Abstract
This chapter is devoted to a further extension of the Shapley value, namely the consistent Shapley value. In a first step, in Section 14.1, the Shapley value is extended to hyperplane games in a way that generalizes the “random order procedure” defined by (8.1.4). We show that the consistent Shapley value is k-consistent. Moreover, we prove that the consistent Shapley value on hyperplane games is characterized by single-valuedness, Pareto optimality, covariance, and 2-consistency.
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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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(2007). The Consistent Shapley Value. In: Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 34. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72945-7_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72945-7_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-72944-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-72945-7
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