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How to Reform EMU?

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Europe's New Fiscal Union

Abstract

EMU’s post-crisis polity is unstable. This makes the euro a risky choice as the currency of European citizens. This chapter discusses ways to address this major challenge and reviews EMU polity’s reform prospects. It first sets out the crucial features of an additional sustained period of muddling-through and reveals the costly implications of the perpetuation of this status quo. Departing from muddling-through, the chapter then describes three competing medium term scenarios for the development of EMU’s polity: an executive technocracy, an intergovernmental confederation and democratic federalism. Having clearly spelled out the possible institutional directions that EU leaders could embark on, the chapter suggests three policy reform steps to make EMU sustainable, offers the ‘technology’ behind institutional settlement and provides the closing remarks of this book.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Interviewee 47 – EU Council official.

  2. 2.

    Interviewee 47 – EU Council official.

  3. 3.

    Interviewee 30 – Finnish Ministry of Finance official.

  4. 4.

    Interviewee 30 – Finnish Ministry of Finance official.

  5. 5.

    Interviewee 40 – EU Council official.

  6. 6.

    Interviewee 18 – Italian Ministry of Finance official.

  7. 7.

    Interviewee 47 – EU Council official.

  8. 8.

    Interviewee 39 – European Central Bank official.

  9. 9.

    Interviewee 44 – European Commission official.

  10. 10.

    Interviewee 30 – Finnish Ministry of Finance official.

  11. 11.

    Interviewee 40 – EU Council official.

  12. 12.

    Interviewee 10 – EU Council official.

  13. 13.

    EDIS: European Deposit Insurance Scheme.

  14. 14.

    Interviewee 40 – EU Council official.

  15. 15.

    Interviewee 40 – EU Council official.

  16. 16.

    Interviewee 32 – European Central Bank official.

  17. 17.

    Interviewee 32 – European Central Bank official.

  18. 18.

    Interviewee 41 – Independent analyst.

  19. 19.

    http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/WP16_09.pdf.

  20. 20.

    http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2017/11/09/la-bce-replica-stizzita-a-tajani-ma-apre-uno-spiraglio-a-modifiche-alle-regole-sui-crediti-deteriorati_a_23271667/.

  21. 21.

    http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/commenti-e-idee/2018-01-27/a-safe-asset-for-europe-133629.shtml?uuid=AExHPAqD.

  22. 22.

    Interviewee 42 – European Commission official.

  23. 23.

    Interviewee 32 – European Central Bank official.

  24. 24.

    Interviewee 33 – European Central Bank official.

  25. 25.

    Interviewee 33 – European Central Bank official.

  26. 26.

    Interviewee 42 – European Commission official.

  27. 27.

    http://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/news/france-and-germany-dither-over-the-eurozones-future/.

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  1. European University Institute, Florence, Italy

    Pierre Schlosser

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  1. Pierre Schlosser
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Schlosser, P. (2019). How to Reform EMU?. In: Europe's New Fiscal Union. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98636-4_8

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