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Modular Software Fault Isolation as Abstract Interpretation

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Static Analysis (SAS 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 11002))

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Abstract

Software Fault Isolation (SFI) consists in transforming untrusted code so that it runs within a specific address space, (called the sandbox) and verifying at load-time that the binary code does indeed stay inside the sandbox. Security is guaranteed solely by the SFI verifier whose correctness therefore becomes crucial. Existing verifiers enforce a very rigid, almost syntactic policy where every memory access and every control-flow transfer must be preceded by a sandboxing instruction sequence, and where calls outside the sandbox must implement a sophisticated protocol based on a shadow stack. We propose to define SFI as a defensive semantics, with the purpose of deriving semantically sound verifiers that admit flexible and efficient implementations of SFI. We derive an executable analyser, that works on a per-function basis, which ensures that the defensive semantics does not go wrong, and hence that the code is well isolated. Experiments show that our analyser exhibits the desired flexibility: it validates correctly sandboxed code, it catches code breaking the SFI policy, and it can validate programs where redundant instrumentations are optimised away.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This exploits the property that the range of the sandbox is a power of 2.

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Correspondence to Julien Lepiller .

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Appendices

A Concrete Operational Semantics

figure b

B Intra-procedural Semantics

figure c

C Proof of Lemma 1

First we need an intermediate lemma:

Lemma 3

(Base pointer is contained).

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{array}{ll} \forall S = &{} \langle \langle bp, cs, \rho _i \rangle , \langle \rho ,\delta ,\phi ^{(\beta )},\iota \rangle \rangle \in Acc , \\ \quad \text {if } &{} \beta = 1 \\ \text { then } &{} s_0 - s_s + {\textsc {gz}}_\bot< bp \le s_0 - {\textsc {gz}}_\top \\ \text { else } &{} s_0 - s_s + {\textsc {gz}}_\bot - f_s < bp \le s_0 - {\textsc {gz}}_\top \end{array} \end{aligned}$$

Proof

We reason by induction on \(S \in Acc\). In the initial state, we have \(bp = s_0 - {\textsc {gz}}_\top \) and \(\beta = 0\), so the property is true since \(s_s > {\textsc {gz}}_\top + {\textsc {gz}}_\bot \).

In the inductive case, we procede by case analysis on , where S verifies the property. Because the property only depends on the context and \(\beta \), most cases are trivial: they preserve the context and \(\beta \). In the case of the StoreFrame rule, the context is preserved, and \(\beta \) is updated to 1. The property is still preserved because the property when \(\beta =0\) implies the property when \(\beta = 1\).

The last case is when the extended call rule applies. In that case, \(\beta (S) = 1\), \(bp(S') = bp(S) - \mid \phi _1 \mid \) with \( \mid \phi _1 \mid \le f_s\) and \(\beta (S') = 0\).

Since \(s_0 - s_s + {\textsc {gz}}_\bot < bp(S) \le s_0 - {\textsc {gz}}_\top \), \(s_0 - s_s + {\textsc {gz}}_\bot - \mid \phi _1 \mid < bp(S') \le s_0 - {\textsc {gz}}_\top \), so \(s_0 - s_s + {\textsc {gz}}_\bot - f_s < bp(S') \le s_0 - {\textsc {gz}}_\top \) and the property holds.

Now we can prove the main lemma:

Proof

First, we prove that \( Acc \subseteq \gamma ({\textit{I}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}})\).

Let \(S \in Acc \). By induction on S, we have the following cases:

  • \(S = \langle \varGamma _0,\varSigma _0 \rangle = \langle \langle [\langle s_0, \phi _i \rangle ] , s_0-{\textsc {gz}}_\top , \rho _0 \rangle , \langle \rho ,\delta ,\phi ^{(0)},\iota _0 \rangle \rangle \) with \( \mid \phi _i \mid = {\textsc {gz}}_\top \).

    By definition, \(\iota _0 \in \mathcal {F}\), so we can construct \(Init(\iota _0)\). By construction, \(S \in \gamma (Init(\iota _0))\).

  • \(S = \langle \varGamma _2, \varSigma _2 \rangle \text { with } \langle \varGamma _1, \varSigma _1 \rangle \in Acc \) and . By induction hypothesis, we also have \(S^\natural \) such that \(\langle \varGamma _1, \varSigma _1 \rangle \in \gamma (S^\natural )\).

    Since \({\textit{I}}\hbox {-}{\textit{Safe}}({\textit{I}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}})\), \(S^\natural \rightarrow ^\natural S_2^\natural \).

    By case analysis on the rule that allows \(\rightarrow ^\natural \), we have:

    • (FunAssign)    The preconditions are the same as for (Assign), so there is \(S'\) such that \(S \rightarrow ^\natural S'\). Furthermore, \(S' \in \gamma (s'^{\sharp })\).

