Abstract
Real market institutions, stock and commodity exchanges for example, do not occur in isolation. The same stocks and commodities may be listed on multiple exchanges, and traders who want to deal in those goods have a choice of markets in which to trade. While there has been extensive research into agent-based trading in individual markets, there is little work on this kind of multiple market scenario. Our work seeks to address this imbalance. In particular, this paper examines how allocative efficiency, the standard measure of a market’s ability to extract surplus, is affected by the presence of multiple markets for the same good. We find that while dividing traders between several small markets typically leads to lower efficiency than grouping them into one large market, the movement of traders between markets, and price incentives for changing markets, can reduce this loss of efficiency.
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Cai, K., Niu, J., Parsons, S. (2010). On the Economic Effects of Competition between Double Auction Markets. In: Ketter, W., La Poutré, H., Sadeh, N., Shehory, O., Walsh, W. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis. AMEC TADA 2008 2008. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 44. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15237-5_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15237-5_7
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