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The European Integration Fund: Principles, Decision-Making and Output

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The EU’s Policy on the Integration of Migrants

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics ((PSEUP))

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Abstract

Whilst the end of Chapter 3 starts the analysis of the European Integration Fund’s policy cycle with a focus on policy formulation, this chapter goes through the successive steps that led to the adoption of the fund. Using process tracing, it shows that the absence of a sound competence at EU level and the permanence of unanimity voting in the Council resulted in the creation of a fund that would grant great discretion to member states as to its spending. In other words, the decision making process emptied the fund of its most constraining clauses. By looking at the most disputed provision, this chapter also shows that most of the debate on the adoption of the fund revolved around the henceforth classic “who-gets-what” question.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Handoll (2012: 45) qualifies the use of the said legal basis for integration as a “creative one”.

  2. 2.

    On delegation aspects, see Chapter 2; but see also Franchino (2004, 2007). Chapters 5 and 6 are concrete cases of implementation of EU outputs in case of limited delegation.

  3. 3.

    Just like Chapter 3, this chapter employs process tracing to establish the mechanism at play. Whereas the mechanism in Chapter 2 was defined as an upload of preferences, the mechanism at play in this chapter appears to be more strictly concerned with bargaining. For more on process tracing, see (Checkel 2005; Vennesson 2008; Mahoney 2010; Collier 2011). For more on the data used here, see the appendices to this book.

  4. 4.

    Chapter 2 provides useful definitions with regard to concepts such as institutional setting and constellations of actors. More generally, see Scharpf (1997).

  5. 5.

    Council Decision 2007/435/EC, article 2.

  6. 6.

    Ibid., article 3.

  7. 7.

    Both defined in C. (2007) 3926 final.

  8. 8.

    In what proportion of the fund and, more importantly, in what implementation years.

  9. 9.

    I do not list them here as it would be too lengthy, see article 4 of the Council Decision 2007/435/EC for more

  10. 10.

    C. (2007) 3926 final.

  11. 11.

    As C. (2007) 3926 final phrases it: “Actions, including introduction programmes and activities, whose main objective is to address the specific needs of particular groups, such as women, youth and children, the elderly, illiterate persons and persons with disabilities”.

  12. 12.

    C. (2007) 3926 final.

  13. 13.

    Migrapol-Integration 43rev.

  14. 14.

    Council of the European Union 15434/04 (2004).

  15. 15.

    Migrapol-Integration 43rev.

  16. 16.

    Migrapol-Integration 40; 52; corroborated by the interviewees.

  17. 17.

    Migrapol-Integration 52.

  18. 18.

    This was notably recalled at the Thessaloniki Summit in October 2003 [European Council 11638/03 (2003)]; in the Commission’s preliminary impact assessment for the fund (Migrapol-Integration 48); in the Commission proposal for a fund [COM (2005) 123 final], to cite a few examples.

  19. 19.

    Council Decision 2007/435/EC.

  20. 20.

    Council of the European Union 15434/04 (2004).

  21. 21.

    European Council 11638/03 (2003); see also COM (2005) 389 final.

  22. 22.

    Migrapol-Integration 42: 2.

  23. 23.

    See C. (2007) 3926 final and COM (2005) 389 final.

  24. 24.

    COM (2005) 123 final.

  25. 25.

    Migrapol-Integration 42: 2.

  26. 26.

    COM (2005) 123 final: 11; see SEC (2005) 435: 44 for a detail of the calculation.

  27. 27.

    See Chapter 3; but see also Schild (2008).

  28. 28.

    Commission proposal for the financial perspectives [COM (2004) 487 final] and accompanying document [SEC (2005) 494 final] proposed that a total of €24.705 billion euro be dedicated to heading 3. But the document adopted by the European Council [European Council 15915/05 (2005)] provided for a more limited amount; €10.270 billion euros would be allocated to the same heading.

  29. 29.

    See Commission’s ex-ante impact assessment SEC (2005) 435. See also Migrapol-Integration 48 and 54.

  30. 30.

    During the negotiation phase, the Commission declared having ‘copied’ the provisions regarding spending rules from the structural funds [Council of the European Union 5578/06 (2006)].

  31. 31.

    Council of the European Union 12802/05 (2005).

  32. 32.

    Council of the European Union 6735/06 (2006).

  33. 33.

    Council of the European Union 9385/06 (2006).

  34. 34.

    Council of the European Union 12524/06 (2006).

  35. 35.

    Council of the European Union 13407/06 (2006).

  36. 36.

