Skip to main content

Referral Hiring and Labor Markets: a Computational Study

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Emergent Results of Artificial Economics

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 652))

Abstract

Many empirical studies emphasize the role of social networks in job search. The social network implicated in this process is known to be characterized by diversified properties, including communities, homophily or ties having various strength levels. Nevertheless, previous models of the labor markets fail to capture the complexity of social networks, as each specific network requires the development of specific algorithms. In this paper, we rather rely on an independent generic network generator for creating detailed networks describing friendships, colleagues, communities and various degrees of connectivity. We build a simple model of the labor market in which individuals find positions solely through their acquaintances, and update their network when being hired. This original experimental setting facilitates the analysis of various characteristics of networks in the labor market, including various sizes, the number of friendship links or the impact of communities. Experiments confirm the ”strength of weak ties” phenomenon. However, the initial characteristics of the network like the existence of communities are shown to be destroyed by the implausible mechanisms integrated into this simplistic model; this suggests that the impact of plausible networks on models’ dynamics may only be studied when the mechanisms of this economic model are plausible as well - in other words, ”a model is only as descriptive as its most implausible component”. Addition of probabilities on ties allow to study close friends configuration and weak, or Facebook friends, configurations. Experiment show that, whereas friend are always more useful than colleagues, weak friends are especially useful when the market is stable and with low unemployment and vacancy rate.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Arcaute E, Vassilvitskii S (2009) Social networks and stable matchings in the job market. Internet and Network Economics pp 220–231

    Google Scholar 

  2. Bayer P, Ross S, Topa G (2005) Place of work and place of residence: Informal hiring networks and labor market outcomes. Tech. rep., NBER working paper

    Google Scholar 

  3. Bramoullé Y, Saint-Paul G (2010) Social networks and labor market transitions. Labour Economics 17(1):188–195

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Cahuc P, Fontaine F (2009) On the efficiency of job search with social networks. Journal of Public Economic Theory 11(3):411–439

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Carrington PJ, Scott J,Wasserman S (2005) Models and Methods in Social Network Analysis. Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  6. Gilbert N (ed) (1994) Simulating societies : the computer simulation of social phenomena. University of Surrey, Guilford (GBR)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Granovetter M (1973) The Strength of Weak Ties. The American Journal of Sociology 78(6):1360–1380

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Granovetter M (1983) The strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited. Sociological Theory 1:201–233

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Ioannides Y, Loury D (2004) Job information networks, neighborhood effects, and inequality. Journal of Economic Literature 42(4):1056–1093

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Montgomery J (1991) Social networks and labor-market outcomes: Toward an economic analysis. The American economic review 81(5):1408–1418

    Google Scholar 

  11. Newman M, Barabasi AL, Watts DJ (2006) The Structure and Dynamics of Networks: (Princeton Studies in Complexity). Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Google Scholar 

  12. Tassier T (2006) Labor market implications of weak ties. Southern Economic Journal 72(3):704–719

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Tassier T, Menczer F (2008) Social network structure, segregation, and equality in a labor market with referral hiring. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 66(3-4):514–528

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Tesfatsion L (2001) Structure, behavior, and market power in an evolutionary labor market with adaptive search* 1. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 25(3-4):419–457

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Thiriot S, Kant JD (2008) Generate country-scale networks of interaction from scattered statistics. In: The Fifth Conference of the European Social Simulation Association, Brescia, Italy

    Google Scholar 

  16. Wasserman S, Faust K (1994) Social network analysis, methods and applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Samuel Thiriot .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Thiriot, S., Lewkovicz, Z., Caillou, P., Kant, JD. (2011). Referral Hiring and Labor Markets: a Computational Study. In: Osinga, S., Hofstede, G., Verwaart, T. (eds) Emergent Results of Artificial Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 652. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21108-9_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21108-9_2

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-21107-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-21108-9

  • eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics