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Challenges and Opportunities: Cyber-Physical Security in the Smart Grid

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Smart Grid Control

Part of the book series: Power Electronics and Power Systems ((PEPS))

Abstract

In this chapter, we develop a vision to address challenges in securing the smart grid. Despite recent innovations, grid security remains a critical issue. The infrastructure is highly vulnerable due to its large scale, connectivity, and heterogeneity. Moreover, attacks on cyber-physical systems and the grid have been realized, most notably the attack on the Ukraine power system in 2015. While techniques in cyber security are useful, their implementation is not sufficient to secure the smart grid. Consequently, we advocate for research in cyber-physical system security, an interdisciplinary field which combines tools from both cyber security and system theory. Within this field, we argue that engineers need to develop a framework of accountability comprised of three main research thrusts: (1) the detection of attacks, (2) the attribution of attacks to particular malicious components and devices on the grid, and (3) the resilient design of systems and algorithms to ensure acceptable performance in the presence of malicious behavior. To close, we discuss the need for a unifying language and set of tools to address these problems, as we consider additional research in compositional security.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213, USA

    Sean Weerakkody & Bruno Sinopoli

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  1. Sean Weerakkody
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  2. Bruno Sinopoli
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Correspondence to Sean Weerakkody .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark

    Jakob Stoustrup

  2. Department of Mechanical Engineering, MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Anuradha Annaswamy

  3. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA

    Aranya Chakrabortty

  4. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA

    Zhihua Qu

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Weerakkody, S., Sinopoli, B. (2019). Challenges and Opportunities: Cyber-Physical Security in the Smart Grid. In: Stoustrup, J., Annaswamy, A., Chakrabortty, A., Qu, Z. (eds) Smart Grid Control. Power Electronics and Power Systems. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98310-3_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98310-3_16

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-98309-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-98310-3

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