Auszug
Informelle soziale Normen mit Sanktionen gehören zweifellos zu den wichtigen Bausteinen der sozialen Ordnung. Tatsächlich lautet eine der Grundannahmen des sogenannten „normativen Paradigmas“, für das insbesondere die Parsons-Tradition steht, dass gesellschaftliche Ordnung ohne eine verbindliche Anerkennung bestimmter Normen der Kooperation unmöglich entstehen bzw. stabil bleiben kann.
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Diekmann, A., Voss, T. (2008). Soziale Normen und Reziprozitat. In: Diekmann, A., Eichner, K., Schmidt, P., Voss, T. (eds) Rational Choice: Theoretische Analysen und empirische Resultate. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90866-3_6
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