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Article 10 [Representative Democracy]

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The Treaty on European Union (TEU)

Abstract

The TEU-Lisbon reproduces, once more, in the context of its very heterogeneous Title II, named “Provisions on democratic Principles”, a relevant article contained in the Constitutional Treaty (Art. I-46 TCE). This normative stipulation determines that “[t]he functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy” (Art. 10.1 TEU). Such a principle, whose central feature is that the citizens elect and remove those who govern them, has been propounded persistently, and now, as the culmination of a long process, is becoming a founding principle of the EU (Art. 2 TEU; → Art. 2 para 18–23).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Mancini (1998), p. 29.

  2. 2.

    See Díez-Picazo (2009), p. 17.

  3. 3.

    Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (ECJ 5 February 1963) and Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v ENEL (ECJ 15 July 1964).

  4. 4.

    Art. 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.

  5. 5.

    von Bogdandy (2000), p. 27.

  6. 6.

    Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v ENEL (ECJ 15 July 1964).

  7. 7.

    Case 294/83, Parti Écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament (ECJ 23 April 1986) para 23: “It must first be emphasised in this regard that the European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, in as much as neither its Member States nor its Institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty,” see defining the European Union as a “Constitutional Union” (“Verfassungsverbund”), Pernice (2001, p. 149).”

  8. 8.

    Kaufmann (1997), p. 31 and Ridola (2010), p. 307.

  9. 9.

    Among others, see Höffe (1999), passim and Beck (1998), passim.

  10. 10.

    Habermas (2000), p. 105; also Weiler and Wind (2003), passim.

  11. 11.

    Majone (1998), p. 5.

  12. 12.

    Cervati (1999), p. 73.

  13. 13.

    Dahl (1999), p. 132; specifically about the democratic deficit of the Union, see among others, Bankowsky and Scott (2000), p. 169.

  14. 14.

    Häberle (2006), p. 53 and also Eriksen and Fossum (2000), passim.

  15. 15.

    Balaguer (2007), p. 57.

  16. 16.

    Act and Decision Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly by Direct Universal Suffrage, O.J. L 278/1 (1976).

  17. 17.

    Case C-133/06, Parliament v Council (ECJ 6 May 2008).

  18. 18.

    Díez-Picazo (2009), p. 93.

  19. 19.

    Ridola (2010), p. 327.

  20. 20.

    Häberle (2000), passim and Ridola (2010), p. 31.

  21. 21.

    Dahl (1999), p. 132.

  22. 22.

    Böckenförde (1999), p. 89 and Grimm (2002), p. 215.

  23. 23.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) (BVerfGE 89, 155)—Treaty of Maastricht. On this case, see Weiler (1994), p. 54.

  24. 24.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08, 30/06/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) (BVerfGE 123, 267)—Treaty of Lisbon; see Häberle (2010), p. 317 and Eriksen and Fossum (2011), p. 153.

  25. 25.

    Habermas (1999), p. 132.

  26. 26.

    See Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding, O.J. L 297/1 (2003), amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1524/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2007, O.J. L 343/5 (2007).

  27. 27.

    Among others, Menéndez (2009), p. 277.

  28. 28.

    See von Bogdandy (2007), p. 33 and Porras-Ramírez (2012), p. 125.

  29. 29.

    Mangiameli (2009), p. 491; von Bogdandy (2010), p. 50; von Komorowski (2010), p. 176 and p. 1170.

  30. 30.

    See Ruffert, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 10 EUV para 7; Nettesheim, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 10 EUV para 8.

  31. 31.

    Weiler et al. (1995), p. 18; von Bogdandy (2005), p. 445; Kirchhof (2010), p. 735; López-Castillo (2008), p. 47.

  32. 32.

    We must also wonder what does that accountability mean when ministers from a particular MS are outvoted by colleagues, as happens frequently? Then, as Bogdanor (2007), p. 6, remarks, “the idea of accountability to national Parliaments may have had some force”. Consequently, “a minister cannot be made accountable to his or her national Parliament for a decision that has been taken by others”.

  33. 33.

    Grimm (1995), p. 282.

  34. 34.

    Mancini (1998), p. 39.

  35. 35.

    Chryssochoou (2003), p. 366.

  36. 36.

    Harlow (2002), p. 168.

  37. 37.

    Bredt (2001), p. 35, 37.

  38. 38.

    Weiler (1995), p. 111; Weiler (2003), p. 18.

  39. 39.

    Kirchhof (1999), p. 230; Ziller (2008), p. 167.

  40. 40.

    Pernice (1999), p. 703.

  41. 41.

    Kirchhof (2010), p. 743.

  42. 42.

    Díez-Picazo (2009), p. 102.

  43. 43.

    See German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993)—Treaty of Maastricht and 2 BvE 2/08, 30/06/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009)—Treaty of Lisbon; French Constitutional Council, Decision N° 2007-560 DC (Judgment of 20 December 2007)—Treaty of Lisbon; Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision Ref. No. K 32/09 (Judgment of 24 November 2010)—Treaty of Lisbon, see Vecchio (2012), p. 54.

  44. 44.

    Friedrich (1968), p. 24; Burgess (2000), p. 55.

  45. 45.

    Case 70/88, Parliament v Council (ECJ 4 October 1991) and in this sense Jacobs (2004), p. 310. As a recent critical review, Conway (2011), p. 304.

  46. 46.

    Ponzano (2007), p. 441.

  47. 47.

    McIlwain (1991), p. 101.

  48. 48.

    Vile (1967), p. 171; García Pelayo (1991), p. 2931; Matteucci (1998), p. 151.

  49. 49.

