Abstract
It is well-known that for several natural decision problems no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This has motivated recent research on designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as ‘redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments’) that generate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting under the simultaneous mechanism. We show that such strategies exist for the sequential pivotal mechanism of the well-known public project problem. We also exhibit an optimal strategy with the property that a maximal social welfare is generated when each player follows it. Finally, we show that these strategies can be achieved by an implementation in Nash equilibrium. All proofs can be found in the full version posted in Computing Research Repository (CoRR), http://arxiv.org/abs/0810.1383
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Apt, K.R., Estévez-Fernández, A. (2009). Sequential Pivotal Mechanisms for Public Project Problems. In: Mavronicolas, M., Papadopoulou, V.G. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5814. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_9
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