

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Sornette, D., Kröger, W., Wheatley, S. (2019). Severe Accidents: Singularity of Nuclear Disasters?. In: New Ways and Needs for Exploiting Nuclear Energy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97652-5_5

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