    Lenaerts (1991), p. 11.

  50. 50.

    Kirchhof (2010), p. 232; Dann (2010), p. 243.

  51. 51.

    Ziller (2007), p. 875.

  52. 52.

    On the importance of the White Paper on European Governance in 2001, as an inspiration to these modifications, see Dehousse (2002), p. 207.

  53. 53.

    Case 70/88, Parliament v Council (ECJ 4 October 1991).

  54. 54.

    Jacqué (2004), p. 383 and Conway (2011), p. 319.

  55. 55.

    Balaguer (2007), p. 72.

  56. 56.

    Ridola (2010), p. 330.

  57. 57.

    Auel and Benz (2007), p. 55.

  58. 58.

    Protocol No. 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union and Protocol No. 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.

  59. 59.

    Report A6-0133/2009, “on the Development of the Relations between the European Parliament and National Parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon”, Committee of Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament.

  60. 60.

    Cooper (2006), p. 281.

  61. 61.

    De Witte et al. (2010), p. 20.

  62. 62.

    Mangiameli (2011), p. 113.

  63. 63.

    Dann (2010), p. 260.

  64. 64.

    Pernice (2003), p. 181.

  65. 65.

    According to Art. 295 TFEU, the remarkable inter-institutional agreements that balance the relationship between the EP, the Commission and the Council strengthen the federal dynamic, complementing the regulation of the Treaties.

  66. 66.

    Asking for a more legitimate structure of economic governance for the “Eurozone”, see Bogdanor (2007), p. 6.

  67. 67.

    Habermas (2012), p. 39.

  68. 68.

    von Bogdandy (2010), p. 51.

  69. 69.

    Micossi (2008), p. 1.

  70. 70.

    See Regulation (EU) No. 211/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 February 2011, on the citizens’ initiative, O.J. L 65/1 (2011). In this sense, in relation to the growing importance reached by the incorporation of several elements of “participatory democracy” through the constitutional reforms made in Switzerland and in the German Länder, defending their incorporation in the EU Treaties, see Häberle (2006), p. 612.

  71. 71.

    Eriksen and Fossum (2000), passim; Ridola (2010), p. 307.

  72. 72.

    COM(2001) 428 final, O.J. C 287 (2001).

  73. 73.

    Closa (2003), p. 445.

  74. 74.

    Eriksen (2001), p. 34, and a more favourable commentary in Dehousse (2002), p. 207.

  75. 75.

    Among others, see the commentaries by Kluth (Art. 39, 40, 43–46 GrCh), Ruffert (Art. 41 GrCh) and Wegener (Art. 42 GrCh), in Calliess and Ruffert (2011).

  76. 76.

    Closa (2007), p. 1037; see also EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (2006), p. 125.

  77. 77.

    Habermas (1999), p. 132.

  78. 78.

    Micossi (2008), p. 7.

  79. 79.

    Bogdanor (2007), p. 19.

  80. 80.

    Menéndez (2009), p. 277.

  81. 81.

    Art. 23 of the German Constitution; Art. 114, 118 and 120 of the Italian Constitution.

  82. 82.

    Häberle (1994), p. 242.

  83. 83.

    Pernice (1999), p. 113 and more recently see Pernice (2009), p. 25.

  84. 84.

    Ridola (2001), p. 194.

  85. 85.

    “Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, shall lay down the regulations governing political parties at European level and in particular the rules regarding their funding” (Art. 191 EC, originally Art. 138 A EC).

  86. 86.

    Jansen (2001), p. 7.

  87. 87.

    See, for an initial overview, Ruffert, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 12 GrCh.

  88. 88.

    Art. 11.2 ECHR: “No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention for disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protections of the rights and freedoms of the others, this article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, or the police or the administration of the state. Nevertheless, this provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.”

  89. 89.

    Regulation (EC) No. 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding, O.J. L 297/1 (2003), amended by Regulation (EC) No.1524/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2007, O.J. L 343/5 (2007).

  90. 90.

    Art. 2 and 3 of Regulation (EC) No. 2004/2003.

  91. 91.

    Art. 4 to 12 of Regulation (EC) No. 2004/2003.

  92. 92.

    Donnelly and Jopp (2009), p. 23.

  93. 93.

    Jansen (2001), p. 7. See also Case C-486/01 P, Front National v Parliament (ECJ 29 June 2004); Bardi (2004), p. 17.

  94. 94.

    Cancio 2009, passim.

  95. 95.

    Jansen (2001), pp. 15, 17, 18.

  96. 96.

    Micossi (2008), p. 7.

  97. 97.

    Mosconi and Padoa-Schioppa (2009), p. 13.

  98. 98.

    Priestley (2011), passim.

  99. 99.

    Bonvicini et al. (2009), p. 59; Mangiameli (2011), p. 113.

Table of Cases

  • ECJ 05.02.1963, 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, ECR 1 [cit. in para 2]

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  • ECJ 15.07.1964, 6/64, Flaminio Costa v ENEL, ECR 585 [cit. in para 2, 3]

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  • ECJ 23.04.1986, 294/83, Parti Écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament, ECR 1339 [cit. in para 4]

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  • ECJ 04.10.1991, 70/88, Parliament v Council, ECR I-2041 [cit. in para 16, 21]

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  • ECJ 29.06.2004, C-486/01 P, Front National v Parliament, ECR I-6289 [cit. in para 44]

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  • ECJ 06.05.2008, C-133/06, Parliament v Council, ECR I-3189 [cit. in para 7]

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Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (2013). Article 10 [Representative Democracy]. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Treaty on European Union (TEU). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31706-4_11

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