    COM (2005) 123 final.

  37. 37.

    Council of the European Union 5578/06 (2006).

  38. 38.

    COM (2005) 123 final.

  39. 39.

    This was actually a point of discussion during the negotiation of the fund.

  40. 40.

    See article 14 of Commission proposal in COM (2005) 123 final.

  41. 41.

    Council of the European Union 12999/06 (2006).

  42. 42.

    The wider the target group, the more member states with a small number of migrants are able to actually use the fund when it comes to implementation. A narrower definition, concerning newly arrived third country nationals for instance, renders the actual use of the fund more difficult for those countries with lower influxes.

  43. 43.

    So-called pre-departure measures; see COM (2005) 123 final: 120.

  44. 44.

    See Chapter 3 for more on this point.

  45. 45.

    Council of the European Union 7214/06 (2006).

  46. 46.

    Council of the European Union 8091/06 (2006).

  47. 47.

    Member states had in total 8 opportunities to voice their concern regarding the definition of the target group. Greece entered a reservation on the matter and held its position from the beginning to the very end when it lifted its reservation. It is thus placed at the top of the figure. Estonia cast its comment once and therefore ranks lower on the saliency scale. Note that I placed saliency on a 0–10 scale.

  48. 48.

    See Chapter 2 for more on this point. More generally, see Tsebelis (2001).

  49. 49.

    COM (2005) 123 final.

  50. 50.

    Council of the European Union 7214/06 (2006); 8091/06 (2006).

  51. 51.

    It is likely that the saliency of their respective positions is underestimated. Since they formulated the alternatives, they came to the fore with their preferences (although they need to be acceptable for the member states) rather than sided for the one or the other so that there is the possibility that their expressed position is more salient. There is however no way to test this hypothesis; I thus consider the conservative option the safest and attribute them saliency following the same rule as for the others.

  52. 52.

    Since the text may be amended the same way it may be accepted, see Chapter 2 for more on this. See also Tsebelis (2013).

  53. 53.

    Council of the European Union 7214/06 (2006).

  54. 54.

    Council of the European Union 8091/06 (2006); 8373/1/06 (2006).

  55. 55.

    Council of the European Union 8373/1/06 (2006).

  56. 56.

    Ibid.

  57. 57.

    Council of the European Union 9028/06 (2006): 1.

  58. 58.

    Council of the European Union 9385/06 (2006).

  59. 59.

    Council of the European Union 10432/06 (2006).

  60. 60.

    For an overview, see inter alia Kassim and Menon (2003) but see also Chapter 2 of this book.

  61. 61.

    Salience in this respect is measured through the number of times a member state expresses its opinion on the matter along the decision-making process. From the moment the issue first arose, to the end of the decision-making process, member states had the possibility of expressing their opinion ten times. Greece here again expressed its position the most often. As for the positions, I considered the first one ever expressed. Note though that positions changed very little in the process. Sweden passed from a 100 to 80% whereas France passed from 60 to 80%.

  62. 62.

    Austria and Germany’s position were not expressed during the official process but before that, when the matter was approached in the NCPIs committee. The Commission’s proposal, at the unofficial stage provided precedence be given to stocks (Migrapol-Integration 42). The Commission reversed the distribution key before officially issuing its proposal on the demand of the Austrian, German and Czech delegations. I consider this as the clear expression of a preference.

  63. 63.

    Council of the European Union 6735/06 (2006).

  64. 64.

    Council of the European Union 8983/06 (2006).

  65. 65.

    Council of the European Union 7214/06 (2006).

  66. 66.

    Council of the European Union 8983/06 (2006).

  67. 67.

    Council of the European Union 10432/06 (2006).

  68. 68.

    Council of the European Union 9385/06 (2006).

  69. 69.

    Council of the European Union 12999/06 (2006).

  70. 70.

    Council of the European Union 13407/06 (2006).

  71. 71.

    Council of the European Union 10865/06 (2006).

  72. 72.

    Council of the European Union 13407/06 (2006).

  73. 73.

    Let us recall that Denmark opted out of policies linked to the AFSJ; hence a reference to 14 of the EU15 countries.

  74. 74.

    See Chapter 2 for more on this. See also Aus (2008).

  75. 75.

    So holds one of the interviewees who happened to participate in the negotiations of the fund.

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  1. Fondazione ISMU and University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem

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Van Wolleghem, P.G. (2019). The European Integration Fund: Principles, Decision-Making and Output. In: The EU’s Policy on the Integration of Migrants. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97682-2_4

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