Abstract
Unlike the classic Trading Agent competition (tac), where participants enter trading strategies into a market, the tac Market Design Competition (cat) allows participants to create rules for their own double auction market and set fees for traders, which they embody in agents known as specialists. Although the generalisation properties of traders when the specialist (i.e., the market mechanism) is fixed have been assessed, generalisation properties of specialists have not. It is unclear whether and how a specialist might (intentionally or unintentionally) favour certain trading strategies. We present an empirical analysis of specialists’ generalisation abilities in various trading environments. Our results show that specialists can be sensitive to a number of factors, including the other trading and specialist strategies in the environment.
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Robinson, E., McBurney, P., Yao, X. (2010). How Specialised Are Specialists? Generalisation Properties of Entries from the 2008 and 2009 TAC Market Design Competitions. In: David, E., Gerding, E., Sarne, D., Shehory, O. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets. AMEC TADA 2009 2009. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 59. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15117-0_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15117-0_13
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