Abstract
We introduce Transformation Games (TGs), a form of coalitional game in which players are endowed with sets of initial resources, and have capabilities allowing them to derive certain output resources, given certain input resources. The aim of a TG is to generate a particular target resource; players achieve this by forming a coalition capable of performing a sequence of transformations from its combined set of initial resources to the target resource. After presenting the TG model, and discussing its interpretation, we consider possible restrictions on the transformation chain, resulting in different coalitional games. After presenting the basic model, we consider the computational complexity of several problems in TGs, such as testing whether a coalition wins, checking if a player is a dummy or a veto player, computing the core of the game, computing power indices, and checking the effects of possible restrictions on the coalition. Finally, we consider extensions to the model in which transformations have associated costs.
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Bachrach, Y., Zuckerman, M., Wooldridge, M., Rosenschein, J.S. (2010). Proof Systems and Transformation Games. In: Hliněný, P., Kučera, A. (eds) Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2010. MFCS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6281. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15155-2_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15155-2_9
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