    • (FunStD, FunLdD, FunCont, FunIndirectJump, FunHalt, FunCrash)

      Similar reasoning.

    • (FunStF)    Here, the preconditions are either true for (StoreFrame) or (StoreCrash) because of Lemma 3, so there is \(S'\) such that \(S \rightarrow ^\natural S'\), with \(S' = \blacksquare \) (writing in the guard zone) or \(S' = \langle \rho ,\delta ,\phi ^{(\beta )},\iota \rangle \) (writing in the frame). Furthermore, \(S' \in \gamma (s'^{\sharp })\).

    • (FunLdS)    Here, the preconditions are either true for (LoadStack) or (LoadCrash) because of Lemma 3, so there is \(S'\) such that \(S \rightarrow ^\natural S'\), with \(S' = \blacksquare \) (reading in the guard zone) or \(S' = \langle \rho ,\delta ,\phi ^{(\beta )},\iota \rangle \) (reading in the stack). Futhermore, \(S' \in \gamma (s'^{\sharp })\).

    • (FunCall)    Here the preconditions are the same as for (CallAcc) because of Lemma 3, so there is \(S'\) such that . Furthermore, \(S' \in \gamma _s(Init(f)) \subseteq \gamma _s(S^{\sharp })\).

    • (FunRet)    Here the preconditions are the same as for (RetAcc), so . Furthermore, \(\blacksquare \in \gamma (s'^{\sharp })\).

Hence our intermediate conclusion: \( Acc \subseteq \gamma ({\textit{I}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}})\).

Let’s now take \(S \in Acc \). We use the previous conclusion to also choose \(S^\natural \in {\textit{I}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}}\) such that \(S \in \gamma (S^\natural )\). Because we have \({\textit{I}}\hbox {-}{\textit{Safe}}({\textit{I}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}})\), we can also take \(S_2^\natural \) such that \(S^\natural \rightarrow S_2^\natural \).

By case analysis with a similar reasoning as the previous property, we get that with \(S' \in \gamma (S_2^\natural )\).

Hence \( Safe ( Acc )\).

D Proof of Lemma 2

Proof

First, we prove that \({\textit{I}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}}\subseteq \gamma ({\textit{A}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}})\).

Let \(S \in {\textit{I}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}}\). By induction on S, we have the following cases:

  • \(S \in Init(f) = \langle \langle \phi _i, bp, \rho \rangle , \langle \rho ,\phi ^{(f)},0 \rangle \rangle \)

    We can construct \(S^\sharp = \langle \langle \phi _i', bp, \rho ' \rangle , \langle \rho ',\phi '^{(f)},0 \rangle \in AInit(f)\) such that \(S \in \gamma (S^\sharp )\).

    \(S^\sharp \in {\textit{A}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}}\), so the property is true in that case.

  • \(S = \langle \varGamma , \varSigma _2 \rangle \text { with } \langle \varGamma , \varSigma _1 \rangle \in {\textit{I}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}}\text { and } \varGamma \vdash \varSigma _1 \rightarrow ^\natural \varSigma _2\). By induction hypothesis, we also have \(S^\sharp \) such that \(\langle \varGamma _1, \varSigma _1 \rangle \in \gamma (S^\sharp )\).

    Because we have \({\textit{A}} \hbox {-} {\textit{Safe}}({\textit{A}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}})\), we also have \(S_2^\sharp \) such that \(S^\sharp \rightarrow S_2^\sharp \).

    By case analysis on \(\rightarrow \), we can see as before that the preconditions of the abstract semantics are the same or more restrictive than those of the intra procedural semantics. It is also built in a way that \(\langle \varGamma , \varSigma _2 \rangle \in \gamma (S_2^\sharp )\).

Hence our intermediate conclusion: \({\textit{I}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}}\subseteq \gamma ({\textit{A}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}})\).

Let’s now take \(S \in {\textit{I}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}}\). We use the previous conclusion to also choose \(S^\sharp \in {\textit{A}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}}\) such that \(S \in \gamma (S^\sharp )\). Because we have \({\textit{A}} \hbox {-} {\textit{Safe}}({\textit{A}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}})\), we can also take \(S_2^\sharp \) such that \(S^\sharp \rightarrow S_2^\sharp \).

By case analysis with a similar reasoning as the previous property, we get that with \(S' \in \gamma (S_2^\sharp )\).

Hence \( Safe ({\textit{I}}\hbox {-} {\textit{Acc}})\).

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Besson, F., Jensen, T., Lepiller, J. (2018). Modular Software Fault Isolation as Abstract Interpretation. In: Podelski, A. (eds) Static Analysis. SAS 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11002. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99725-4_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99725-4_12

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