Abstract
Peer-to-peer systems are known to be vulnerable to the Sybil attack. The lack of a central authority allows a malicious user to create many fake identities (called Sybil nodes) pretending to be independent honest nodes. The goal of the malicious user is to influence the system on his/her behalf. In order to detect the Sybil nodes and prevent the attack, we use here a reputation system for every node, built through observing its interactions with its peers. The construction makes every node a part of a distributed authority that keeps records on the reputation and behavior of the nodes. Records of interactions between nodes are broadcast by the interacting nodes and honest reporting proves to be a Nash Equilibrium for correct (non-Sybil) nodes. We argue that in realistic communication schedule scenarios, simple graph-theoretic queries help in exposing those nodes most likely to be Sybil.
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Cárdenas-Haro, J.A., Konjevod, G. (2010). Detecting Sybil Nodes in Static and Dynamic Networks. In: Meersman, R., Dillon, T., Herrero, P. (eds) On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems, OTM 2010. OTM 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6427. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16949-6_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16949-6_15
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