Prospects of Objective Knowledge

Abstract

When looking at modern epistemology, one might come to the conclusion that the prospects for a solid realism are not so good. Two main sources for this common assessment can be identified: (1) First of all, Logical Positivism has initiated a new phase in the recent history of philosophy that was first and foremost characterized by a commitment to science. It has become evident, however, in the development of this tradition that the early hopes for a new foundation of a strong epistemic realism were soon disappointed: Tendencies toward internalism, constructivism, pragmatism, antirealism, or even cultural relativism were established. The most important steps in this development will be analyzed in the first part of the chapter: The working hypothesis in the short sketch of the historical development of epistemology is that a certain ultimately Cartesian and antievolutionary dualism plays the decisive role in the formative period of modern realism. It is this same dualism that leads from realism to more skeptical positions. By taking this Cartesian opposition for granted, modern realism again turns from empiricism to internalism or linguistic idealism. The main argument against realism will be examined and rejected: the defense of a coherent realism is only then impossible if one accepts the dualism of mind and world in the first place. But in this case most arguments against realism become a powerless tautology.

(2) Secondly, it will be argued that this implicit dualistic terminology plays also a decisive role in the interpretation of the results of the modern science of cognition. Many modern approaches to cognition begin with the claim that cognition is essentially a biological phenomenon. These views are therefore at first glance intrinsically antidualistic. But also in this domain one can trace back a shift from more realistic to more constructivist or relativistic paradigms. It will be shown that it is not surprising that the “biologization of reason” has led to two radically different interpretations: a realistic one and a more constructivistic one. It will be argued that also in these approaches the dualistic and eventually antievolutionary opposition is in fact ultimately decisive for the general philosophical and epistemological conclusions. The main point, however, is that any Evolutionary Epistemology simply cannot answer the basic problems concerning objectivity in knowledge. A positive solution is a vicious circle, the negative solution entails a self-contradiction. If one follows this line of thought then it becomes evident that only one of the interpretations can be a research paradigm that is both fruitful and does not undermine itself.

(3) The last part of the chapter following Millikan (1984, 2004), Thompson (2007), Lorenz (1973), Goodson (2003), Proust (1999) and Noë (2004), therefore focuses on a very short sketch of how the combination of a philosophical realism and an evolutionary conception of the phenomenon of cognition could be spelled out in such a way that one does not fall into the traps of either dualism or self-contradiction.