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An Efficient Auction Mechanism for Hierarchically Structured Bandwidth Markets

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Quality of Service in the Emerging Networking Panorama (WQoSR 2004, QofIS 2004, ICQT 2004)

Abstract

In this paper, we formulate a new problem, namely allocation of bandwidth in a two-level hierarchically structured market. In the top level a unique seller allocates bandwidth to intermediate providers [e.g. Internet Service Providers (ISPs)], who in turn allocate their assigned shares of bandwidth to their own customers in the lower level. We present an efficient mechanism comprising auctions in both levels. We prove that, due to the structure of the mechanism and certain rules imposed by the top-level seller, the following dominant strategies apply: a) each of the lower-level customers reveals truthfully his demand in the auction he participates; b) each intermediary reveals truthfully to the top-level seller the aggregate demand in his respective market. Both the mechanism and the results extend to the case of more than two market levels.

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Bitsaki, M., Stamoulis, G.D., Courcoubetis, C. (2004). An Efficient Auction Mechanism for Hierarchically Structured Bandwidth Markets. In: Solé-Pareta, J., et al. Quality of Service in the Emerging Networking Panorama. WQoSR QofIS ICQT 2004 2004 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3266. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30193-6_31

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30193-6_31

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-23238-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30193-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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